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ABSTRACT 
About 130 miles northwest of Minneapolis, lies the 
farming community of Farwell, Minnesota (pop. 103). This 
is the case of Joe Sauter, a sheep farmer who in 1958 
filed a claim against the Atomic Energy Commission for 
loss of livestock, damage to trees, and personal injuries 
that he believed were the result of radioactive fallout. 
This case will detail the efforts of the AEC to cut short 
the claim of radiation injury by suppressing key 
radiological data which would have substantiated Sauter's 
claim and proved damaging to the AEC. 
Officials within the AEC knowingly and willfully made 
false statements and representations, not only to Sauter, 
but to the agricultural representatives who investigated 
the sheep deaths on Sauter's farm on behalf of the AEC. 
Later, Sen. Clinton Anderson (D-MN), chairman of the 
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and Sen. Hubert 
H. Humphrey, chairman of two subcommittees on disarmament 
and international health, both made specific requests to 
the AEC for radioactive hotspots in Minnesota and North 
Dakota. The AEC withheld the information learned on 
Sauter's farm in order to protect the broader interests of 
the AEC in producing nuclear warheads and promoting 
nuclear energy. 
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The dawn of the nuclear age can be seen as the product 
of three points on a triangle; 1) an idea that it was 
possible to build an atomic bomb; 2) a country rich enough 
to devote vast sums of money in turning that idea into a 
reality; and 3) the power to keep the idea secret while the 
bomb was being made. Fully explaining any one of these 
three points on the triangle that led to the successful 
explosion of the Trinity shot on July 16th, 1945 could be a 
book in itself. The first two points of the triangle are 
richly illustrated in the government's own official 
historical accounting of the times (see Hewlett and 
Anderson, Jr. : 1962). While much as been written on the 
first two points, little has been written on the systematic 
use of secrecy and coverup to influence the direction and 
momentum in the development of the American nuclear 
programs. There are several obvious reasons for this, the 
most obvious reason of course being the difficulty in 
gaining complete access to the necessary information, even 
thirty years after the fact. For instance, it was necessary 
to initiate and direct a Congressional investigation to 
obtain much of the material contained in this thesis. As 
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this thesis will point out, the full story is still being 
withheld. 
The heart of the thesis is a detailed case study of 
Joseph August Sauter, an obscure Minnesotan sheep farmer. 
The case will be presented in the historical context of the 
atomic fallout issue in the state of Minnesota. The study 
will focus on a socio-historical account of one man's 
struggle with the Atomic Energy Commission in gaining the 
truth about fallout with its possible damaging effects to 
both livestock and vegetation. The AEC was charged with the 
impossible duty of both protecting the health and safety of 
the American public against the deleterious effects 
resulting from nuclear weapons testing, as well as the 
creation, production and testing of new nuclear weapons for 
the US atomic arsenal. This thesis will demonstrate how 
Atomic Energy Commission officials broke specific laws in in 
order to protect their own organization. They failed not 
only in the area of protecting the health and safety of the 
American public, but committed transgressions against 
American citizens' basic rights of due process as guaranteed 
under the US constitution. 
It should be noted the subject at hand is an extremely 
difficult one to study without getting immersed in 
scientific and technical details, from the makeup of the 
bomb, to the process of a fissionable chain reaction, to the 
radiobiological effect of ionizing radiation as it 
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penetrates the human body. Since it is important to 
understand the scientific rudiments of the story, technical 
explanations will be given in lay terms. The study will 
demonstrate that high ranking officials of the Atomic Energy 
Commission, in their capacity as "scientific experts" made 
political decisions based on questionable scientific 
grounds, at best. 
I will begin with a very brief history of the 
development of the atomic bomb and the subsequent 
development of the Atomic Energy Commission. 
The Men Behind the Bomb 
The two men most credited with the idea that the bomb 
could be built were Leo Szilard a Hungarian born physicist 
and Albert Einstein. Szilard became convinced 1) that an 
atomic bomb could be built that would release tremendous 
amounts of energy and 2) that Hitler, who controlled the 
only known large uranium mine (located in Czechslovakia) was 
working on developing it. In 1939, he went to France and 
England with his ideas, but was scoffed at by the military 
officials. He then came to America and convinced Albert 
Einstein to write to President Roosevelt on his idea.1 
After a meeting with Einstein, Roosevelt appointed a 
secret advisory scientific committee to determine the 
1see Pringle and Spigelman (198 1) for a more 
comprehensive overview of this period. 
feasibility and funding of an atomic weapon program. In 
1942, the S-1 Committee so recommended in order to 
guarantee that Hitler would not be the only one to have an 
atomic bomb. In September, 1942, General Leslie Groves 
became director of the top secret bomb-building project 
code-named "Manhattan Engineer District" (MED). The best 
and brightest scientists in the field of physics, 
engineering, and radiobiology were lifted from their various 
fields and drawn together for the single greatest experiment 
of mankind. The prestige and challange that the project 
offered were unparalleled. The design and machining of the 
bomb began in ernest. MED was given a "blank check" for 
expenses. 
The Manhattan project would become the most expensive 
and the most secretly conducted government program in 
history. 
The Manhattan Project was the most expensive 
single program ever financed by public funds. The 
physicists' bill for working out the theories had been 
paid in modest sums of $100, 000 here and there, but the 
engineer's bill to construct the first atomic bomb came 
to more than $2 billion (Pringle and Spigelman, 198 1: 
16) • 
For men like General Leslie Groves, the director, the 
project had to succeed, or else they would be spending the 
rest of their lives explaining their failures. 
Despite massive operations in Oak Ridge (Tennessee), 
Chicago, Hanford (Washington), and Los Alamos (New Mexico), 
the thousands upon thousands of workers, scientists, 
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engineers, doctors, truck drivers were all sworn to secrecy 
as to their immediate occupational tasks, and most did not 
know their own ultimate role. Work was compartmentalized so 
that one group of people did not know what other people were 
doing. Massive redundancy between the different sites was a 
byproduct of the compartmentalization of knowledge. Some of 
the top physicists risked their security clearances in a 
visit to Oak Ridge by telling the Oak Ridge scientist that a 
particular experiment they were conducting was no good. The 
same experiment had been tried at Argonne and simply didn't 
work (personal interview with Allan Kline, March, 1986). 
In April, 1944, the allies became aware that the Reich 
had not come close to creating an atomic weapon but had 
merely begun the chain reaction process in a graphite pile 
reactor, a "first step" technically. But the momentum to 
complete building the bomb was great, spurred by the 
problems of how to win the war in the Pacific decisively and 
quickly. 
The first continental test of an atomic bomb, code­
named Trinity, was on July 16, 1945. The bomb was set on 
top of a 100 foot tower in the New Mexico desert called 
Jornado del Muerto (Journey of Death) and detonated •just 
before dawn. There was some debate that the oxygen in the 
Earth's atmosphere would ignite, but scientists set the odds 
at 3 in 1, 000 and decided to chance it. Wagers were made 
between the physicist on the explosive force of the bomb. 
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After the first explosion of a nuclear bomb J .  Robert 
Oppenheimer made the remark that has oft been quoted "I am 
become death, shaterer of worlds . "  Historical accounts of 
this event often color the event in sorrowful, somber tones . 
Personal interviews with two physicists on the team that 
developed the Nagasaki bomb painted a different picture to 
this author . One responded, 
Our first reaction was one of elation, 'it works, we 
did it!' Our second reaction was, the war is over . 
Simple as that . We were elated over both facts . The 
first thing that we did was go into town, get our 
haircut almost down to the scalp [hot particles from 
the blast had stuck in their hair] and go have a beer 
(interview with Allan Kline March, 1986) . 
The nuclear arms race between the USSR and the US 
began six hours after the Trinity shot on July 16, 1945, 
when, over the table at Potsdam, Truman decided not to tell 
Stalin of the Allies' atomic success . A coded message 
arrived from General Groves, informing him that the baby had 
been born and was larger than all previous estimates . What 
Truman did not know was that Stalin was kept apprised of 
every step of the development of the bomb by a Soviet spy on 
the Los Alamos team of physicists, Dr . Klaus Fuchs (Pilat, 
1952) . 
The campaign of secrecy worked extremely well with both 
the Japanese and American populace. The two bombs dropped on 
populated areas in Japan were chosen for their symbolic 
value so as to demorilize the enemy. People in Hiroshima 
did not even seek cover when the Enola Gay flew overhead. A 
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single B-29 plane, they thought it was simply a weather 
. 1 2 reconnaisance p ane. Americans were equally shocked, but 
they were elated that a long and painful war had come to an 
end. 
No less surprised by the revelation of the bomb was the 
United States Congress. It had never been officially 
informed of the Project. Even Vice President Truman had not 
been told of the project until Roosevelt was on his death 
bed. The bomb was dropped when Congress was in summer 
recess. Upon their return however, there was a flurry of 
activity on how to control the awesome force of the atom. 
Between September and December, 1945, no less than fifty 
bills were introduced by legislators on the control of the 
new nuclear weapons and power program. The central issue of 
contention was whether the military should continue control, 
or whether control should be turned over to the civilians. 
The issue was settled in a characteristically politically 
expedient compromise: the ultimate control of the new 
program would rest in the hands of civilians, while the 
military would oversee the production, development and 
testing of nuclear weapons ( Ball, 1986: 20) . 3 
2For a graphic, unforgettable account of the human 
destruction of the nuclear bomb, see Hersey (1946) . 
3For a more comprehensive look at struggle over 
civilian versus military control of the nuclear weapons and 
(Footnote Continued) 
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Immediately after war, the government went to great 
pains to control adverse information about radioactive 
"after effect" of the bomb. MacArthur imposed a ban on any 
Japanese newspaper articles dealing with reports of A-bomb 
damage, calling them "inflammable" and "needling." However, 
others found that "in the long run, the radiation from the 
bomb was more significant than the blast or the thermal 
effects" (Miller, 1986: pg 61). 
Many of the scientists at Los Alamos who were on the 
teams that developed the first atomic bombs returned to 
their positions at universities or went on to prestigious 
positions in industry. Though they could now tell their 
relatives, friends and colleagues that they had worked on 
the bomb, they could tell no one the specifics of the making 
of the bomb. The penalty for disclosure--up to life in 
prison. 
Some, embittered over their involvement in the project 
left the field of nuclear physics altogether. 
By August 1, 1946 Truman signed the McMahan bill, 
creating the Atomic Energy Commission law. Five civilian 
commissioners would make up the board of the AEC. The 
commissioners gave broad latitude to the field managers in 
the day to day operations of the directed operations offices 
(Footnote Continued) 
energy program, see the debate in Congress over the McMahan 
bill and the May-Johnson bill, in Smith (1965). 
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across the country. At the time of its inception, the 
combined operations of the AEC were larger than even those 
of General Motors. The chairman of the AEC, according to H. 
Peter Metzger was head of the "glamour agency" and was 
number four on the protocol list in DC. This entitled him to 
appear at state functions just after the Vice-President, the 
Secretary of State, and the Speaker of the House (Metzger, 
1972: 8 1) .4 
In 1946, two months before the AEC bill was signed into 
law, the military set up the first, publically announced 
nuclear weapons test in the Pacific Marshall islands. 
Code-named "Crossroads, " the test involved the detonation of 
two nuclear bombs, with 42, 000 servicemen watching from 
ships eight miles away. The tests created so much 
radioactivity that a third nuclear explosion was cancelled. 
According to Congressional records, the Radiation Safety 
Officer was threatened with a court martial for his stand 
that the third shot be cancelled due to the radiological 
"nightmare" created by the fallout.5 Nevertheless the 
42, 000 men at the test were told they received an insig­
nificant amount of radiation and were soon shipped home. 
4see also Ball (1986) , for a discussion of the 
development of the new agency and the management problems 
soon encountered because of the enormous size of the agency. 
5 See Bradley (1948) for an account of the Crossroads 
experiment. 
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The logistical difficulties of moving over 5, 000 miles 
precision equipment, with thousands of men and support 
material, led the military to find a site closer to home for 
"proof-testing" their newly designed nuclear bombs. In 
January, 1951, the AEC began testing of nuclear weapons at 
the Nevada Test Site. The above ground testing at Nevada 
would continue for over a dozen years. In all, over 110 
nuclear explosions were detonated in the twelve year period. 
More than a quarter million servicemen participated in the 
atmospheric nuclear weapons tests. Some viewed the tests 
from airplanes, others from trenches eight miles away. A 
few in volunteer programs were stationed as close as five 
hundred yards from ground zero. The explosive force of some 
of the nuclear shots were as little as 400 pounds (Titania 
10/30/58, in the Operation Hardtack II  series) others topped 
the scales at a walloping 74 kt (Hood 7/5/57 in Operation 
Plumbbob series) or over three times the explosive force of 
the bomb that decimated Hiroshima (Allen et al, vs USA, 
1984: Appendix C of the Memorandum Opinion) . 
An inevitable byproduct of the nuclear weapons test 
program was radioactive fallout. It was known from the days 
of Madame Curie (discoverer of Radium) that radiation caused 
injury to human cells and tissue. Radiation can affect a 
living human cell in one of three ways. In the case of 
gamma rays, the ionizing radiation may pass directly through 
a cell, causing no damage whatsoever. Or, the radiation may 
10 
pass through the cell, destroying everything in its path. 
In either of these two cases, no long term harm is done. 
The damage is done when the radiation passes through a cell 
and partially destroys the genetic code of the cell. The 
cell may lie dormant for a number of years. Then, for 
reasons that are still not clear, the cell will begin 
replicating at a fantastically rapid pace under the new 
genetically altered code. The altered cells are known as 
"cancer 11 • 6 
Scientists, legislators, and citizens in the 1950's 
were extremely concerned about fallout from the nuclear 
weapons test site in Nevada. Of the short lived isotopes, 
Iodine 131 was the most damaging. By mimicking stable 
iodine, the I-131 bombarded the thyroid and could later lead 
to thyroid cancer, or diseases and disabilities related to 
thyroid destruction.7 
The isotope that worried most people however, was 
strontium 90. Sr90 is chemically similar to calcium. The 
6For a more scientific explanation of radiation and the 
carcinogenic process, see the opening chapters of Gofman 
(1981) and Allen Vs USA, a Memorandum Opinion "II. 
Background: Basic Principles of radiation and Nuclear 
Physics, " 10-50; 98-129; and 318-406. 
7see Ball (1986) "Association Between Radiation 
Exposure from Nuclear Fallout and Cancer: the Medical 
Controversy, 1961-1985, " particularly references to the 
Knapp study (1963) and the Rallison study (1974) on 
radioactive iodine and cancer induction. 
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predicted pathway to humans was that fallout would settle on 
vegetation which grazing cows would then consume. Strontium 
90 would then concentrate 50-100 times above normal in the 
cows' milk. 8 The strontium 90 would again concentrate in 
the bones and teeth of children drinking the milk by factors 
of 50-100. With its relatively long biological half-life of 
28.3 years, and its tendency to deposit in the bones, 
Americans were extremely concerned that the weapons testing 
would lead to increases in bone related cancers such as 
leukemia and osteosarcoma.9 
Managing the fallout, both physically and politically 
was the most difficult obstacle in the carrying out of the 
nuclear weapons testing program by the Atomic Energy 
Commission. Max Weber (1946) warned of bureaucracy's 
natural tendency to centralize power for its own benefit. 
The response of the AEC to potential political conflict and 
redirection of its goals was the use of secrecy and 
811Above normal" is really a misnomer, since strontium 
90 does not occur naturally in nature; there is no "normal" 
or "natural background" level of strontium 90. 
9on the concern Minnesota scientists had over strontium 
in Minnesota wheat, see chapter four below; at the national, 
Congressional level, see the discussions of concern over 
strontium throughout the 1957 hearings on the "Nature of 
Radioactive Fallout and its Effect on Man" before the 
Special Subcommittee on Radiation of the JCAE May 27 through 
June 3, 1957, particularly 141-161. 
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classification of information as a means of self­
protection. Such control of knowledge is a form of power. 
As has been indicated by Edelman (1964) and Muller (1973) , 
government bureaucrats have the resources to reconstruct 
"reality" in their own interest through the suppression of 
information and the manipulation of politically charged 
symbols. 
I will return to this historical account in the 
concluding section, in which I will apply Lukes (1975) 
conception of power in an analysis of how the Atomic Energy 
Commission became one of the most powerful governmental 
institutions in American history. By rigidly controlling 
the flow of information and the production of knowledge on 
fallout, the AEC was able to persuade the public, Congress, 
and the Courts as to the safety of the nuclear weapons 
testing program despite, evidence to the contrary. As this 
thesis points out, however, intellectual dishonesty and 
political expediency often got in the way of the true facts 





"Special Cases: " Congressional Investigations 
The work for this thesis began over three years ago, 
when I discovered a unique set of files in the personal 
collection of Dr. Stafford Warren, MD., in the Radiological 
Archives of the University of Tennessee. Dr. Warren was the 
medical director for the Manhattan Division from 1943 
through 1945. In 1946, he turned down the position of 
director of the Division of Biology and Medicine for the 
Atomic Energy Commission, and instead opted for heading the 
Los Angeles Atomic Energy Project at the University of 
California, Los Angeles. From time to time, in the 1940's 
and S0's, Dr. Warren was called by the AEC to act as a 
medical consultant on cases where individuals claimed injury 
to radiation. 
The set of files that I discovered dealt with 
approximately 20 individuals: some atomic workers from the 
Manhattan Project days; some people downwind from nuclear 
tests who claimed injury from weapons fallout; others were 
servicemen who took part in the Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons 
Tests. Many of the people in the files exhibited classic 
symptoms of radiation injury. All the cases were denied 
diagnosis, treatment, or compensation for their radiation 
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injury. However, in some cases the radiological records 
documented overexposures, and/or individuals were 
surreptitiously studied as "research cases." Physical exams 
were set up by the Atomic Energy Commission, in their own 
words "Solely for Public relations." 
In some cases, individuals who claimed injury 
repeatedly requested the radiological information. After 
conferences, telexes, phone calls, and internal agency 
memos, one very meritorious claimant was told that the 
records he requested simply did not exist; if the records 
which he requested were collected at all, they were 
collected out of personal curiosity of the scientists 
involved, the records simply no longer existed. Yet the 
records to which the top level AEC officials referred to 
were found in the 250+ page AEC medical/legal dossier kept 
on this man. The chief medical consultant directing the 
investigation of the case, Dr. Stafford Warren, had copies 
of both the letter denying the existence of the records, and 
the non-existing records in his file. 
The policies and practices found in the files touched 
on the lives of the 250, 000 servicemen who were participants 
in the nuclear weapons tests from 1945-1962; the countless 
number of people exposed to radiation downwind from nuclear 
tests; and the 600, 000 people who have worked in nuclear 
weapons facilities across the country including the 120, 000 
people currently employed. There are over a thousand 
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lawsuits in today' s courts that have been brought by people 
alleging radiation injury from past government nuclear 
operations. Most cases are lost by the plaintiffs for lack 
of evidence. Radiation injuries, in most cases, leave no 
smoking guns. Radiation affects the human cellular 
structure in one of three ways. Two of the three ways are 
not harmful. The first way, is that a wave of gamma 
radiation, for example, may pass cleanly through a cell and 
not cause any cell disruption. The second way is that the 
cell may be completely destroyed by a burst of radiation, in 
which case, new cells are produced to replace the old one. 
The third way radiation disrupts the cell is by passing 
through and destroying pieces of the DNA structure. By 
doing so, it changes the code of the DNA. The cell might 
lie dormant for twenty years, then begin replicating itself 
with the altered DNA code. That altered code may result in 
any of a number of cancers. 
Unlike other diseases such as asbestosis, bysinossis 
which can be traced back to their origin, and sillicosis, 
radiation induced cancers are nearly impossible to prove. 
That is why complete, honest accounts of one's exposure to 
radiation are so important to literally thousands of people 
in today's society. 
After reviewing the hundreds of pages of documents in 
the set of Warren files, I concluded there was at least an 
unspoken policy to protect the interests of the Government 
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in radiation injury cases in the 1940' s and S0' s .  The 
1940' s and S0' s were a time of rapid development of both 
America' s nuclear weapons and nuclear energy programs . 
"Adverse publicity" as a result of these, and other 
documented cases of radiation injury coming under public 
scrutiny could have hindered the momentum of these two areas 
vital to the development of America' s national security . 
So, in the interests of broader American interests, certain 
government officials chose to subvert the rights and due 
process of American citizens by withholding crucial 
information . 
That is why the conclusion of every case in the files 
closed with words to the effect that there was "no 
connection between your condition and exposure to radiation" 
despite the fact that some of the cases had documented 
records showing over-exposure to radiation . 
In persuing my research, I later discovered the file of 
Joe Sauter which became the main focus of this study . His 
case is a classic example of governmental abuse in 
suppressing critical radiological information . 
I chose to do my master' s thesis on this subject 
because I thought it would be helpful not only to the 1100+ 
people with over 2 billion dollars of claims against the 
government for radiation injuries, but I thought it would be 
extremely important to have an accurate account of what 
happened during the formative years of both the American 
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nuclear weapons and power programs. I realized that getting 
more information than what existed in the original files I 
had found would be difficult to impossible. Going through 
the process of the Freedom of Information Act would be 
vitually useless, as the Privacy Act of 1974 forbade the 
government from releasing documents that contained 
information that would consitute invasions of privacy of 
American citizens. Needless to say, sensitive medical and 
legal records fall under the provisions of the Privacy Act. 
I wanted to get into the central repositories of the 
Department of Energy's predessor agency, the Atomic Energy 
Commission. If consultants to the AEC kept their files on 
radiation injury cases, surely the government would have 
them housed in their main repository in Washington, DC. 
The only governmental agency that could help me, I 
decided, was a Congressional committee or subcommittee 
assigned as a watchdog to the Department of Energy. On the 
recommendation of an executive director from one of the 
foundations that has funded my work in the past, I went to 
the Energy, Conservation and Power subcommittee. Before 
meeting with them, I had written, for their review, 
summaries on cases from the files that represented the 
government's treatment of a nuclear worker, an atomic 
veteran, and an individual claiming injury from fallout. 
On April 24, 1984, I met with Jeannine Hull and Allison 
Freeman of the Energy, Conservation and Power Subcommittee, 
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chaired by Representative Richard Ottinger (D-NY), of the 
House Energy and Commerce Committee. I invited Geoff Sea, 
health and stafety representative of the Oil, Chemical, and 
Atomic Workers Local 3-689, Piketon, Ohio, and Atty. Cooper 
Brown, general counsel of the Washington, DC, office of the 
National Association of Atomic Veterans. I asked them to 
speak on how the research affected the rights of nuclear 
workers and atomic veterans. 
I requested the assistance of the subcommittee in 
gaining access to the central files of the AEC, in order to 
not only document the cases (such as the Sauter case) which 
we already had, but to attempt and uncover any policy papers 
which justified or ordered the suppression of critical 
information from alleged radiation victims. The number one 
priority that I had set for working with the subcommitee was 
that no information would be released prematurely, otherwise 
DOE would be given a virtual "roadmap" on where to find 
similar incriminating documents and bury them even deeper in 
their respositories, if not destroy them altogether. The 
subcommittee staff agreed. 
The initial response of the subcommittee to my findings 
was overwhelming. Within an hour after our meeting, they 
drafted a letter to the DOE Secretary Donald Hodel, stating 
that a Congressional investigation was now underway on the 
entire medical/radiological record keeping system of the 
Atomic Energy Commission. They requested that I come to 
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Washington and lead a Congressional investigation on the 
matter, and they would lend me the needed subcommittee staff 
to do the job. I accepted. 
Three weeks later, I joined the subcommittee on an 
unpaid/temporary basis; I would lead the research effort 
into the AEC/DOE Division of Biology and Medicine (DBM) 
archives. DBM was the leading branch in the AEC responsible 
for evaluating, and subsequently suppressing the critical 
radiological and medical information from the public. The 
division within DOE that had assumed the responsibility of 
the AEC's Division of Biology and Medicine was the Office of 
Health, Environment and Research (OHER) . OHER was headed by 
Dr. Charles Eddington.1 
I met, along with two staffers from the subcommittee, 
with Dr. Eddington, his assistant Dr. Thiessen, and the 
head of records for OHER, Mr. Joe Diel. The meeting took 
place the last week of May, 1984, in the DOE complex in 
Germantown, MD. The complex, built during the the 1950's, 
1Dr. Eddington had been with the DOE and AEC for over 
two decades. He was involved in the 1960's human 
experiments in which prisoners from Washington and Oregon 
had their testicles irradiated, some up to 600 rads. The 
experiments were designed to simulate the effects of cosmic 
radiation that future NASA astronauts might incur from space 
flights. The only other place that experiments of this type 
were conducted on humans was in Nazi Germany in the early 
40's. Dr. Eddington had been involved in getting the 
experiments funded (ABC World Evening News Special by Karen 
Burns, November 19, 1984) . 
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originally housed the Atomic Energy Commission central 
offices. In the lobby, a scaled-down model of the Trinity 
bomb commemorates the development of the atomic bomb. 
For an hour, we discussed the record keeping policies 
of the AEC/ERDA/DOE. Each of the officials assured us that 
records were scrupulously kept on individuals working in the 
DOE facilities. All the while, the officials asked 
indirect, and finally directly, what exactly was it that we 
wanted? At the end of the hour, we answered with a 
question: "Where are the records of the Division of Biology 
and Medicine. " 
Each DOE official looked at the other, waiting for the 
other to respond. Finally, almost in unison they answered 
that they did not know where they were. This is despite the 
fact that three men had worked in the AEC, had risen from 
the ranks of the Division of Biology and Medicine since the 
1950's and 60's. They said they would research the matter 
and get back with us. Without telling them what we wanted, 
they had still gotten more information out of us than we had 
gotten out of them. 
The next day, I unwittingly broke Congressional 
"protocol" by setting up a meeting with the Chief Historian 
of the Department of Energy, Dr. Jack Holl. Congressional 
protocol is an unwritten code of ethics that is applied to 
Congressional investigations. When setting up the meeting 
with Dr. Holl, the correct procedure would have been to 
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first contact the Congressional Liaison office of DOE and 
have them not only set up the meeting, but have a person 
from their office attending the meeting. The liaison 
official would take notes of the conversation, often 
interjecting on behalf of the DOE official in fielding 
difficult questions. 
Being with the subcommittee less than week, I was not 
aware of the unwritten laws of Congressional protocol. Dr. 
Holl met with me and after a 30 minute chat told me the 
exact location of the files I was seeking. Dr. Holl is in 
the same office complex as Dr. Eddington, Thiessen, and 
Diel. 
According to Dr. Holl, one of the last acts of the 
Atomic Energy Commission was to appoint a custodian to the 
old AEC records. Holl is the successor to the original 
custodian of the files. When asked of the location of the 
DBM files, Dr. Holl said they were stored in 17 different 
vaults and secured areas within the DOE complex in 
Gernmantown. In addition to the 17 areas, records were kept 
in the DOE Records Center, also in the Germantown complex. 
The files in the Records Center were in transition, being 
sent from the central DOE archives to one of the regional 
Federal Archive Records Centers. Within each Division in the 
AEC, there was a custodian of the records who was 
responsible for keeping an index of the files which went 
from the Records Center to the regional Federal Archive 
22 
Repositories. Given the length of time which Eddington, 
Thessen and Diel had been with the DOE/AEC and given the 
fact that Diel was the head of records for that Division 
which was responsibile for the DBM files, it was hard to 
believe they did not know of the location of their own 
files, only three floors away from their own offices. 
The subcommittee notified Dr. Eddington and the. DOE 
Congressional Affairs office that we had located the files. 
DOE's response was surprising. I did not expect DOE to 
contratulate me for so quickly locating the fiels, but 
neither did I expect a DOE attorney to call up the staff 
director of the Energy Conservation and Power subcommittee 
and admonish him for letting his staff people contract DOE 
personnel without first going through the DOE Congressional 
Affairs office. The subcommittee informed the DOE attorney 
that I was new on the staff and would not do it again. 
Though the subcommittee requested immediate access to 
the files, the DOE denied access for over two weeks. On June 
8, 1984,  I drew up a procedure paper for reviewing the files 
once DOE had given us access to them. Conflict was 
beginning to rise between me, DOE and the subcommittee. I 
believed that DOE was not justified in delaying the 
subcommittee access to 25-38 year-old files; I believed that 
the subcommittee was not pushing hard enough to gain quicker 
access to the files. I felt that if the AEC had in the past 
systematically suppressed information which would prove 
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damaging to the agency, then the DOE would be very hesitant 
to come forward with that information, even though over 
twenty years had elapsed. 
In the procedure paper, I outlined the "best of all 
possible worlds" method that the subcommittee should have 
used when reviewing the files: first, a congressional 
investigator security-cleared for reviewing classified 
documents should go over the papers--a close accounting 
should be taken of the number of pages in the file folders 
so as to make it harder for the DOE to lift material from 
the files; second, the subcommittee staff should have the 
right to copy the material rather than have a DOE employee 
copy it; third, the subcommittee should have the right to 
bring the material directly from the DOE secured vaults to 
the reviewing rooms to insure that DOE did not take material 
out of the files. 
I felt that these procedures, if used, would increase 
our chances of obtaining unaltered files, but I told the 
subcommittee there was a good chance the files were already 
in the process of being reviewed and gutted by the DOE. I 
was told by the subcommittee that DOE had never stalled more 
in providing the subcommittee with records this old, and 
that there was nothing the subcommittee could do but wait. 
I called up Rep. Ottinger's personal secretary to set up a 
meeting with him, in order 1) to find out if he was even 
aware this investigation was underway; and 2) to confirm 
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that the subcommittee was doing all it possibly could in 
gaining immediate access to the files . However, I was 
informed by Ottinger' s secretary that since I was now part 
of the subcommittee staff I would have to go through the 
staff director of the subcommittee to have an appointment 
made. I immediately requested a meeting to be set up with 
Ottinger through the staff director, but he refused to set 
up the meeting. I was openly critical of the way the 
investigation was being handled, and the staff director 
seemed not to want this dissension to reach Rep. Ottinger. 
On June 12, 1984, the subcommittee was given access to 
the AEC' s Divison of Biology and Medicine files. It was 
clear that DOE had already gone through the files and taken 
out incriminating information. The subcommittee has both 
direct and indirect proof of this. The physical appearance 
of the folders was the first indication the files might not 
be complete. Folders which were over 30 years old had what 
appeared to be brand new metal prong brief fassteners 
attaching the papers to the folders. Indentations in some of 
the file folders told of an earlier time in which the 
folders held many more papers than the single page which 
they now held. 
Examples of questionable files included: A file 
labeled ''Medicine Health and Safety Medical Services, Case 
Histories'' contained in it a single page with the partial 
details of a single case history of a worker suffering from 
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exposure to beryllium (Box 3354, File 20). Yet, in another 
file labeled "Treatment and Illness, " this research found 
references to 21 other beryllium cases in AEC or AEC 
contracted facilities for the same time period as that 
covered in the "Case Histories" file ; another file entitled 
"Medicine Health and Safety Claims--1953" held only a single 
claim. 
Material was also improperly filed. A man claiming he 
was exposed to radioactive fallout while prospecting for 
uranium in 1955 was found in the file folder "Embalming and 
Autopsy Procedures--1953." 
Despite the brand new brief fasteners; despite the 
files labeled "Case Histories" and "Claims" each containing 
only a single page of paper ; despite the file folders with 
creases in the sides which obviously meant the files 
previously held much more--despite all this, the assistant 
to the director of the DOE History Division, Mr. Prentice 
Dean, told me that the files had not been altered in any way 
since they had come into the historian's possession (Memo, 
Honicker to Hull, 6/20/84) . 
I informed the subcommittee in detailed memos of the 
evidence strongly suggesting the files had been altered. The 
subcommittee staff responded that there was no way we could 
"prove" the files had been altered as a result of the 
congressional investigation, short of a DOE "whistleblower" 
coming forward and admitting that he or she had seen files 
26 
being gutted. At the end of the two weeks spent in the 
files (and with no replacement help forthcoming from the 
subcommittee staff after my helper had left to work on the 
Mondale campaign), I requested that my wife, Jackie Kittrell 
(a lawyer who is also a health and safety technical advisor 
to the Atomic Trades Labor Council in Oak Ridge) be brought 
into the research, again on a voluntary basis, to help 
systematically and thoroughly document the inconsistencies 
in the altered files. The subcommittee rejected the request 
out of hand, citing the fact that two people from the same 
non-profit organization (the Radiation Research Project), 
who were also married, would be viewed as nepotism and would 
cast a bad light on the image of the subcommittee. The 
subcommittee offered to look around DC for help, or to have 
an intern work on the project, but no one with the proper 
qualifications was found. I questioned their reason of 
nepotism as the basis for refusing to bring Ms Kittrell into 
the investigation, since nepotism, by the very definition of 
the word, implies a paying job; the subcommittee staff, in 
effect, turned down free, experienced and qualified help to 
work on the investigation, when no other help was to be 
found. My confidence in the subcommittee's direction of the 
project was quickly eroding. 
At the end of June, 1984, I requested an index of the 
Division of Biology and Medicine files from Dr. Eddington's 
office, files which were stored at the Federal Artchive 
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Center in Suitland, Maryland. Among the 200+ pages of index 
file names were five pages of "Special Cases" listings. 
Over 80 "special cases" were listed under the title "ASEV 
Central files for 1945-1962" (Radiation Exposure Files) . 
Nearly half the cases were classified, confidential, 
restricted, or secret. Other cases were marked "Official 
Use Only, " which was not a security classification, but 
which nevertheless restricted public access. Some of the 
cases listed in the index were the same as the original 
files that launched the investigation. I knew we had found 
what we were looking for. 
Given the questionable integrity of the files which the 
DOE had already provided to the subcommittee, I thought it 
imperative to develop a different strategy whereby the files 
could be immediately seized, rather than giving the DOE 
ample time to edit out the sensitive papers. 
I was informed, however, by my subcommittee supervisor, 
Jeanine Hull, that there was no other way to obtain the 
files rather than filing a request with the DOE and giving 
them a reasonable time to provide the files to the 
subcommittee. 
To determine what a "reasonable time" was, I called the 
Suitland repository and asked how soon the records would be 
accessible to the subcommittee. Mr. Jack Saunders in the 
Records Certer informed me that if the material had an 
accession number and the subcommittee had the approval of 
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the DOE division that "owned" the files, then the files 
would be available at the repository for review the 
following day. I immediately called the DOE Congressional 
Affairs Liaison, Mr. Harold Kneeland, and asked him how long 
it would take to get the files once the request was made. 
He replied that it would take no more than a few days. 
On July 10, 1984, I drafted a request on official 
subcommittee stationary, requesting the specific files and 
also requesting specifically that the files not be altered, 
removed, or destroyed. The letter was to be signed by the 
Chairman of the subcommittee. I gave the draft letter to 
his subcommittee supervisor, Jeanine Hull. Ms Hull ordered 
me to redraft the letter, leaving out the paragraph which 
requested DOE not to alter the files. Her explanation was 
that she did not want to offend the Congressional Affairs 
Liaison person. She further instructed me to: 1) direct the 
memo, not to Secretary of Energy Donald Hodel, but to the 
Congressional Affairs Liaison Harold Kneeland ; 2) not to 
have the memo come from the chairman of the subcommittee, 
Rep. Ottinger, but from me and her ; and 3) not to have the 
memo go over on official Energy, Conservation and Power 
Subcommittee stationary, but on a plain sheet of paper. Her 
reasoning was by doing it "informally" through the 
congressional affairs person "that things would get done 
quicker" than sending over a formal request. 
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Rather than providing the files to the subcommittee in 
one or two days, DOE took ten days to give the subcommittee 
access to four boxes of files which were over twenty years 
old and which were within arm's reach of the Suitland 
archive records official. When I expressed frustration with 
DOE congressional affairs staffperson Harold Kneeland at 
taking so long in providing these files to the subcommittee, 
he responded that his reviewers worked hard to get the files 
reviewed and to the subcomittee in ten days, and that he did 
not know it was an urgent matter. He said he would have 
gotten the material to us sooner had we made an "official" 
request, rather than making the "unofficial" request to him 
on plain stationary. 
Again, unfortunately, it was the same story as with the 
files which we had already reviewed from the DOE archives in 
Germantown. It was even harder to justify why twenty- to 
forty-year old files would have brand new metal prong 
fasteners attaching the files to the folders unless it was 
done in an attempt to hide the discrepancy in the bend of 
the older fasteners if a large amount of papers had been 
removed. Unlike the other files reviewed earlier, these 
four boxes did not contain any box or job classification 
numbers which a researcher would normally need to identify 
and call up the boxes for research purposes. For these 
reasons, this research believes the DOE gutted the files 
provided to the Energy Conservation and Power subcommmittee 
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as a direct response to the subcommittee investigation of 
1984. 
Although DOE provided the subcommittee with the DBM 
files marked "Minnesota Fallout Data--1957-1959, " the Sauter 
file was not to be found. This is despite the fact that the 
primary AEC official in charge of coordinating the 
investigation, suppressing the damaging information, and 
denying the claim, was the chief of the Nuclear Weapons Test 
Effects Branch which was part of the Divison of Biology and 
Medicine. Much of the information in the second chapter was 
gathered through the congressional investigation. As such, 
it can be seen as a reflection of the fallout controversy 
from a filtered point of view. The first chapter is more a 
reflection of what really happened, how scientists in 
government stepped out of their roles as scientists and made 
highly charged political, non-scientific decisions. 
The subcommittee requested that I file a detailed 
report of the investigation, listing specific files and 
boxes in other repositories that had not been reviewed. A 
letter would then be sent to DOE by the subcommittee 
requesting that they neither remove, alter, or destroy the 
additional files listed. 
Given both the DOE and subcommittee's track record over 
the summer in gaining access to these files, I refused at 
first to file a report, on the basis that writing up any 
part of the project would only provide the DOE with a better 
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roadmap in which to seek out and bury more incriminating 
information. 
After many insistent phone calls from the subcommittee 
staffer Jeanine Hull, I agreed on one condition. I asked 
that she have the chairman of the Subcommittee (Rep. 
Ottinger) either write or call an individual whom I wanted 
to testify in the hearings. I would not write a 
Congressional report without his permission. His story 
would be a crucial part of the report. Ms Hull agreed to my 
request, and said she would try and get the man's permission 
to use his story and participate in the hearings. 
I later found out (after the man had again refused 
permission to let me use his story for the Congressional 
report) that Ms Hull from the subcommittee made no effort to 
contract the man: she had not even read the 76 page report 
documenting his case which I presented to her in April at 
our first meeting. 
Given that she had not read the documented reports I 
had written earlier, it is clear to see the reason for her 
complete lack of understanding as to the thrust of the 
investigation. 
Despite DOE's being mandated by law to comply with the 
subcommittee's requests for information, documents, records 
and files, and despite the subcommittee's reputation as 
being one of the premier watchdogs of the DOE, the Energy, 
Power and Conservation subcommittee failed in its attempt to 
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gather the "truth and nothing but the truth" from the DOE in 
their investigation. 
Any number of reasons can be given for their failure: a 
lack of understanding on the part of the subcommittee staff 
as to the scope and direction of the investigation; an 
ever-present protocol that allows for the government agency 
being investigated to have plenty of advance notice so as to 
cover their tracks; a lack of resources on the subcommittee 
side with which to attack the problem, and an abundance of 
resources on the DOE side to obfuscate the issue. 
Whatever the reason, a common theme can be drawn from 
the experiences of the investigation, to Sauter's attempt to 
gain the truth about fallout on his farm, to the state of 
Minnesota's attempt to gather information from the AEC about 
radioactive hot spots in Minnesota. When a governmental 
agency is unaccountable to the people for its actions, no 
amount of letter writing from constituents, meetings with 
state and congressional representatives, speeches, articles 
in newspapers, or Congressional investigations is going to 
make the agency accountable for its actions. 
Finally, it should be noted that several questions in 
the first chapter remain unanswered. The man who made the 
claim of injury from radioactive fallout, Joseph August 
Sauter died in 1971, 13 years before I learned about the 
case. His sole surviving daughter, Mary Lou Sauter Young, 
was not living with him in the late 1950's, the time the 
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claim was made. His closest nephews, Joe and Willie Sauter, 
only vaguely remembered the details of the claim, and as 
they lived more than 50 miles away in Morris, Minnesota, it 
is understandable their recollections are hazy at best. 
As such, the reconstruction of this case is made 
primarily from documents obtained during the Congressional 
investigation and subsequent Freedom of Information Act 
requests from Mary Lou Young. Additional information was 
obtained in personal interviews with more than 20 people who 
knew Sauter or were personally involved in fallout 
controversy in the 1950 ' s. I am indebted to Mary Lou, Joe 
and William Sauter for their invaluable help and in sharing 
their personal memories of Joseph Sauter with me. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE CASE OF JOE SAUTER 
On April 28, 1900, Joseph August Sauter was born in 
Morris, Minnesota. He was the son the German immigrants, 
Joe Sauter and Caroline Hunecke. He was born into a large 
farm family. He was one of 9 children; two died in their 
youth, another child was adopted. Joe worked on his 
father's farm from the time he could walk until he was 16. 
To most kids of our generation, 16 marks the turning point 
in their lives; the freedom of mobility that comes after 
passing the test for a driver's license. To Joe, it marked 
the time when he felt duty-bound to enlist in the U.S. 
Army, Infantry Division. 
A year after signing up, Joe sent his closest sister, 
Barbara a picture postcard of himself and his army "buddy." 
The postcard picture was taken in France where he was 
mustard gassed by German troops. He was not a tall man, but 
he was broad across the chest, square shouldered. He looked 
into the camera with bright brown eyes. His face was long, 
but full. At 17, he looked proud to have served in the last 
months of World War I, even if he did have to lie about his 
age to get into the Army. 
Joe came back from Europe in 1918 and returned to the 
family farm in Morris, a small farming community in western 
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central Minnesota. Joe asked his father to let him have one 
of the farm' s outbuildings to live in. It was hardly more 
than a one-room tar paper shcack. Its only heat was a coal 
furnace that Joe kept stoked by shovelling in coal through 
the front window of the house. 
Joe ' s  nephews William and "little Joe" Sauter of 
Morris, Minnesota, both saw their uncle as an independent, 
self-contained man. "He didn't like to see you coming, " 
Willie said. He was particular about the way his farm was 
run and the way his animals were treated. He was a man not 
to be crossed. Willie worked the farm the year before Joe 
died in 197 1. Though Joe paid him well, Willie knew he was 
extremely demanding about how jobs were to be done on the 
farm. One day Willie plowed an extra field for Joe while he 
was in town for supplies. Joe returned, and instead of 
thanking Willie, cussed him out for plowing the field wrong. 
Willie had plowed the field from north to south instead of 
east to west. To most farmers that would not make much of a 
difference, but to Joe it did. Willie noted, however, even 
though Joe had his notions of how even the smallest job was 
to be done, there was almost always a pretty good reason 
behind doing the job that particular way. And if you did a 
job wrong, Joe never held back from telling you the mistakes 
you had made. 
Despite the care and attention he took in running the 
farm, or because of it, Joe's small log farmhouse with rough 
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clapboard siding was a shambles on the inside. There was not 
much more than a large room with only an old woodstove that 
was used for heating and cooking (although Joe was never a 
very good cook), an ancient Fridgedaire refridgerator with 
the electric motor housed in the round casing above the 
cooler, a wooden table, a few rickety chairs, magazines, 
newspapers and books stacked in the corners around the room. 
Off to the sides were two sleeping areas, one used by Joe, 
and the other by Joe's closest relative and friend, his 
older sister Barbara Sauter. 
Barbara taught school in Morris, Minnesota. She later 
became superintendent for county schools in Morris. She made 
the fifty mile trip from Morris to Farwell often to visit 
her brother. She cooked for Joe, straightened his house and 
cleaned his clothes. He also helped satisfy Joe's thirst 
for knowledge. Willie was amazed how Joe was always into 
something, be it taking correspondence courses in diesel 
mechanics, studying animal husbandry, checking for parasites 
in his animals' feces with a microscope to studying the 
lives of the mid-western Indians. Barbara brought Joe 
books, magazines, and kept him up to date on current affairs 
by bringing the major Minnesota newspapers with her on her 
trips to his farm. 
Most of Joe's life was spent outdoors. When he wasn't 
taking care of the farmwork, Joe was criss-crossing his 
forests and pastures, checking his animal traps for mink, 
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fox and skunks. He would skin them and hang the pelts up in 
the barn until furriers came from the east to buy them. He 
had more ways to hunt than his newphews had ever seen. The 
few times that Willie had seen Joe so talkative was when he 
described tracking, hunting and trapping animals. Willie 
said Joe was the only man he had seen that could skin a 
skunk and come away not smelling a bit. Joe invented traps 
that guaranteed an animal would stay caught rather than 
chewing its leg off and escaping into the woods for a long, 
painful death. 
In the winter of 1926 Joe married his hometown girl, 
Margaret Rose Hoover. She was several years younger than 
Joe and was impressed by his worldly ways, his directness, 
and his affections. Before the marriage ended, Joe sired 
two childred, Mary Lou and John. 
Joe's independence, love of the outdoors and his 
inattention to his domestic life led to a short-lived 
marriage. When his daughter Mary Lou was only 2 years old, 
and her young brother only a todler, Rose left Joe to live 
alternately with her parents or her cousins in Alexandria, 
Minnesota. The children were told that Joe was dead and did 
not even know of his existence until his actual death in 
1971. After the divorce, Joe continued to work his father's 
farm, and with Barbara's help, eventually bought the family 
farm. 
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In the mid- 1930s, Joe began studying mineralogy. With 
the fever of gold in his veins, and his sister's geology 
books in the trunk, Joe headed out to California to 
prospect. He mined his own shaft for a few years, then, 
longing for Minnesota, returned to the family farm. When he 
left, Joe put all his mining tools deep in the tunnel and 
blew the entrance closed with dynamite. 
He later returned to California in the winter of 1947 
to reclaim his mine, but he had disguised the entrance so 
well, and the terrain had changed so much in his absence, 
that he could not find it. In the spring of 1948 he 
returned once again to Minnesota. 
Joe decided to sell the 240-acre family farm in Morris 
and look for a farm with plenty of water, forests and 
pasture, so that, at the age of 50, he could "retire." He 
wanted to do nothing but fish, hunt and raise sheep. 
Joe found a beautiful piece of land 26 miles northeast 
of Morris. The 124-acre farm was located in the Holmes City 
township, 2 miles north of the town of Farwell (population 
50). The farm had more woodland and rolling hills than 
pastureland. The largest pastures, about 30 acres were 
interspersed among the woods of ash, white oak, elm, 
boxelders and other hardwoods. 
The farm bordered two lakes called Freeborn and Little 
Freeborn. Freeborn was a half mile wide and a mile and half 
long. Freeborn Lake is a fisherman's dream and a popular 
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swimming spot for many kids who lived in the surrounding 
community. 
Joe didn't retire once he bought the Farwell farm. He 
made his living raising sheep. He started raising sheep in 
1938 on the family farm in Morris. 
"He was well known in those parts for his sheep, " his 
nephew Willie said. "He had the most beautiful sheep you 
could lay your eyes on. He took care of those sheep and 
watched over them as if they were his own children." 
Joe was fiercely protective of his livestock and did 
not tolerate any trespassers on his land that might threaten 
his animals. The time and place where tracks of dogs or 
hunters were found were carefully jotted down on a pocket 
notebook that Joe carried withhim in his overalls on his 
walks across his land. 
Joe was not always popular with his neighbors in the 
Farwell area. He angered them by threatening to shoot their 
dogs if they came onto his land. Even domestic dogs will 
kill sheep if they run in packs. Joe was known for meeting 
trespassing hunters with his old double-barrel Winchester 
shotgun. He wouldn't have any of his traps disturbed or his 
sheep shot by mistake. 
One spring, the rains came especially hard. That 
summer the lake continually back-filled onto one of Joe ' s  
best bottomland pastures. He told his neighbors to let the 
water out of the earthen dam. But, for one reason or 
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another the neighbors never got around to letting the water 
out . So, one Sunday morning, while all the neighbors were a 
half mile down the road in the Oscar Lake Lutheran Church, 
Joe took a crate of dynamite out to the dam and blew a hole 
in it . The water ceased flooding his land, and, as his 
nephew Willie dryly remarked, "I imagine they all stood up 
that Sunday morning . "  
But there was one tresspasser that Sauter was helpless 
in stopping . This tresspasser could neither be heard, seen, 
felt, nor tracked by ordinary human means . 
On June 18th, 1957 at 4:45 a . m .  (Pacific Standard Time) 
a 10-kiloton bomb was exploded in the Nevada desert as part 
of the Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Test series codenamed 
"Operation Plurnbbob . "  The bomb was suspended at 500 feet 
above the ground in a balloon when it was detonated . The 
radiation from the bomb, codenamed "Wilson", was caught in 
the trophospheric winds of the atmosphere and were carried 
rapidly away towards the north and the east . Predicted 
traj ectory maps, weather maps tracking the path of the 
fallout, would later show one layer of the fallout path 
going across the Dakotas and ending in the vicinity of Joe 
Sauter ' s  farm four days later . Sauter ' s  farm was only a 
county away from the North Dakota/South Dakota border . 
It ' s  very likely the reason the traj ectory map (Figure 
1) shows the path of the fallout cloud ending in the 
vicinity of Sauter ' s  farm on the 22nd is that there was a 
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large rainstorm on that day, 1.22 inches according to U.S. 
Climatological Data for the Alexandria area, which is  less 
than 10 miles from Sauter's farm. About 90% of the fallout 
drops out of the atmosphere as a result of rain. 
DATES IMOICATE 0900 Ii C.T. POSITIOII 
WIIIN 1 145 ll.C.T. -. 18, 1957 
Figure 1 .  Trajectory Map 
Less than a week later, on June 28th, Sauter noticed an 
unexplained rust or copper discoloration on his clover. 
According to Sauter in his claim filed with the AEC, the 
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clover developed holes and was "burned" so that it didn't 
develop seed, making it nearly worthless to feed the sheep. 
On September 1, 1957, Joe's sheep began to die. The 
first dead sheep were found under a grove of white oak 
trees. The sheep had fed heavily on the white oak leaves 
after they had mysteriously fallen off--well before the 
first frost. Sauter called his nephew (and namesake) Joe 
Sauter, who lived about 50 miles away, to come and look at 
the dying sheep and his "petrified trees. " The nephew 
remarked (when interviewed about the incident in 1984) that 
he had never seen anything like what happened to those 
trees. "It was just like the fall come too early, like an 
early frost coming. "  The leaves withered; most fell off, 
while some hung on the trees long after they should have 
fallen. 
Sauter described the sheep suffering a stiffness in 
their joints which led to complete paralysis before their 
deaths. Those sheep that did not die immediately developed 
scours (a severe diarrhea) and what Sauter termed "shrinkage 
of the flesh. " With winter and the birthing time of the 
sheep, Joe saw no end of the sheep dying. Sheep were 
stillborn, or severely premature, and few of the birthing 
survived. 
Within a year he had lost 40% of his herd, over 90 
sheep. 
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Sauter thought the deaths might be connected to the 
"burned" clover . He bought hay from other farmers to 
replace his own . After that, the sheep seemed to improve . 
Though barely high school educated, Sauter was a 
perceptive man . He closely read the Minnesota papers that 
summer . He may have read that Operation Plumbbob in 1957 
exploded the most and largest nuclear weapons of any test 
series to date . He may have read reports by Minnesota 
scientists revealing that predominant wind patterns brought 
the radioactive clouds over Minnesota . Leading scientists 
at the University of Minnesota were concerned about the 
long-term effect of fallout . By this time Sauter had raised 
sheep for nearly 20 years . He knew of no other explanation 
for the death of his sheep . By elimination, Sauter deduced 
fallout to be the cause . 
Believing that radiation on the vegetation had killed 
his sheep, Joe took steps to remove the "poison, " as he 
called it, from his land . On April 21, 1958, Sauter 
received burns to his hands and eyes after handling 
"limbage" grown on his property . He thought it was caused 
by nuclear fallout on his plants . After this experience, 
Joe began the long, slow process of seeking restitution for 
the damages to his farm that he believed were caused by the 
negligent actions of the Atomic Energy Commission . 
Sauter wrote Sen . Hubert Humphrey to seek help in 
filing a claim against the AEC for radiation inj ury to his 
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sheep and trees. Sen. Humphrey contacted the Minneapolis 
Star. They ran a story on Sauter on April 14, 1958 (Figure 
2 )  • 
Figure 2 .  Newspaper Article on Sauter 
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On April 8, 1958, Sen. Humphrey wrote Lewis Strauss, 
Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, that he had 
received a letter from Sauter requesting information on how 
to go about filing a claim of damage due to radiation from 
fallout. Humphrey wrote: 
Mr. Sauter complained of ' petrified trees •.. and 
40% loss on 224 lambs ... in the fall of 1957. 
[ Occurences of ] dumb birth ... loss of parental 
instinct, and severity in reduction of masculine 
sex ... 40 birthed ... all in error' (Humphrey to 
Strauss, 4/8/58) . 
After Humphrey wrote Strauss, he informed Sauter he had 
notified the AEC of his case. On April 12, 1958, Joe Sauter 
wrote the "Chief" of the AEC. An AEC employee typed the 
handwritten letter to make it more legible. In the letter 
Sauter claimed: 
... although complaint was passed to Washington ... I 
have seen nothing of any ... investigation of the facts. 
You are hereby advised that certain vegetation, 
the evidence of this date chiefly trees, were stricken 
or petrified, and to the best of my knowledge they are 
both poisonous and Radioactive ... I lost a total of 93 
lambs and 2 stock animals immediately and following the 
leaf shed from the trees, last fall ... I am not 
prepared for delayed, or tedious negotiations in this 
instance, the evidence as spoken, will be properly 
disclosed (Sauter to AEC Chief, 4/12/58) .  
On April 22, 1958, K.E. Fields, General Manager of the 
AEC, acknowledged receipt of Sauter's letter and informed 
him that his claim had been referred to the Commission's 
Albuquerque Operations office. Fields told Sauter that he 
would hear from them in the near future . 
By mid-May, the investigation of Sauter's claim had 
begun by the AEC. On May 16, 1958, Williaim W. Allaire, 
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director of the AEC Albuquerque Operations Office, wrote to 
Fred Driver, who was the head veterinarian of the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture in St. Paul, Minnesota. Allaire 
requested Driver to send his livestock inspectors out to 
Sauter's farm in order to find the sheep' s cause of death. 
Allaire informed Driver of the allegation of radiation 
injury, but he downplayed the validity of Sauter's claim: 
Copies of Mr. Sauter's two letters are enclosed. As 
you can see, the exact nature of the damage is not 
clear. Your assistance in investigating this alleged 
damage is very much appreciated. We have from time to 
time called on personnel from the Department of 
Agriculture Animal Disease Eradication Branch to give 
us a report of their findings after their visit to such 
claimants. In most instances, the damage was found to 
be of ordinary disease origin, and not radiation 
connected (Allaire to Driver, 5/16/58) .  
On May 20 , W.W. Allaire wrote Sauter. Allaire 
dismissed the claim that Sauter's livestock injuries and 
deaths could have been caused by exposure to radioactive 
fallout. Allaire made these statements before any facts or 
evidence had been gathered in the investigation of the case. 
Nevertheless, Allaire informed him of how to go about making 
a claim against the AEC: 
As you are probably aware, the Atomic Energy 
Commission, through cooperation of other agencies, is 
kept informed as to the intensity of radioactivity from 
' fallout' throughout the United States. The levels of 
radioactivity resulting from the 1957 test region (or 
any other continental tests) on any place outside of 
the Government-controlled test areas in Nevada, could 
not have caused the damaging effects or loss of 
livestock as described in your letter. However, we 
have asked the U.S. Department of Agriculture to visit 
you and to give assistance in determining the cause of 
your losses. You should hear from them shortly (Allaire 
to Sauter, 5/20/86) . 
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Allaire enclosed copies of the AEC claim from which 
Sauter could fill out in triplicate if he still thought he 
had a claim against the AEC which could be adequately 
supported. Allaire included with the claim forms a copy of 
the government pamphlet "Atomic Tests in Nevada. " The 
pamphlet was written to allay the fears of people living 
downwind from the nuclear tests. It claimed no one had been 
injured by radioactivity from the fallout of the nuclear 
weapons tests. 
The AEC routinely denied claims of radiation injury 
before investigation of the facts. Letters such as the one 
sent to Sauter were found in several other medical/legal 
files in the course of research. The letters effectively cut 
short the development of medical/legal suits being brought 
against the government and were sent not only to people 
downwind from nuclear tests, but to atomic veterans and 
atomic workers claiming injury as well. When a top AEC 
official wrote people uneducated in radiation biology or 
nuclear physics, emphatically denying their injuries are 
radiation related, it effectively chilled their desires of 
filing injury compenstation claims against the AEC. For 
instance, Mildred Rogers from Kerville, Texas, wrote to the 
AEC complaining of unexplained burns which she thought might 
be radiation related. On August 14, 1958, Dr. H. D. Bruner, 
Chief of the AEC Division of Biology and Medicine's Medical 
Research Division responded to her letter without 
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investigating any of the circumstances, enrivonrnental 
conditions or radiological data for the area. Dr. Bruner 
wrote: 
The current level of radiation from fallout is 1/30th 
to 1/40th of that which we receive from X-ray machines 
for medical purposes and the naturally radioactive 
substances occurring in the earth and our bodies 
[ emphasis mine ] (Bruner to Rogers, 8/14/58). 
In all but a very few cases would a person desist in 
filing a claim after receiving the initial denial letter by 
the AEC. Miss Rogers, along with the vast majority of those 
who received such denial letters, dropped the matter. 
Sauter persisted. 
On May 27, 1958, representatives from the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture visited Sauter ' s  farm to determine 
the cause ofthe sheep's death. Dr. A. Peterson and Leon 
Fleisher, Jr., both livestock inspectors, reported their 
findings to Dr. Driver the following day. In their report, 
they noted the size and location of Sauter's farm. The 
inspectors said that Sauter followed the practice of 
periodically sprinkling builders' lime and flowers of 
sulphur into the water at the places where the sheep drank. 
They said that the lambs were feeding chiefly on fallen oak 
and ash tree leaves. They collected leaves and hay samples 
since Sauter thought that they were contiminated by 
radioactive fallout. If was clear to them Sauter believed 
the leaves were the cause of his sheep's deaths. It was 
noted by the livestock insprectors the sheep had been raised 
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on the same pastures, under the same conditions for a number 
of years, concluding that "there would be indications that 
other [ unknown ] problems could be involved. " (Peterson to 
Driver, 5/28/58). 
On May 29, 1958, Driver sent Allaire a letter which 
summarized the report from Peterson and Fleisher. He sent 
the samples which the inspectors and Sauter had collected, 
and requested that the leaves be checked for radioactive 
fallout ; then Sauter should be informed of the findings. The 
inspector believed this would please Sauter. Driver 
concluded the letter to Allaire: 
Our inspectors advise that Mr. Sauter said nothing 
about claiming any damages during their visit and they 
believe that maybe the pamphlet [ "Atomic Tests in 
Nevada" ] that you forwarded to him helped (Driver to 
Allaire, 5/29/58). 
The bottom line of the pamphlet was that the fallout 
from the nuclear tests had not caused illness or injury to 
anyone living near the Nevada Test Site. 
77-78) notes: 
Rosenberg, (1980: 
The pamphlet, chock full of misleading and inaccurate 
information, should be written in the annals of social­
psychology as a hallmark in government attempts to 
propagandize the populace. 
Despite the impressions made upon the livestock 
inspectors of Sauter's seeming quiescence, Sauter went ahead 
and filed a claim of damages against the AEC on June 12, 
1958 (see Appendix A. ) 
After Sauter filed the claim, the AEC earnestly began 
gathering medical, radiological, rain and air monitoring 
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data on the Sauter claim. The vegetation samples collected 
by the livestock inspectors and by Sauter were sent to the 
AEC' s Health and Safety Labs (HASL) in New York for 
analysis. Allaire thought that a gross beta reading would 
be all that was necessary (Allaire to Dunham, 6/6/58). 
That is not surprising, given that they expected to find 
only normal background ranges of radiation in the 
vegetation. 
Although Sauter was over a thousand miles away from the 
test site, the AEC, rather than using an in-house physician, 
chose Dr. Donald Chadwick to gather the medical information 
concerning the personal damage protion of Sauter's claim, 
which totalled $15.60 in personal injuries. Dr. Chadwick 
was the Chief of Program Services, Radiological Heath 
Medical Program, Division of Special Health Service of the 
U.S. Public Health Services. He was also a member of the 
Federal Radiation Council. 
On July 1, 1958, Dr. Chadwick wrote to Sauter. Chadwick 
asked for more specific information on the burns--how soon 
after handling the "limbage" did the unidentified burns 
appear, what was the nature of the burns, and what happened 
with the passage of time. Chadwick also requested the name 
and address of the physicians who treated Sauter, along with 
permission to obtain the medical records and findings for 




On July 11, 1958, Dr. John Harley, Chief of the 
Analytical Branch of the Health and Safety Labs, wrote a 
memo to Dr. Gordon Dunning regarding the Sauter vegetation 
samples. Dunning was the head of the Effects of Nuclear 
Weapons Testing Branch within the AEC Division of Biology 
and Medicine. Dunning, a PhD . in Science Education, was a 
key figure in evaluating and dismissing radiation injury 
claims made against the AEC. Dr. Harley enclosed the 
results of the gross beta counts on the vegetation from the 
Sauter farm. He specifically left the interpretation of the 
results up to Dr. Dunning. 
Nine samples were collected- -five by Sauter and four by 
Peterson, the livestock inspector. The samples included the 
1957 oak and ash tree leaves. Sauter found the first dead 
sheep under the oak and ash trees on September 1, 1957. 
Samples of clove, box elder, and rock elm were also 
included. The counts ranged from 730 disintegrations per 
minute per gram ash for the mixed 1957-58 leaves to 4900 
d/m/g/ash for the 1957 white oak leaf sample. 
The counts on the very leaves Sauter said his sheep ate 
before they died were more than 100 times above normal 
background radiation levels at the time the samples were 
taken. Taking the decay curve into account, the intensity 
of the radiation at the time of the initial fallout was even 
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higher. Dunning knew he was measuring fallout long after 
the fact. Had he taken the data and gone backwards, 
factoring in the half-life decay rates, the readings on 
Sauter's farm on the day of the initial fallout could have 
possibly been closer to thousands of times higher than 
normal background radiation levels. 
Keeping the Lid on a Controversy 
The AEC's response to the high levels of radioactivity 
in Sauter's vegetation was the opposite of both their duties 
and responsibilities to Sauter and the American public. 
On July 15, 1958, after the results of the analyses 
were obtained from Dr. Harley, W. W. Allaire wrote a memo 
which noted the highlights of a telephone conversation with 
Dr. Gordon Dunning. Of the five points mentioned 
concerning Sauter's claim, the first is the most important: 
Dunning has data on gross beta counts for foliage 
collected in connection with the Sauter claim. This 
is a very high number, 75 or 100 times backgroun� 
Dunning feels that although the intensity is not 
harmful, disclosure of these numbers might be 
misinterpreted and thus damaging [ emphasis mine ] 
(Allaire memo to files, 7/15/58). 
The integrity of the investigation of Sauter's claim 
collapsed at the moment these two top AEC officials 
knowingly chose to suppress the true levels of radioactivity 
on Sauter's farm. Their decision precluded independent 
scientists from making their own interpretations of the 
data, mainly calculating back to the time of the fallout to 
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determine how much radiation the sheep were exposed to, both 
externally and internally. The AEC made endless 
pronouncements in press releases, at public hearings, before 
congressional and judicial bodies of the AEC's commitment to 
release all the available data on fallout in America. Since 
they were the only governmental agency capable of accurately 
assessing the dangers of nuclear fallout on a comprehensive 
level, the public, courts and congress put great faith in 
the AEC's pronouncements. As early as 1953,  Richard D. 
Elliot, Director of Information in the AEC Santa Fe 
Operations Office, delivered a special report which stressed 
four major obligations to the AEC: 
1. To inform concerned publics of the hazards created 
and of preventive action which may be taken; 
2. To warn people in advance of potentially hazardous 
stiuations, or situations which may alarm them; 
3.  To report after the fact not only with 
reassurances but also with details and 
interpretations; 
4. And, to the extent of the agency's responsibility, 
to reimburse the public for its losses (Hacker, from 
draft manuscript, n. d: ch. 10, p. 34). 
Given the levels of radiation on Sauter's farm it is 
obvious the AEC failed at the very least on the first two 
obligations by not telling Sauter what preventative measures 
he could take against chronic exposure to low levels of 
radiation that would persist for years. On the third and 
fourth obligations, the only part which the AEC fulfilled 
was to report back with reassurances, not with details or 
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honest interpretations. At no point did the AEC officials 
make any attempt to reconstruct the internal dose rate in 
order to determine how much radiation the sheep had received 
from eating the radioactive leaves. Their strategy was to 
suppress the radiological information, minimize the 
finding's importance between themselves, and thus prevent 
the "embarrassment" of a medical/legal suit being brought 
against the government at a time when the state of Minnesota 
and the country was highly sensitive to the issue of fallout 
from nuclear weapons testing. 
The second and third points of the Allaire memo to the 
files dealt with the level of Strontium 90 in the samples. 
Sr90 is considered to be one of the most harmful isotopes 
from fallout. Its chemical similarity to calcium makes it a 
bone seeker--radiation in the bones can cause leukemia and 
osteosarcoma. With its 29-year biological half-life, Sr90 
is a predominant isotope from nuclear weapons fallout after 
most of the short-lived isotopes have decayed away. Allaire 
noted that it would take another 6 to 8 weeks before a 
reliable result could be obtained on the Strontium 90 levels 
in the samples. Allaire quoted Dunning as saying (long 
before the results were even known) : 
Dunning says that he feels the strontium content is 
such could then safely state to Mr. Sauter (or others) 
that plant life with this amount of strontium could be 
consumed for X number of years without harmful results 
(Allaire memo to files , 7/15/58) . 
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It was a common saying by AEC officials such as Willard 
Libby during the fifties that a cow would have to eat 
several tons of hay before they would perceive harmful doses 
of radiation. Consistent with the AEC denial of injury 
before the investiation was conducted and the pamphlet 
"Atomic Tests in Nevada, " which stated in effect that 
radiation from the nuclear tests had not caused a single 
injury in or outside of the nuclear tests site, the AEC 
first came up with the conclusion of no harm, then sought 
facts to support their conclusion. 
Dunning and Allaire were not the only officials who 
participated in, or knew of, the suppression of key 
radiological data damaging to the -AEC. Copies of Allaire's 
memo to the files were sent to Oliver Placak, the USPHS 
official responsible for overseeing the Public Health 
Service Nevada Test Site offsite radiation monitoring 
program in Nevada; M. E. Smith, Chief of the AEC Las Vegas 
Branch; and Roscoe Goeke, Radiological Safety Advisor of the 
Office of Test Operations. Any one of these people could 
have spoken out against the suppression of the information, 
but they kept silent. 
Instead, four weeks after the memo recommending 
suppression of the information, Roscoe Goeke wrote W. W. 
Allaire, head of Nevada operations, in order to further 
minimize the radiologcial findings from the Sauter farm. 
Goeke's memo reads: 
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In order to be able to better evaluate the analysis 
of tree leaves, grass, and hay conducted by NYOO in 
connection with the Sauter claim, I called Dr. John 
Harley and discussed with him the results obtained and 
how they compared to results obtained from samples 
collected in other parts of the United States. 
Dr. Harley indicated that · normal ' background to 
them means the background level prior to the start of 
weapons testing and that is consisted only of 
potassium beta radiation. Using this figure Dr. 
Dunning ' s  statement that the Sauter sample figures 
were about 100 times over background is probably 
correct. However, this is not a fair comparison. 
Rather, comparison to samples from other parts of the 
United States collected after weapons testing started 
should be made. Dr. Harley said that results of 
sampling last fall in Vermont and lower New Hampshire 
were in this same general range. This confirms the 
PHS data from Texas given to us by Mel Carter on 12 
August by telephone. 
NYOO is presently running Sr90 analysis on three 
samples having the highest gross beta count. Results 
will be sent to us by memorandum by this Friday, the 
15th. A preliminary look at the results indicated 
that they were in the same range as elsewhere in the 
United States (Goeke to Allaire, 8/13/1958). 
Goeke ' s  logic is absurd. According to Dr. H.D. Bruner, 
the head of Medical Research for the AEC ' s  Division of 
Biology and Medicine, 
The current level of radiation from fallout is l/30th 
to 1/40th of that which we receive from x-ray 
machines for medical purposes and the naturally 
radioactive substances occuring in the earth and our 
bodies (Bruner to Rogers, 8/14/58). 
Either Goeke or Bruner was seriously misleading. 100 
times over background was never considered "normal 
background range" by scientists outside of the Atomic Energy 
Commission. Even "fresh" levels of radiation 100 times 
background would be news in states like Vermont and Texas. 
Of course, the most serious flaw in Goeke's logic is 
the fact that the radiological analyses were made a year 
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after the fallout. Goeke was comparing vegetation samples 
taken when the fallout was "fresh" with samples taken a year 
after the initial fallout. Although the use of decay curves 
was fundamental to men in his position, Goeke omitted this 
crucial factor in his analysis of the situation to Allaire. 
There is no excuse for this omission. Goeke's statement of 
the Sr90 samples being "in the same range as elsewhere in 
the United States" was equally misleading. Dr. Harley at 
the AEC New York Operations Health and Safety Labs (NYOO) 
ran Strontium 90 analyses on only three of the samples, 
since the cost for running each sample was over $100. The 
counts on the samples ranged from 43.3 +- 2.3 d/m/g ash to 
83.6 +- 7.6 d/m/g ash. Based on their guestimate of the 
level of calcium in the samples, Dr. Harley estimated the 
level of Strontium 90 in the samples to range from 393 +- 21 
micromicrocuries per gram calcium to 760 +- 69 
micromicrocuries per gram calcium (uuc/g ca). 
One week after the completion of the Strontium 90 tests 
Allaire wrote the Chief Veterinarian of the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture, erroneously "updating' him on the Sauter 
case: 
We would like to bring you up to date on what has 
transpired on this case since our last letter. The 
samples of hay, leaves and branches of trees from the 
sheep pastures have been analyzed by the AEC Health 
and Safety Laboratory, for gross beta and Strontium 90 
activity. The gross beta activity in these samples is 
in the same range as normal background levels found in 
samples obtained from Vermont, New Hampshire, and 
Texas. Three samples were analyzed specificially for 
the isotope Strontium 90. Results of this analysis 
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were reported in sunshine units [ micromicrocuries Sr90 
per gram calcium ] and they are somewhat higher than 
the national average, but we do not feel they are high 
enough to have caused the damage alleged by Mr. 
Sauter [ emphasis mine ] (Allaire to Driver, 9/5/58) . 
If one does not take the decay factor into account, the 
counts on the Sauter farm could have been in the same range 
as post-shot radiation levels found in Vermont, New 
Hampshire and Texas. It may have been "routine" for the AEC 
to find levels 100 times above background in scattered 
spots across the country following nuclear explosions. But, 
as Sauter was never truly informed of the radiation on his 
farm, neither were the people of the states of Vermont, New 
Hampshire and Texas ever informed. There is certainly 
nothing in the history books, congressional hearing reports, 
or newspapers to indicate otherwise. 
As to the Strontium 90 counts being "somewhat higher 
than the national average, " as Allaire said, or, "the same 
range as elsewhere in the United States" as Goeke said, not 
only were the counts more than 100 times above the level of 
Strontium 90 found in American hay, they were higher than 
any Strontium 90 levels found in St. George, Utah, for the 
same time. (St. George is reputed to be the community with 
the highest level of exposure to fallout from nuclear 
weapons testing in the country.) The levels of Strontium 90 
on Sauter's farm were higher than any levels reported to the 
state of Minnesota in its 1958-59 efforts to obtain all the 
relevant data on fallout in Minnesota from the Atomic Energy 
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Commission. Finally, the levels of Strontium 90 on Sauter's 
farm were higher than any of the levels of Strontium 90 
reported to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy 1959 
comprehensive hearings on fallout. 
Despite the fact that the most critical leaf samples 
was higher in Strontium 90 than any level reported to 
Congress of Strontium 90 in American vegetation, the AEC 
could still justify away its existence. The position of 
C.L. Weaver, Radiological Safety Advisor of the Albuquerque 
Operations Office was that even though the levels of 
Strontium 90 were over 100 times that found in American hay, 
and 5-8 times over the maximum permissible limit for safe 
human consumption, it was not a serious matter since the 
levels were not high enough to cause a rapid death in sheep 
as Sauter claimed. (Weaver to files, 4/2/59: p.4) . None of 
the AEC officials, however, considered the obvious fact, 
that at the time of the initial fallout, Strontium 90 made 
up a very small fraction of the total radioactivity. 
For instance, in the 1959 Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy Hearings on fallout from nuclear weapons tests, the 
chairman of the subcommittee conducting the hearings, Rep. 
Chet Holifield, requested additional information on Sr90 and 
its relation to the whole spectrum of fission products in 
nuclear fallout. In the supplement provided to the 
subcommittee, AEC scientists responded to Holifield's 
request of Strontium 90 relative to the total level of 
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radioactivity from fallout. The AEC scientists wrote (the 
supplement had no author ' s  name) that determining the level 
of radioactivity could be approximated by finding the level 
of Sr90, then finding the approximate time of deposition of 
fallout with the use of predicted trajectory maps. From 
these two sets of facts, one could then take the decay 
curves into account: 
The Strontium 90 content of fission debris is less 
than 1/20, 000 of the total radioactivity in the first 
two days after detonation and increases gradually to 
1/10, 000 in four days, 1/5000 in eight days, and 
1/2000 in twenty-five days (Hearings (1959: 2119) . 
Weaver and Dunning had the three keys to make the most 
basic analysis on the level of radioactivity from the 
initial fallout on Sauter ' s  farm. They had Sauter ' s  account 
of the first abnormal signs on his farm beginning in the 
last week of June, 1957. Dunning had the trajectory maps 
from Operation Plumbbob that showed the Wilson shot ending 
in the vicinity of Sauter ' s  farm on June 22nd. A simple 
phone call to the Minneapolis newspaper would have confirmed 
the heavy downpours in the area on that day. Dunning and 
Weaver could have put the facts together. They knew that 
the Sr90 in the one sample on Sauter ' s  farm, though higher 
than any levels released to the American public, may have 
been only 1/10, 000 of the total level of radioactivity. The 
two AEC scientists, Dunning and Weaver, knew that other 
isotopes may have posed much more serious threats at the 
time of the fallout, but they ignored the other isotopes. 
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After Allaire assured the chief livestock veterinarian 
inspector for the state of Minnesota that the sheep on 
Sauter's farm were not killed by radiation from the nuclear 
weapons test, he asked him to have his people come up with 
an alternative explanation for their deaths. Ironically, he 
wrote: 
The burden of proof for this claim is Mr. Sauter's, 
however, we need for our record and reply to the 
claimant, a statement from your Department on the 
possible cause of livestock loss. An additional 
investigation by the Veterinary Livestock Inspector 
and determination, if possible, of the cause for the 
loss of lambs would be appreciated. It is our opinion 
that this loss is not radiation connected, based on 
the gross beta and Strontium 90 activity found in the 
foilage [ sic ] samples." (Allaire to Driver, 9/5/58). 
Allaire concluded the letter by recounting how the AEC 
dealt with mysterious livestock losses around the Nevada 
Test Site: 
We have a Veterinary Officer at the Nevada Test Site 
assigned for investigating claims of alleged damage 
due to fallout radiation. As a result of numerous 
claims received in this area, our experience shows 
that the damage is usually the result of livestock or 
range management, or a common endemic disease and is 
not the result of fallout radiation (Allaire to 
Driver, 9/5/58). 
The livestock inspectors returned to Sauter's farm at 
the request of the AEC, but were unable to make a diagnosis 
of the cause of death due to the badly decomposed state of 
the carcasses. Peterson, the livestock inspector who 
visited Sauter's farm, concluded: 
I do not think it possible to arrive at a definate 
[ sic ] diagnosis as to the cause of death. All we have 
to go by is what Mr. Sauter can tell us and that is 
6 2  
somewhat limited and of little value. As stated 
before these sheep were being fed cheifly [ sic ] from 
falling leaves from trees on his farm togather [ sic ]  
will [ sic ] small portions of alfalfa hay. I assume it 
possible these sheep could have overeaten on these 
leaves (Peterson, Wentworth to Driver, 9/11/58) . 
Since the description of the death of the sheep did not 
resemble any endemic disease which the livestock inspectors 
were familiar with (since they had earlier ruled out 
livestock mismanagement) , and since Allaire had effectively 
eliminated radiation as a possible cause by conveying false 
information on the results and interpretations of the beta 
and Strontium 90 activity, the inspectors were at a loss to 
explain the cause of death, other than the possiblity of the 
sheep overeating on the falling leaves. 
An attempt to gather the records of the livestock 
inspectors on the Sauter case bore no fruit because, by 
1986, Allaire, Peterson and Wentworth, the chief of 
livestock veterinary inspection for the state of Minnesota 
at that time, were all dead. 
On October 23, 1958, Gordon Dunning responded to a 
request from Allaire's assistant manager, James E. Reeves. 
Reeves wanted Dunning's opinion on Sauter's claim of 
radiation damage from fallout. Dunning's letter is included 
as Appendix B. 
This letter raised more questions than it answered. 
When Dunning stated the exposure in the Farwell, Minnesota , 
area "probably had been less than 100 milliroentgens", where 
did he get this information and what was the dose rate? Was 
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it 100 mr/hour, per day, per month, per year? He stated 
that this amount 
would not produce any observable effects on humans, 
plants, or animals .... fallout ... that would produce 
this external gamma exposure could also produce 
external and internal beta exposure (Dunning to Reeves, 
10/23/58). 
How did he determine these "potential beta doses ... 
might be ... tens of rads in the plant tissues"? Since he 
calculated the external beta dose to the plants to be in the 
"tens of rads", why did ne not go ahead and calculate the 
internal beta dose the sheep would have received from eating 
the plants? Again, is he basing this calculation of tens of 
rads beta radioactivity without fully extrapolating back to 
the time of the initial fallout? 
Dunning recommended that more monitoring be done in the 
Farwell area if Sauter's case were to come to court, but he 
did not suggest more in-depth monitoring should be done 
otherwise. Given the fact the Strontium 90 levels were 
higher than the highest levels reported to Congress in 1959, 
the AEC clearly failed in its responsibilities to monitor a 
known area where there might be future health problems due 
to chronic above-background levels of radiation. 
Denying Personal Injury 
With the "analysis" of the vegetation and livestock 
portion of Sauter's claim neatly wrapped up by Dunning and 
Allaire, the AEC turned its attention to gathering all the 
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evidence against Sauter on the $15.60 portion of his claim 
of personal injury. On December 1, 1958, R. Goeke, Rad 
Safety Advisor at Albuquerque Operations Office wrote J.G. 
Terrill, Jr., of the USPHS. He requested the USPHS to send 
in Dr. Chadwick ' s  findings of their medical investigation 
on Sauter: 
Completion of the denial of this claim is pending 
until we hear from your office concerning your 
investigation and receive the report of your findings. 
Other portions relative to this claim have been 
completed and our legal staff desires to consummate 
this claim as soon as possible [ emphasis mine ] (Goeke 
to Terrill, 12/1/58). 
Dr. Chadwick had received a two-page letter from Sauter 
on July 19, 1958, concerning the injuries he thought were 
related to fallout. Sauter complained of temple and 
forehead headaches, socket headaches. In April of 1958, 
Sauter experienced burns on his hands after sawing off 
deformed limbs from the trees he said were "stricken" by 
fallout in 1957. Sauter described in detail the wind 
patterns, dates, and occurrences of burning eyes, burns on 
the "left shoulder swivel leaving brand purple red, pain in 
wrist hinge, deep." On June 4th, 1958, with the winds from 
the southeast, his wrist joints began hurting and the 
headaches returned. He noted that the leaves on the trees, 
especially the white oaks, were turned over, reversed. He 
saw evidence the fallout was still coming. Patches of his 
clover were scorched on the ground. With fallout still 
coming, he refused to accept whatever the AEC gave him as a 
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final settlement. He seriously believed his farm was being 
hit by radioactive fallout. Any reports to the contrary by 
the AEC would be seen by him as '' (1) stupid or (2) willfull, 
premeditated deceit." Sauter wrote Dr. Chadwick, "At best, 
you are in serious error with superfluous fallout, in the 
settled regions or populace." 
Sauter concluded the letter to Chadwick with a call for 
taking positive steps to reduce the hazards to radiation 
exposure on his farm: 
In conclusion, it is believed on my part, that you, of 
the great Health Division could well employ, 
experimental or otherwise, a calcine, either dust or 
spray over this recent stricken areas, and attempt at 
least to neutralize some of the evil element, instead 
of telling stricken people, the trees are just dying 
of old age and other false preachings (Sauter to 
Chadwick , 7/9/58). 
Dr. Chadwick had requested a report from Sauter's 
doctors, Drs. R.D. Letson and G.E. Lee, as to their opinions 
of the origins of burns on Sauter' s hands and eyes. 
Chadwick received a single paragraph letter from each of the 
doctors saying the cause of the non-specific burns were 
unknown, but probably not radiation related. The extent of 
the eminent Dr. Chadwick' s medical investigation was to get 
on record the statement of two country doctors that Joe 
Sauter' s burns on his hands and eyes were not radiation 
related. 
Is it plausible that these two country doctors would 
have recognized radiation burns if they had been confronted 
which such? According to Collins and Gauldin (1980) several 
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studies have been reported in the late 1960s and 70s of 
urban physicians who were unable to detect classic symptoms 
of radiation burns. One case in 1974 involved a child with 
radiation burns who was examined by 16 physicians over a 
20-month period, but whose diagnosis of radiation burns went 
unmade. The authors who wrote up this case study concluded: 
An information gap characterizes the two groups of 
people whose expertice would bear upon the detection 
and prevention of such an incident. From the first 
appearance of a change in skin ... to the ultimate 
recognition of the etiology, some 16 physicians saw 
the lesions. It is quite possible that none of them 
had ever seen a radiation reaction or radiation 
necrosis. Similarly, the custodians of radiation 
sources and authorities for licensing and control are 
not apt to be aware of ... the spectrum of injuries 
that might be encountered in the physician ' s  office or 
the hospital emergency room (Collins and Gaulden, 
cited in Fry and Hubner, 1980: 202). 
At best, without blood charts, visual examination of 
the burns, or more detailed information, the logical and 
objective position to be taken by Dr. Chadwick would have 
been there was not enough information to decide one way or 
another as to the cause of Sauter ' s  burns. Instead, Dr. 
Chadwick and the USPHS took the position of vigorously 
gathering the information which would refute the claim, in 
this case two country doctors ' opinions on radiaiton burns 
in western Minnesota in 1958. Allaire later requested 
Chadwick write back to the two country doctors and have them 
provide the AEC with an alternative diagnosis, so that the 
AEC ' s position on the $15.60 portion of Sauter ' s  claim for 
personal injury would be strengthened (Allaire to Chadwick, 
5/21/59). No alternative analysis was found in the file. 
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The AEC had gathered a sufficient amouont of evidence 
to buttress their case against Sauter. On April 1, 1959, 
W.W. Allaire sent Sauter a simple, two-paragraph letter: 
Dear Mr. Sauter: 
Your claim under Section 167, Atomic Energy Act of 
1954 for damage to livestock, trees, personal burns, 
and paint on your barn submitted June 12, 1958 has 
been thoroughly investigated. 
We have been unable to find any evidence to support 
your claim that the fallout from the Atomic Energy 
Commission tests at the Nevada Test Site caused this 
alleged damage. On the contrary, all indications are 
that such fallout did not cause the alleged damage. 
Therefore, we must deny your claim (Allaire to 
Sauter, 4/1/59). 
On the same day, James Reeves (Allaire's assistant at 
the Albuquerque Operations Office) wrote Brig. General 
Alfred Starbird concerning the Sauter claim. Starbird was 
the head of the AEC Division of Military Applications and 
was kept informed of radiation injury claims due to fallout 
being brouhgt against the AEC. Reeves sent to Starbird a 
carbon of the final notice to Sauter denying compensation 
"since investigations revealed no evidence to support the 
claim.'' (Reeves to Starbird, 4/1/59). Reeves warned that 
Sauter might continue to pursue his case through the support 
of his congressmen. In light of recent news reports on high 
levels of Strontium 90 being found in Minnesota wheat 
samples, Reeves thought it important that Starbird contact 
the AEC Congressional Liaison Office so they could be 
prepared in case Sauter took this course of action. It's 
worthwhile to note the Minnesota wheat samples Reeves 
referred to in the memo were reported to have contained the 
68 
highest samples of Strontium 90 in the U.S. (testimony of 
Charles Dunham in 1959 JCAE Hearings on Fallout, May 5-9, p. 
27). Yet the counts on Sauter ' s  farm exceeded the levels of 
Strontium 90 reported to Congress only a month after this 
letter was written. Reeves concluded the correspondence 
with: "Dr. Dunning of DBM [ Division of Biology and Medicine] 
has complete information on this investigation." (Reeves to 
Starbird, 4/1/59). 
The day after Reeves wrote his letter to General 
Starbird, C.L. Weaver, Radiological Safety Advisor of the 
Albuquerque Operaitons Office, drafted an AEC legal defense 
position paper. The seven-page draft was marked "Operation 
Test Office Files." Presumably it would be used in the 
event the Sauter case became active litigation. The 
position paper first focused on the fact the sheep died 
after drinking the water treated with builder ' s  lime and 
flowers of sulphur. The paper did not mention the water had 
been treated this way six years previously without ill 
effect, and that the first dead sheep were found under the 
most radioactive trees and did not have access to the 
treated water. Weaver said the primary defense of the AEC 
would focus on a tactic used in the 1954 Nevada sheep trail 
cases where they would have experts testify that fallout in 
the Minnesota area was: 
less than 1 mr/hr during the summer of 1957 [ which] 
could not cause sheep death in September and October, 
1957. Experimental evidence would be our primary 
defense plus the fact Mr. Sauter could not show death 
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was not attributable to drinking poisoned water 
(Weaver, 4/2/59, p. 2) . 
At the very least, if Dunning's estimate of the beta 
radioactivity dose being in "the tens of rads in the Farwell 
area" (an mr, millirem, is one thousandth of a rem) was 
correct, then it is obvious that the "expert" witnesses 
could not have been telling the truth. 
Weaver then detailed the damages to the trees and 
clover on Sauter's farm. Though listing the levels of beta 
activity in the 9 samples from Sauter's farm, Weaver failed 
to mention the levels were over 100 times normal background 
radiation. Consistent with Dunning's actions Weaver failed 
to do a dose reconstruction, based on the decay of the 
radioisotopes from the time of the initial fallout and the 
time the samples were analyzed. For this reason Weaver 
concluded the animals could not have died so quickly from 
such low levels of radioactivity. 
It is clear that in the event of litigation the AEC 
would have used the data most suitable to their conclusions. 
Weaver minimized the fallout problem in Farwell by comparing 
the levels of fallout in air and rainwater samples collected 
in Minneapolis (over 130 miles east of Farwell) with those 
levels tested at the Nevada Test Site. Weaver concluded: 
It is difficult to compare results in this case except 
to show that the highest activity in rain water 
analyzed at NTS [ Nevada Test Site ] was about 5 times 
higher than the highest rain water analyzed from 
Minneapolis, Minnesota . . .  It is not believed than 
[ sic ] an investigation of predicted trajectories 
furnished by the USWB [ U. S. Weather Bureau ] is 
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necessary. The results obtained by the PHS 
surveillance Network are much more useable and give 
figures which can be compared to other locations 
[ emphasis mine ] (Weaver, 4/2/59, p.6) . 
The trajectories Weaver was referring to were maps 
which traced the fallout paths of the different nuclear 
explosions from the Operation Plumbbob series and were sent 
to Dunning two months earlier by Lester Machta from the 
USWB. The maps showed over 40% of the fallout paths from 
Operation Plumbbob passing over the state of Minnesota with 
the fallout from five nuclear explosions passing over the 
Farwell, Minnesota, area. The trajectory maps would have 
lent support to Sauter's claim, so they were not to be a 
part of the defense used by the AEC in the event Sauter took 
the AEC to court. Given the high counts in Farwell, showing 
the fallout path could have only proved detrimental to the 
AEC ' s  case. The AEC was more comfortable with using 
radiation monitoring results taken over 100 miles away 
rather than extrapolating the levels of radiation based on 
samples collected on Sauter's farm. 
Summary of Laws Broken by AEC 
On the AEC claim form which William Allaire, Director 
of the AEC Albuquerque Operations Office, sent to Sauter, 
two laws were cited which told of severe punishments should 
Sauter file a fictitious claim. Since they are central to 
this paper they are quoted in full: 
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18 USC Subsection 287--False, fictitious or fraudulent 
claims 
Whoever makes or prepresents to any person or officer 
in the civil, military, or naval service of the United 
States, or any department or agency thereof, any claim 
upon or against the United States, or any department 
or agency thereof, knowing such claim to be false, 
fictitious, or fraudulent, shall be fined not more 
than $10, 000 or imprisoned not more than five years, 
or both (June 25, 1948, ch. 645 62 Stat. 698) . 
It is clear Sauter had a strong incentive not to 
knowingly make a false claim against the government. Based 
on the evidence brought out in this research report, it is 
clear Sauter ' s  claim of radiation injury had merit. The 
other law which appeared on the AEC claim form was similar 
to the one quote above, but its generality leads this 
researcher to believe it could apply not only to Sauter but 
to those evaluating the claim as well: 
18 USC Subsection 10001--Statements or entries 
generally 
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any 
department or agency of the United States knowingly or 
willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any 
trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any 
false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or 
representations, or makes or uses any false writing or 
document knowing the same to contain any false, 
fictitious or fraudulent statements or entry, shall be 
fined not more than $10, 000 or imprisoned not more 
than five years, or both (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 
Stat . 749) . 
When the first law was written to protect the interest 
of the United States Government against those who would make 
false claims, the lawmakers decided to write a companion law 
to protect the interest of the individual in cases where 
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people in government agencies would make fraudulent 
representations in order to protect the interests of the 
particular government agency. Did the representatives of 
the AEC violate the second law? It has been the intention 
of this report, not to "prove" that the death of Sauter's 
sheep was caused by radiation, but to prove that the 
representatives of the AEC knowingly, willfully concealed 
material facts, made false statements and representations in 
order to protect the interest of the Atomic Energy 
Commission. When Dr. Dunning and W.W. Allaire agreed to 
suppress the true levels of radiation on the Sauter farm to 
prevent damaging the AEC, they were concealing a critical 
material fact. When Allaire reported to the chief 
veterinarian of the U.S. Department of Agriculture that the 
beta radiation on Sauter; s farm was within the "normal 
background range, " he was knowingly making a false 
representation. When James Reeves, W.W. Allaire's assistant 
manager of AEC Albuquerque Operations Office, wrote the 
director of the AEC Division of Military Applications 
stating "investigations reveal no evidence to support 
Sauter's claim, " he was knowingly making a false statement. 
And finally, when the Radiological Safety Advisor, C.L. 
Weaver was putting together the legal defense position paper 
and noted they could get witnesses to testify the levels of 
radiaiton over Minnesota were less than 1 mr/hr, and chose 
to use evidence taken over 100 miles east of Sauter's farm 
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which proved favorable to the AEC ' s  stand, he was willfully 
prepared to make fraudulent representations on the behalf of 
the Atomic Energy Commission. 
Had Sauter knowingly filed a false claim, it would have 
been easy enough for the AEC to prove the falsehoods. They 
could have sent government investigators--from their own 
security investigators to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation--to verify the facts stated in his claim. They 
could have gone around to his neighbors and found out if 
Sauter held any open hostilities toward the government in 
general or the AEC in particular. With the extensive labs 
and scientists available to the agency, the AEC, if they 
found no radiation on the farm and suspected Sauter of 
willfully filing a fraudulent claim, could have more 
thoroughly investigated. They could have sent teams of AEC 
scientists out to the farm to find out how Sauter "caused" 
the leaves on the trees on his farm to be shrivelled up and 
fall off long before the first frost of the year. They 
could have sent AEC pathologists out to the farm to take 
samples of even the well-decayed sheep to find out if Sauter 
perhaps deliberately used poison on them in order to make 
the AEC "look bad. " 
The AEC had scores of scientists and technicians at 
their disposal to prove or disprove Sauter's claim. What 
did a 58 year-old high school educated sheep farmer in 
western Minnesota have to do to prove the AEC willfully and 
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knowingly misrepresented the facts? He could have appealed 
to the state government of Minnesota, or to the Joint 
Committee on Atomic Energy, the congressional watchdog of 
the AEC, but as will be pointed out in the next chapter, 
they were having their own troubles getting the whole truth 
out of the Atomic Energy Commission. 
The AEC was probably the gove'rnmental agency most prone 
to such abuses. Three reasons for this are: 
1. through the use of "National Security" the AEC had 
a virtual monopoly over the control of scientific data in 
this area. Findings which were critical of the nuclear 
weapons testing program could be classified, and effectively 
suppressed in the interest of "National Defense; " 
2. at the time, there were virtually no labs working 
in the field of radiation that were not dependent on the AEC 
for substantial monetary support. For a scientist dependent 
on AEC funding to generate findings highly critical of that 
agency spelled a complete economic cut in support. See the 
cases of Dr. John Gofman, Dr. Ernest Sternglass, Dr. Tom 
Mancusco, Dr. K.Z. Morgan, Dr. William O. Caster, among 
others; and 
3. the AEC was charged with two imcompatible roles, 
mainly that of providing nuclear weaponry to the Defense 
Department and promoting the development of commercial 
nuclear power, but also that of protecting the public from 
exposure to ionizing radiation. 
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CHAPTER IV 
AEC COVERUP: KEEPING MINNESOTA UNINFORMED 
During the same period in which the Sauter case took 
place, the state of Minnesota made parallel attempts to 
uncover information about radioactive fallout over Minnesota 
and its effects on the plants, animals and people of 
Minnesota. A special Scientific Advisory Committee set up 
by Governor Orville Freeman, called the Atomic Energy 
Development Problems Committee, was trying to gather fallout 
data for the entire state. Task groups within the Advisory 
Committee repeatedly made requests to the AEC for all the 
relevant information to the public regarding fallout. 
Later, Senator Clinton Anderson (D-NM), Chairman of the 
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and Senator Hubert 
Humphrey (D-MN), chairman of the subcommittees on 
disarmament and international health, both specifically 
requested all the information which the AEC had on 
"hotspots" in Minnesota and North Dakota. Neither Gov. 
Freeman, with his appointed Scientific Advisory Committee, 
nor the two Senators were able to obtain information on "hot 
spots" such as those on Joe Sauter's farm in western 
Minnesota. 
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State Finds Fallout Hot Topic 
In 1957, the issue of fallout in Minnesota was a hot topic 
in the Twin Cities ' newspapers. The scientist most 
responsible for bringing the issue to the forefront was Dr. 
William o .  Caster. He was trained in the filds of radiation 
biology and nutrition. From 1951-57, his studies 
concentrated on the biological effects of ionizing radiation 
on the heart and other organs. 
On May 16, 1957, the Minnesota Daily, the university 
newspaper, printed an interview with Dr. Caster entitled, 
"New Evidence Shows Fallout from Atomic Tests is Greater 
than Scientists have Generally Supposed. " (Minnesota Daily, 
5/16/57, p. 1). In the article, Dr. Caster quoted a 
statement made by AEC Commissioner Willard F. Libby the year 
before when he noted in the Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Science that the midwest, including Minnesota, 
was the hottest spot on the globe because it was the first 
place in the storm path of the fallout where there was heavy 
rainfall. Also, wind conditions above the region 
exacerbated conditions favorable to fallout. 
In the two weeks following the May 16 article on Dr. 
Caster, over 45 related articles appeared in the Twin Cities 
area newspapers. They covered the spectrum: from Strontium 
90 in milk to the psychological effect of "duck and cover" 
drills on school children. 
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on June 3, 1957, Governor Orville Freeman told a 
meeting of Midwest state attorneys general of his concern 
"about radiation hazards from nuclear weapons tests." He 
announced he was going to establish "an advisory committee 
to study problems of nuclear energy and radiation fallout 
hazards." The focus of the advisory committee was to gather 
all the known facts of fallout in Minnesota and to release 
the information in a manner understandable to the public. 
Governor Freeman told the audience: 
Responsible officials should no longer conceal 
frightening facts on the grounds they might have a 
· bad psychological effect' on the people (Minnesota 
Tribune, 6/4/57). 
Dr. Caster, a key figure on the Governor's Scientific 
Advisory Committee, paid dearly for his unequivocal 
statements on the hazard of fallout in Minnesota. Following 
a June 27, 1957 article in Science, in which Caster 
criticized the AEC for improperly calculating the maximum 
permissible concentration of Strontium 90 in humans, an AEC 
official met with his University of Minnesota department 
head, Dr. W. D. Armstrong, and told him that Dr. Caster need 
not bother ever applying for another grant from the AEC. 
In an interview on September 23, 1984, Dr. Caster 
pointed to a reprint of the Science article and said, "That 
one article cost me $30, 000 a year. " Other established 
scientists who were critical of the AEC also met with 
"defunding" problems. (See particularly the cases of Dr. 
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John Gofman, Dr. Thomas Mancuso, Dr. Ernest Sternglass, and 
Dr. Karl z .  Morgan.) 
In July, 1957, Freeman appointed the members of the 
newly created Minnesota Atomic Development Problems 
Committee. In the Governor's own words some two dozen of 
the finest scientists and lawyers in Minnesota were 
appointed to the Committee. It was broken down into 11 Task 
Groups which addressed areas ranging from basic nuclear and 
health physics, radiation biology, and tolerance standards 
setting, to the power of regulatory agencies and the law. 
On January 24, 1958, the Task Group on the Biological 
Significance of Ionizjng Radiation released an intirim 
report. The scientists had found that several samples in 
river, surface, stream and lake waters in Minnesota had 
exceeded the maximum provisional limits from gross beta 
radioactivity. The report stressed, however, there was not 
cause for alarm since the treated city drinking water in the 
Twin Cities was found to be below the maximum provisional 
limits. The interim report stressed that the real problem 
was that the state of Minnesota did not have comprehensive 
data with which to assess the present and future hazard to 
its residents from weapons testing fallout. The Task Group 
urged that a program begin immediately to collected the 
needed information . 
The chairman of the Task Group on the Biological 
Effects of Ionizing Radiation was Dr . Maurice B .  Visscher. 
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He was the head of the Physiology Department of the 
University of Minnesota Medial School, past president of the 
American Physiological Society, and widely regarded as one 
of the world' s leading physiologists. His interim report 
was sent to Dr. Gordon Dunning, chief of the Effects of 
Nuclear Weapons Tests Branch, AEC, on February 20, 1958. 
Visscher stressed to Dr. Dunning that the Governor's 
Scientific Advisory Committee did not want to cause a panic 
about present radiation levels in Minnesota water but wanted 
to emphasize a feeling of urgency 
because we are definitely concerned about the 
possibility that Sr90 is accumulating in biological 
material to a more significant extent than even the 
recently published data by Kulp and others would 
indicate (Visscher to Dunning, 2/20/58) . 
(Dr. Lawrence Kulp was an AEC-contracted scientist who had 
worked under the AEC's Sr90 analyses "Operation Sunshine" 
studies in the mid-1950's) . 
Dr. Visscher requested that the AEC send all their 
information on levels of Sr90 in Minnesota's 1957 crops of 
hay, alfalfa, legumes and other vegetables, which were not 
available in current literature, and levels of Sr90 in 
Minnesota milk (Visscher to Dunning, 2/20/58) . 
On February 24, 1958, a meeting was held in Washington, 
DC, between Gov. Freeman and K. E. Fields, General Manager of 
the AEC (General Manager was the highest position in the 
AEC, excepting that of the AEC Commissioners) . Also present 
were Dr. Charles Dunham, Director of the Division of Biology 
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and Medicine (DBM), Dr. Gordon Dunning, and Miles Lord, 
Attorney General of Minnesota. According to Dunning's 
notes, the AEC and the Governor agreed on three points: 
1. The Atomic Energy Commission would send one or 
more technical representatives to Minnesota in the 
near future to confer individually with Dr. Visscher 
and other appropriate scientists for the exchange of 
information and data. 
2. The [ AEC ] would accept selected samples from 
Minnesota and have them analyzed for Sr90 and perhaps 
other nuclides if desired. 
3. After the facts and data were established, we 
would meet with the governors's scientific committee 
in Minnesota and have an open discussion, if he wished 
(Dunning to Files, 3/12/58) .  
Two days after this meeting, Dunning received a series 
of fallout maps which showed fallout passing over Minnesota 
at least 14 times from the "Operation Plumbbob" series of 
nuclear explosions at the Nevada Test Site. Dr. Lester 
Machta, from the U.S. Weather Bureau Special Projects 
radiation monitoring team, noted that Minnesota was in a 
"favored position" to receive fallout during the spring 
(Machta to Dunning, 2/26/58) .  
On March 1, 1958, Gov. Freeman wrote the AEC General 
Manager, K.E. Fields, thanking him for the AEC's cooperation 
up to that time. Freeman concluded the letter: 
May I again emphasize that we are very anxious to be 
completely responsible in this matter here and not in 
any way unduly excite the people of the state .... On 
the other hand, we believe that there is a real 
hazard; that we are not adequately informed at present 
to evaluate it; and that . .. until we have the basic 
data ... we have not met our obligation to the people 
of our state. I trust ... the cooperation . . .  will 
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continue to the mutual benefit of our state and 
nation (Freeman to Fields, 3/1/58). 
As promised at the February 24 Washington, DC, meeting, 
Dr. John Harley, Chief of the Analytical Branch of the AEC 
New York Operations Health and Safety Laboratory (NYOO 
HASL), and Dr. Dunning of the AEC Effects of Nuclear Weapons 
Tests Branch met with Dr. Visscher ' s  Task group on March 6, 
1958. According to Dunning' s memo to the files, Harley did 
an excellent job of describing the analytical procedures for 
sampling and interpreting data. 
Dr. Harley left 20 to 30 reports with the committee. 
One dealt with the level of Sr90 in Minnesota milk and was 
marked "Official Use Only". Although "Official Use Only" is 
an internal agency classification and not a security 
classification, the Minnesota Task Group scientists were 
told not to release the information in the milk report. 
Dr. Caster says that Dr. Dunning told the Minnesota 
scientists in the March 6 meeting that their calculations 
for Sr90 were overestimated by a factor of three. Caster 
said: 
Dunning did not make us look particularly good at 
the time. Having a federal professional on radiation 
come in and tell us we didn ' t  know how to calculate 
the Strontium levels made us feel pretty bad. A 
couple of days later, however, we went over the 
calculations and discovered that Dunning was 
technically correct, but he had left the daughter 
product Yttrium 90, out of his calculations. As with 
Strontium 90, Yttrium 90 is also a bone binder. 
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We, being radiation biologists, took both isotopes 
into account for estimating the biological hazard. 
One thing we discovered was that much of the fallout 
from recent shots was the rare isotope Neptunium. The 
half-life of Neptunium is 2. 3 days; [ its ] daughter 
product is Plutonium 239. The problem with the feds 
was that nobody was telling us what the hazard was 
(Interview with Caster, 9/23/84) . 
The Minnesota Star and the Minnesota Daily both ran 
short reports on the meeting the next day which stated that 
Harley and Dunning were not concerned about the levels of 
radioactivity in the lakes and streams of Minnesota and that 
future studies would ease any fears residents might have 
(Minnesota Star and Daily, 3/7/58) . 
On March 19, 1958, the New York Times published a 
letter to the editor written by Dr. Visscher which sent 
shockwaves through the AEC. Visscher noted points of 
"confusion" that "non-scientists" might have regarding the 
nuclear weapons fallout controversy. His first point 
emphasized the lack of knowledge about the damaging effects 
of low level radiation from fallout: 
We think, but do not really know, that Sr90 is the 
main hazard as far as cancer is concerned . . .  We do not 
really know how little Sr90 will produce cancer. The 
fact that the magnitude of the damage is just an 
'educated guess' is the first great difficulty. 
The real effect may easily be only one tenth or 
ten times as great [ as current estimates ] .  The public 
should know that it will be absolutely impossible to 
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'know' how dangerous this element is for at least 20 
years . . .  The public should know that we scientists 
have no actual data on the carcinogenic activity of 
low levels of Sr90 (Visscher 3/19/58) .  
The second point struck a particularly raw nerve at the 
AEC. Dr. Visscher asserted that the AEC had withheld 
information from the public: 
The second reason for confusion is secrecy. Right 
now the most extensive data on Sr90 in milk in the 
U. S. are in the hands of the [ AEC ] .  On March 5, 
1958, I was shown these data which are marked 'For 
Official Use Only' and I am therefore now not 
privileged to disclose the facts they contain. 
There is one point about this situation that 
disturbs me greatly. It is that the top 
administrative officials do not have confidence in the 
intelligence of the American people. They act as 
though they did not really believe in the democratic 
system. The facts in question have no conceivable 
military significance. They are important only as 
background information for policy decisions. To 
withhold them from the public means one of two things, 
either that our Washington administrators do not trust 
our intelligence, or that they hope to control opinion 
by monopolizing information. 
Either conclusion would be distressing to me as 
one who believes in the democratic process because it 
would mean that we are imitating the practices of 
authoritarianism, which I adbhor. (Visscher, 3/19/58) .  
The day that Dr. Visscher's letter appeared in the New 
York Times, Morse Salisbury, Director of Information 
Services for the AEC, suggested that the head of the 
Division of Biology and Medicine, Dr. C. L. Dunham, write the 
Times and clarify the OUO (official use only) aspect brought 
out in Visscher's letter. (Salisbury to Dunham, 3/19/58) .  
The next day, Merril Eisenbud, Director of the AEC NYOO, 
drafted a response to Visscher's letter which he sent to the 
main AEC offices in Germantown, MD, for a "fast clearance. " 
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In the draft, Eisenbud accused Visscher of obscuring the AEC 
premise that data stamped "OUO" was of a provisional nature 
and that it would be released when it was cross-checked for 
intralaboratory errors . Dr . Dunham, in his response to 
Salisbury' s memo, wrote a report called " Allegation by 
Maurice B .  Visscher . . .  11 Dunham also stressed that the 
material was not classified but merely held back because of 
the provisional nature of the data . Neither of these draft 
letters saw the light of day . 
Dr . Dunning answered why the AEC did not publicly 
respond to Dr . Visscher' s allegations . In a letter to Dr . 
Caster ' s  department head, Dr . W . D .  Armstrong, Dunning wrote: 
We are disturbed, of course, by the deliberate 
distortion of facts that Dr . Visscher wrote in his 
letter . . .  however, rather than enter in a round- robin 
of letter writing, we are officially ignoring Dr . 
Visscher ' s  letter (Dunning to Armstrong, 3/27/58) . 
Dr . Caster felt there had been attempts by the AEC to 
cover up levels of radiation using tactics other than 
classifying them not for public release . Caster accused Dr . 
Dunning of the AEC of hiding high exposures by averaging 
those exposured into a large non-exposed population . Caster � 
said: 
It introduces a dangerous concept . . .  that the 
individual is not important . . .  When the AEC stated 
that the situation is safe, what they mean is that the 
average situation is safe (Draft copy of "The 
Biological Hazard from Atomic Fallout, " Caster, 5/58, 
p .  9 - 1 0 ) .  
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Dr. Dunning responded that averaging radiation 
exposures into large populations was consistent with current 
scientific practice. He said of Caster ' s  remarks: 
Nothing could be further from the truth ... than that 
the AEC is not concerned with the individual ... Let me 
assure you ... that the individual is most certainly 
considered important and no data are averaged or in 
any other manner manipulated to conceal important 
information [ emphasis mine ] (Dunning to Caster, 
4/10/58) . 
Dunning later had James G. Terrill, Jr., meet with 
Caster and two Minnesota health department representatives 
to futher drive home the point that neither the AEC nor the 
USPHS withheld fallout information from the public. In a 
June 3, 1958, memo from Terrill, Chief of the Radiological 
Health Program of the Division of Sanitary Engineering 
Services for the Department of HEW, to Gordon Dunning, 
Terrill outlined the major points of the May 29th meeting 
with Dr. Caster and two other doctors form the Minnesota 
Department of Health. Terrill explained the functions of 
the U.S. Public Health Services radiation monitoring 
program. Terrill wrote: 
Item by item I outlined the principal objectives 
and findings of each of these undertakings. I 
explained that security was a relatively formidable 
factor in our early deliberations, but that all of our 
activities were now free of security restrictions, and 
had been published in some form. I explained that 
presently we were not handicapped so much by security 
limitations as we are handicapped by the actual 
methods of analysis and delay in preparation of 
reports. Apparently Dr. Caster had been under an 
impression that we were withholding information for 
some type of security reason. However, at the 
conclusion of our meeting I think he was satisfied 
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that we are not withholding any information beyond the 
point where we have had a reasonable chance to analyze 
it and form conclusions in our own mind (Terrill to 
Dunning, 6/3/ 5 8) .  
Despite Dunning ' s  emphatic denial that the AEC withheld 
any information, three months later Dunning chose to 
withhold information from Joe Sauter on the basis that 
releasing it would be damaging to the AEC (Allaire to files, 
7/15 / 5 8 ) .  
AEC Denies State Support 
Three weeks after Dr . Visscher ' s  letter appeared in the 
New York Times, chastising the AEC for withholding 
scientific data on Strontium 90 in milk, the General Manager 
of the AEC wrote Gov . Freeman . Freeman had earlier 
requested financial assistance from the AEC in setting up an 
independent comprehensive radiation monitoring and analysis 
program in Minnesota . Freeman had reqeusted only $ 49, 000 to 
set up the special lab in the Minnestoa State Department of 
Health . The AEC Division of Biology and Medicine ' s  budget 
in 1959 was $43, 242, 000, out of which $2, 648, 000 was devoted 
to fallout sampling and analysis (JCAE Fallout Hearings, 
Vol . 1, 5 / 5 - 5 / 8 / 59, p .  17) . The General Manager, K . E .  
Fields, refused to give financial assistance to such a 
program: 
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We would find it difficult to justify support 
of . . .  large scale state or local programs of monitoring 
environmental radioactivity except in the areas in 
which we operate large nuclear facilities. Perhaps it 
is not generally understood that our own large scale 
studies . . . [ were ] originally designed to obtain 
information on concentrations which might result from 
nuclear warfare and possible future nuclear weapons 
tests, as well as to provide adequate information on 
fallout from tests which have been held . • •  Much large 
concentrations of radioactivity than those observed in 
air, water, milk or other foods would represent no 
appreciable hazard to health except as they might be 
maintained over periods of many years. It would be, 
therefore, impractical to think of a detailed local 
radioactive monitoring program as contributing to 
public health, even at levels of fallout much larger 
than those occurring from foreseeable programs of 
weapons testing (Fields to Freeman, 4/11/58) . 
Field ' s  conclusion of no adverse effects as unknown 
future levels was in contradiction to knowledge both within 
and outside the AEC. 
Dr. Caster pointed out in a June 15, 1958 editorial 
addendum to the Task Group 5 (Quantitative Standards for 
Determining Hazard to Humans from Radiation) report that the 
level of Sr90 in the body causing injury to humans was 
greatly underestimated due to recent findings of the 
variance of the degree of deposition from one person to 
another. Citing a study completed in May by a group of 
Swedish scientists, Caster wrote: 
This 'meticulous ' investigation found that Sr90 
will not be distributed evenly in the skeleton but 
will concentrate in certain bones and that 
concentration will vary with conditions. The 
significance of this . . .  lies in the conclusion that 
Sr90 is 60 times more dangerous to humans than the AEC 
statements . . .  assume and . . . 10 to 12 times more than 
assumed [ previously ] . . .  by this committee . . . .  This 
would double, and perhaps triple, an individual's 
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chances of having leukemia, and would place 
an individual j ust above the threshold for bone 
damage. 
The reduction in x-ray tolerance levels in the 
last three years suggests a parallel trend in the 
evaluation of Sr90 hazards, [ but ] one great difference 
exists ... an x-ray machine can be turned off at will ; 
Sr90 in the skeleton cannot (Basic Data ... in 
Minnesota, p. 57). 
In summary, five points would have mediated in favor of 
a state-wide radiation monitoring program in Minnesota: 
1. Libby ' s  pronouncement of Midwest, including 
Minnesota being the hottest spot on the globe because of 
prevailing fallout conditions ; 
2. Gov. Freeman ' s  Scientific Advisory Committee 
finding several instances of untreated water in 
Minnesota exceeding the provisional limits set for beta 
radioactivity ; 
3. The predicted traj ectory maps of fallout from the 
Operation Plumbbob series of nuclear explosions showing 
fallout passing over Minnesota at least 14 times with rain 
coinciding with the passage of several clouds over 
Minnesota ; 
4. Dr. Caster ' s  presentation of new evidence 
indicating " hotspots" of Sr90 building up in the bone which 
greatly increased the hazard of exposure to Sr90 ; and, 
5. The presence of a team of qualified, aggressive, 
yet non-alarmist scientists who would spearhead the program. 
8 9  
Despite these points the AEC refused to consider any 
support of a state-wide independent radiation monitoring and 
analysis program in Minnesota. 
State Attempts to Get Data from AEC 
On July 29, 1958, Lee Loevinger, attorney, former law 
partner of Gov. Freeman and chairman of the Governor's 
Advisory Committee on Atomic Development Problems, wrote the 
AEC on behalf of the Task Group which was chaired by Dr. 
Visscher. Loevinger requested a copy of the four- volume 
AEC publication "Environmental Contamination from Weapons 
Tests: A compilation of Data Concerning Transport, 
Deposition, Distribution and Biological Uptake of World­
Wide Radioactive Fallout." Dr. Visscher's Task Group had 
learned of the report ' s  existence, not through the AEC, but 
through a July 13, 1958 New York Times article. Loevinger 
wrote: 
Both the Minnesota Atomic Development Problems 
Committee and its subcommittee on Environmental 
Contamination feel that the data gathered by the AEC 
and presumably contained in the publication referred 
to, would be of great value to us in performing our 
role, and that it is necessary that our subcommittee 
be informed of the data that is available in order 
properly to perform its function [ emphasis mine ] 
(Loevinger to AEC, 7/29/58 ) .  
Loevinger's request for all the data available on 
fallout in Minnesota came less than four months after 
Dunning's emphatic assertion to Dr. Caster that the AEC did 
not manipulate data in any way to conceal information, and 
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less than two weeks after Dunning ' s  decision to suppress the 
true levels of radioactivity on the Sauter farm in western 
Minnesota. 
On August 22, 1958, the Minnesota Atomic Development 
Problems subcommittee called the Task Group on Basic 
Research issued a detailed six-page report entitled, "Areas 
in the Biological Sciences where Basic Information is Needed 
in Relating to the Manner in which Atomic Energy May 
Influence Residents of Minnesota." The report reflected the 
dedication and the competence of the Task Group which the 
governor had referred to in his earlier letter to the 
General Manager of the AEC. The report addressed several 
areas where there was a serious gap in the field of 
knowledge on the damaging effects of radiation. Information 
was badly needed from the areas of soil chemistry and plant 
nutrition to the pathway of Sr90 in the human body. The 
report recommended: 
[ We need ] a well integrated interdisciplinary program 
that is concerned with following the pathway of 
isotopes from the time they leave the soil and enter 
plants until they are incorporated into human tissue 
and/or excreted back into the environment where the 
pathway to the human will be repeated. 
The final statement of the report by the subcommittee 
on Basic Research reflected the overall problems and 
positions facing the state of Minnesota: 
It seems relevant to emphasize the almost 
overwhelming magnitude of the problems that confront 
the biological scientists in their efforts to contend 
with the new physical environment that has resulted 
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from the products of atomic fission .... It seems 
obvious that an effective program in the areas 
outlined must necessarily be a program which is well 
integrated and coordinated .... However, to be 
properly implemented a program of such wide scope must 
be established on sound footing based on thorough 
comprehension of the information that presently 
exists. They suggest that a detailed appraisal of the 
problems outlined in this report could best be 
facilitated by holding a symnposium 
in which experts in the fields of concern would be 
requested to participate (Task Group on Basic 
Research, 8/22/58) . 
Such a well thought out, comprehensive approach to the 
monitoring and analysis of radiation in the state of 
Minnesota as that proposed by the Atomic Development 
Problems Committee was beyond both the capabilities and 
inclinations of the AEC. Their own piecemeal approach to 
monitoring fallout did not even meet their own standards for 
scientific reliability. 
Broad Assurances/Unreliable Analyses 
As the pace of atmosphere nuclear weapons tests 
accelerated over the years, the demand for biological 
testing of its effects greatly increased along with it. 
"Operation Sunshine" was initiated in the mid-fifties by the 
AEC to test the level of Strontium 90 in the biological 
cycle of plants, soil and animals (including humans) across 
the country and in selected sites in over two dozen other 
countries. "Sunshine" referred to the unit of measurement 
for Strontium in the samples. One "sunshine unit" was 
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equivalent to one micro-microcurie of Stronitium 90 per gram 
of calcium in the sample. 
Because of the overwhelming number of samples to be 
analyzed, the AEC had to use outside, private contractors to 
complete much of the work. The outside contractors, 
however, were not carefully screened ; they did not always 
follow the extremely rigid procedures needed to get reliable 
results. 
Reports were completed in September, 1958, at the AEC 
Health and Safety Laboratory (HASL) in New York, which found 
that several of the private labs which the AEC contracted 
with to analyze samples for Sr90 had produced results which 
were scientifically unreliable. The Director of the AEC New 
York Operations Office had suspected for over a year that 
the results coming in from the contractor labs were 
unreliable. It was not until the HASL had devised a program 
to send the contractor labs duplicate samples of vegetation, 
soil, feces and bones, that systematic proof could be 
established to confirm their suspicions. The report stated 
that some of the private labs findings deviated as much as 
89. 9% off the mark of the average values. S. Lough, the 
Director of the NYOO, wrote Dr. Dunham that despite all the 
work with the private labs over the year to improve their 
analyses, the work was still proving to be scientifically 
unreliable. Lough wrote: 
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The analytical data submitted by the contractors have 
been so unreliable that some participating 
investigators have been unwilling to use them in the 
preparation of scientific reports in connection with 
the overall fallout program. To me it appears 
entirely indefensible for the Atomic Energy Commission 
to continue expenditure of funds for additional 
contractor- performed analyses which we are confident 
will be unsatisfactory (Lough to Dunham, 11/10/58). 
Dunham agreed with Lough, and the contractor labs' work 
on the analysis of Sr90 was suspended until guidelines for 
better quality assurance were developed by the AEC. The AEC 
Health and Safety Laboratory would continue analyzing Sr90 
in vegetation, but the private contractor labs would 
continue their anaylysis of Sr90 only in surface rainwater 
and gumpaper samples. Coincidentally, the vegetation samples 
showed the highest counts of Sr90 as a result of atomic 
testing fallout, while surface water and gumpaper analyses 
showed the lowest Sr90 counts and gave the poorest picture 
qualitatively of the deposition of fallout. The AEC Health 
and Safety Lab (the very lab which ran the Sauter vegetation 
analyses for gross beta and Sr90) was singled out by Judge 
Jenkins in the recent Utah decision Allen Vs. USA. Judge 
Jenkins noted it was a practice of the AEC lab to stop the 
counting of an ashed sample for beta radioactivity when it 
reached 640 counts per minute. Jenkins also noted the 
samples were ashed at such high temperatures that certain 
radioactive elements, such as iodine, were driven out of the 
sample (Allen Vs. USA, Civ #70-0515-J, p. 86). For whatever 
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reasons, suspending the private contractor labs programs of 
analyzing Sr90 in vegetation insured that the AEC would 
maintain a firm central control on the monitoring and 
analysis of Sr90 in vegetation. 
Strontium 90 in Minnesota Wheat 
In July of 1958, Dr. Visscher sent the AEC several 
samples of Minnesota wheat crops from different parts of the 
state to be analyzed for Sr90. It was not until January 25, 
1959 that the results were reported to Dr. Visscher. On 
February 6, 1959, Gov. Freeman held a press conference where 
Dr. Visscher released the Task Group ' s  interpretations of 
the findings. Dr. Visscher reported: 
The findings indicate that some further action is 
necessary in connection with atomic energy problems, 
especially in regard to the establishment of a 
permanent State Commission and in connection with 
appropriation of funds for its work. There are 
possibly serious economic as well as health 
implications to the entire North Central and Plains 
region including Minnesota in the data we are 
presenting (Visscher, 2/6/59). 
The data was presented in terms of Sr90 per 
gram/calcium in the wheat. Visscher found that the average 
samples for the 1958 wheat crops had exceeded the maximum 
permissible concentration of 100 micromicrocuries Sr90 per 
gram calcium by 50%. Visscher stressed there was not cause 
for alarm, since one derives only 5-10% of the calcium of 
one ' s  diet from wheat. Dr. Visscher pointed out, however, 
there was inadequate data on Sr90 in other foods, such as 
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milk. Comprehensive monitoring of milk would be important 
because Americans derive more than 75% of their calcium from 
milk. Although the average level of Sr90 found in the wheat 
was not dangerous, levels such as 600 micromicrocuries per 
gram calcium as found in one sample could present long-term 
hazards. Visscher noted that Sr90 in the food was more of a 
hazard to children than adults (Visscher report, 2/6/59) . 
At that time, findings indicated there was a forty-fold 
difference in the levels of Sr90 which was found in the 
average 40 year-old and the bones of the average 2 year-old 
(Caster interview, 9/23/84) . 
Dr. Visscher's report was intended to alert Minnesota 
residents and officials, along with neighboring states, that 
more must be learned about the Sr90 contamination problems. 
Milk, meat, fish, poultry products, and vegetables required 
intensive study. Corrective measures must be planned and 
prepared since there might be some localities in the future 
where all the foodstuffs, including milk, would be heavily 
contaminated, and if bomb testing continued throughout the 
world, the situation would undoubtedly become progressively 
worse. It would seem essential, according to Visscher, to 
be able to protect children from food containing as much as 
600 micromicrocuries per gram of calcium. To do this, 
Visscher asserted the state of Minnesota and its scientists 
needed much more analytical information (Visscher report, 
2/6/59) . Visscher concluded: 
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It is the responsibility of the State Legislature to 
decide whether to make a serious effort to minimize 
these . . . hazards. It can . . .  [ be done ] by establishing 
the Commission [ an independent radiation monitoring 
and analysis program ] that Gov. Freeman is 
requesting . . . •  Gov. Freeman's foresight . . .  
responsible for the fact that Minnesota is 





There will be some . . .  who will say that these 
findings should have been kept secret, so as not to 
disturb people . Their false logic would be that 'what 
people don't know won't hurt them. ' 
In any democratic society people not only have a 
right to know, but must know the facts if they are to 
act intelligently. The role of the scientist is to 
provide a sober interpretation of the facts, to allow 
people to take precautionary and preventive measures 
before it is too late. 
Fortunately, we have a governor whose policy it is 
to give the people the facts so that they may act 
intelligently through their Legislature. The present 
situation is not one to become panicky about. It is, 
however, one that requires increased information to 
avoid a panic situation in the future (Visscher 
report, 2/6/59) . 
Despite the fact that the highest count of Sr90 in 
Minnesota report to Visscher was from the largest milled 
wheat production center in Minnesota, the AEC did not make 
any attempt to go back and do an intensive study of the 
region. As will be seen, their response to the problem 
simply was to recalculate the permissible level of Sr90 in 
foodstuffs in order to bring all but two of the samples 
below the maximum permissible concentration of Sr90. 
Three days after the press release of the Sr90 counts 
in the wheat samples, Dr. Visscher wrote Senators Humphrey 
and McCarthy asking for a Senate investigation. Visscher 
thought an investigation might induce the AEC to determine 
the practical values of radioactivity in soil, plants, and 
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animals, including man, and to obtain comprehensive data on 
foodstuffs in the American diet. He was shocked that the 
AEC had not conducted a significant Sr90 analysis of Midwest 
wheat. Visscher wrote: 
The AEC has been so concerned about reassuring the 
public that there is no harm in what it has been doing 
in the bomb testing area that it has failed to devote 
enough attention to finding out the facts even as to 
what the levels of radioactivity in foods are 
(Visscher to Humphrey and McCarthy, 2/9/59). 
As a result of Visscher disclosing the Sr90 levels 
found in the wheat samples at the February 6 press 
conference, a telegram was sent from London to the U.S. 
Secretary of State requesting information on the validity of 
the Sr90 data. 
The British Ministry of Health asked for an authentic 
copy of the data and an evaluation by the AEC Division of 
Biology and Medicine because of the implications of 
"possible health hazard though consumption of U.S. wheat 
purchased by the U.K." (Werner to Wells, 2/12/59). 
On the same day that the Division of Biology and 
Medicine received the telegram from London, Dunning sent an 
"official use only" memo to Dr. Dunham, Head of the AEC 
Division of Biology and Medicine. In this memo, Dunning 
recounted briefly the exchanges between the AEC and 
Minnesota during the past year. He said of the February 24, 
1958, meeting with the governor: 
In an effort to avoid a direct reply to their 
request for the AEC to finance a laboratory for their 
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use, it was decided to have HASL analyze some of their 
samples . During and following these events not all 
the problems were scientific in nature . 
In light of the present events , and in the belief 
that our problems are not ended in Minnesota, I would 
suggest the following: 
1 .  There should be a definite assignment of 
responsibility to follow on all of the factors that 
bear on the collection and analysis of the wheat 
samples . . . .  It is not advisable to accept blindly 
whatever materials are sent us and then publicly 
report the results without the necessary 
information . . .  
2 .  The highest strontium units found in the wheat 
samples (610 and 602 strontium units ) were greater 
than the others not [so much, pencilled in ] because 
of a larger Sr90 content but because of a lesser 
amount of calcium . As you know, the subject of 
calcium content in foods was discussed in relation 
to the Rongelap [Bikini Islands ] data . You may 
wish to ask Hal Hollister to put further thoughts 
to the calcium content problem [emphasis mine ] 
(Dunning to Dunham, 2/12/59 ) . 
Dunning also noted in the Official Use Only memo that 
he was not against the state of Minnesota ' s  plans for a 
scientific symposium on fallout, but that he was against the 
symposium being held in Minnesota "solely on scientific 
considerations . '  What those scientific considerations were, 
Dunning never revealed . 
Playing "Fast and Loose" with the Numbers 
The AEC quickly came up with a solution to the report 
of the Minnesota anaylsis of the wheat exceeding the maximum 
permissible level . When the AEC released the findings in 
January, 1959, the levels were reported in terms of Sr90 per 
gram of calcium . Dr . Visscher accurately reported that 
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those levels did in fact exceed the maximum permissible 
level for human consumption (100 micromicrocuries per gram 
calcium) but had said that there was cause for concern, not 
panic, since wheat had such a low calcium content. What the 
AEC did was to draft a reply to the London telegram stating 
that the Visscher report had been a product of 
"misinterpretation. " The AEC's interpretation of the data, 
sent to the British Ministry of Health, was that 22 of the 
23 samples analyzed were actually well below maximum 
permissible levels. They based this interpretation not on 
the Sr90 per gram of calcium in the wheat but on the Sr90 
level per kilogram of wheat. Three months later, in the 
hearings on fallout before the special subcommittee on 
radiation of the JCAE, Visscher submitted written testimony 
which found the basis of the AEC recalculation of the 
permissible level of Sr90 per kilogram of foodstuff rather 
than the earlier method of per gram calcium untenable (1959 
Hearing Report, Appendix B, p. 2141). 
Despite the recalculation of the data, bringing all but 
one sample below the maximum permissible level, a member of 
the British Parliament, Konni Zilliacus, was alarmed by the 
report of the high Sr90 levels in the Minnesota wheat and 
called for a ban on the importation of the U. S. wheat, 
cereals and related products (Associated Press, 2/24/59). 
The AEC responded to the threat of a ban on wheat by 
having the United States Information Agency send telegrams 
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to all U.S. Missions in countries which imported U.S. wheat. 
The document was entitled, "Background on Sr90 in Wheat." 
This document stated that it was the level of Sr90 in the 
total diet which counted and that the present American diet 
was estimated to have about one eighth of the permissible 
level per kilogram of food. The amount of Sr90 found in the 
bones of children was only 2% of the maximum permissible 
body burden. The report noted that one would have 
to eat at one sitting a few tons of wheat containing 
80 micro-microcuries per kilogram of wheat before the 
maximum permissible amount would accumulate in the 
body (Background on Sr90 in Wheat, no date). 
The British did not ban the import of U.S. wheat. 
The conflicting information in the media generated a 
flurry of requests for clarification on the hazard of Sr90 
in wheat from concerned citizens, congressmen, national 
flour milling associations, bakers associations, 
correspondents from magazines and newspapers such as Time­
Life, and from one presidential aide requesting information 
for a presidential news conference. 
One concerned citizen was Mrs. John Harms of Carmel, 
California. She wrote Clinton Anderson (D-NM), chairman of 
the JCAE, on February 23, 1959. She pointed out the 
contradictions between Dr. Visscher's and the AEC ' s  
interpretation of the Minnesota wheat data. In a February 7 
United Press International story, she said: 
Scientists said the Sr90 average of all 1958 crop 
samplings was one and one-half times the 'safe limit' 
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set forth by the AEC. Visscher was quoted, ' We did 
not expect to find as high quotas in the wheat as we 
did. The situation undoubtedly will get worse if the 
world continues nuclear bomb testing. ' 
Yet a February 17 UPI wire story flatly contradicted 
the earlier article. According to the AEC version of the 
same strontium sample findings, 
The officials said there is no indication anybody in 
the world is getting anywhere near the maximum 
permissible dose of Sr90 from food. The average of 
Minnesota wheat sample for 1957-1958 was far below 
permissible levels (Harms to Anderson, 2/23/59). 
Mrs. Harms had written Dr. Visscher earlier to try to 
clear up the contradictions between the two articles, and 
she included his reply in her letter to Sen. Anderson. Dr. 
Visscher wrote her: 
The AEC has simply changed its basis of calculation 
ofpermissible levels of Sr90 in foodstuffs. Earlier 
maximum permissible dose levels were expressed in 
terms of micromicrocuries of Sr90 per gram calcium. 
They are now proposing to express it in terms of 
kilogram of food or liters of fluid. This will hardly 
be a tenable basis of calculation because if there 
were as much as 80 micromicrocuries per liter of 
water, we would in hot weather be getting many times 
the permissible amount per day. 
In the last analysis, it is only the facts that 
are of any importance, and the facts are that the 
levels in such plant crops as wheat have risen from 
zero in 1945 to 155 micromicrocuries per gram calcium 
in 1958. It is our hope that they will not continue to 
rise. What is badly needed is more research on this 
problem, and also, very much more information about the 
actual levels of radioactive materials in all of the 
foodstuffs which make up the human diet in various 
parts of the world. 
It is quite ridiculous to say that · there is no 
indication anybody in the world is getting anywhere 
near the maximum permissible dose of Sr90 because no 
one in the AEC or anywhere else has actual information 
on the complete diets of anyone in the world. 
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What the world public has a right to resent is the 
bland reassurances it has been given in the absence of 
factual information (Visscher to Harms, 2/20/59) . 
Dr. Visscher wrote Sen. Humphrey on February 29, 1959, 
pointing out that the rising levels of radiation due to 
fallout may become serious in the future and that the AEC 
had "no excuse" for not having "basic data on all of the 
major American foodstuffs" nor was the AEC devoting enough 
research toward ameliorating Sr90 as a hazard. Dr. Visscher 
ironically noted that AEC Commissioner Libby's 
"interpretations are in large part identical with those I 
gave in a press conference with Gov. Freeman on Feb. 6, 
1959" (Visscher to Humphrey, 2/28/59) . 
On March 6, 1959, Sen. McCarthy sent Commissioner Libby 
Dr. Visscher's earlier February 6 letter, asking the AEC to 
respond to Visscher's allegations on the failure of the AEC 
to conduct adequate radiation monitoring of all American 
foodstuffs. 
Libby passed these letters on to the head of the 
Division of Biology and Medicine, Dr. C.L. Dunham, for his 
reply. Dunham did not directly respond to any of Visscher's 
allegations, but instead sent McCarthy three documents for 
his information (Dunham to McCarthy, 3/20/59) . The packet 
of letters included one from Libby to Visscher dated March 
6, 1959 in which Libby stated: 
I am particularly anxious that we in the AEC do 
everything we can to make known what we know about 
fallout and see that the most important unknown areas 
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are investigated. We have been concentrating on human 
bone, milk, rain, and soil and I am afraid thus 
somewhat under emphasizing grain and vegetables (Libby 
to Visscher, 3/6/59). 
Libby asked Visscher to take part in the JCAE hearings 
on fallout in May. Dunham also enclosed a copy of the AEC 
"Background on Sr90 in Wheat" to McCarthy. Without 
responding to any of Visscher's allegations, Dunham's reply 
gave the impression that Visscher ' s  allegations were without 
merit, since: 
1. Libby' s letter gave the impression the AEC was 
doing everything possible to explore and release all the 
known information on fallout in America; and, 
2. the AEC report on Sr90 in wheat implied that a 
comprehensive monitoring of major American foodstuffs was 
unnecessary since the average American diet contained only 
about one-eighth of the maximum permissible concentration of 
Sr90. 
In light of the "anxiousness" of the AEC to make 
everything known about fallout available to the public, it 
is odd that on March 25, five days after Dunham's reply to 
McCarthy, Dunham would send a memo to Libby recommending 
against bringing the U. S. Public Health Services into the 
arena of monitoring vegetation for Sr90. Dunham wrote 
Libby: 
[ The DBM ] is aware of the problem of the need for 
additional information concerning Sr90 . . .  in cereal 
grains and vegetables. At the present time we are 
preparing to increase our sampling program in this 
area . . . .  We definitely should not turn this over to 
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the Public Health Service. Work is being undertaken 
by the Pure Food and Drug Administration in this area 
and we will coordinate with them to make certain that 
our programs do not overlap (Dunham to Libby, 
3/25/59). 
Given the magnitude of the sampling and analyzing 
needed to gather a complete picture of fallout in American 
foodstuffs and DBM ' s  past history of working with the Public 
Health Service, it is not clear why Dunham would so strongly 
recommend against seeking PHS help in this area. The USPHS 
was the first agency Dunham listed in the May 1959 JCAE 
hearings of agencies which the AEC worked with in gathering 
fallout data. 
The need for assistance in analyzing fallout data was 
even s more marked by the fact that the AEC files did not 
show the suspended private contractor labs coming back on 
line for analyzing Sr90 in vegetation at this time. With 
the level of controversy generated by the release of the 
Minnesota wheat samples, it is no wonder that the AEC wanted 
to maintain a firm central control over the analysis of Sr90 
in vegetation. 
Congress Gets into the Act 
The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy was the primary 
watchdog of the AEC in protecting the U.S. public. The AEC 
was mandated by law to fully comply with the requests for 
information by the JCAE. Sen. Clinton Anderson (D-NM) was 
chairman of the JCAE during this time and was well known for 
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his confrontations with the AEC. In December 1958, Sen. 
Anderson learned of a DOD report which found that fallout 
from the stratosphere, the upper atmospheric layer, "dripped 
out" at a rate much faster than assumed by the AEC. He 
requested documentation from both the DOD and the AEC 
supporting this new information. 
General Herbert B. Loper, Assistant to the Secretary of 
Defense (Atomic Energy), wrote Sen. Anderson on February 19, 
1959 and informed him that the half-time residence of 
stratospheric fallout was only two years rather than seven 
years as estimated by the AEC scientists, most notably AEC 
Commissioner Willard F. Libby. The letter also contradicted 
the AEC pronouncements that fallout scattered evenly across 
the globe. The Department of Defense found that fallout was 
heaviest in the 35 degree - 50 degree latitude band north or 
south, which covers part of the Northern United States. 
Despite the new evidence, Gen. Loper wrote to Sen. 
Anderson: 
The risk of damage resulting from the testing of 
weapons is therefore extremely small and much less 
than other common day occurences such as X-rays, 
automobiles, chemical contaminants, household 
cleaners, etc. However, the probable casualties 
attributable to radioisotopes from weapons testing 
when summed over the populations of thousands of years 
creates a moral issue that could be of considerable 
propaganda importance [ emphasis mine ] (Loper to 
Anderson, 2/17/59). 
The letter to Sen. Anderson was marked "Confidential­
Restricted Data. " Classifying the information infuriated 
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Sen. Anderson. He thought it vital that the information be 
made available for scrutiny by scientists in the general 
public. 
Less than two weeks later, Commissioner Libby sent Gen. 
Loper a letter classified "Confidential" which disputed the 
DOD ' s  calculations of the resident half-time of fallout in 
the stratosphere being only two years. Libby said the AEC 
had restudied the problem of stratospheric fallout and found 
the half-time fallout rate to be "about four years, " rather 
than the earlier AEC position of seven years, or the DOD 
position of two years. Libby said the new position of the 
AEC on stratospheric fallout would be made known in a study 
which would be released on March 13, 1959 in a speech by 
Libby in Seattle, Washington. 
As to the notion of there being a band of maximum 
"drip-out, " Libby called that an old argument which was 
still not resolved. Libby stated the findings were obscured 
by the fact that high fallout in the "Northern Hemisphere is 
due to tropospheric [ the lower atmospheric layer ] or local 
fallout which was never in the stratosphere." (Libby to 
Loper, 2/27/59 w/cc to Sen. Anderson.) 
On March 9, 1959, Sen. Anderson wrote the Department of 
Defense. He asked the DOD to justify the classification of 
the Gen. Loper letter and asked what part of the letter 
would he be able to discuss in public without jeopardizing 
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the classified information (from Attchmt. #4, JCAE rel. 
#211, 3/22/59) . 
While waiting for a reply on the classification 
problems of the letter, Sen. Anderson monitored the speech 
made by Libby on the AEC' s "restudy" of the stratospheric 
fallout problem, which was presented in Seattle on the 13th 
of March. Libby's speech stayed close to the previous AEC 
party line on fallout in his "restudy." He stated the 
half-time residence of fallout was between five and ten 
years, with a mean residence time of six years. Libby's 
restudy of the problem made no mention of the Department of 
Defense findings of the half-time fallout rate being only 
two years, nor of his statement in a confidential letter 
made two weeks earlier to Sen. Anderson of the half-time 
fallout rate being four years. 
Sen. Anserson was angered by all the contradictory 
information and by the fact he was prevented, because of 
"national security, " from speaking out on these glaring 
inconsistencies. 
On March 18, 1959, the Department of Defense downgraded 
Gen. Loper's letter to "Confidential." Only one sentence in 
the entire letter contained classified information. Yet the 
DOD felt: 
Although the remainder of the letter is unclassified, 
the Department recommends that it not be discussed in 
public because there is not full agreement as to the 
interpretation of the data that has been obtained so 
far. We believe it would be far better before the data 
108 
and conclusions are made public that there is a close 
agreement amongst the investigators concerned. 
Therefore, we believe that until the results are more 
than preliminary, the CONFIDENTIAL classification 
should remain on the letter (Attchrnt #4, JCAE rel. 
#211, 3/22/59). 
It was clear to Sen. Anderson the reason the DOD wished 
to keep the letter classified was more political than a 
matter of national security. He kept the pressure on DOD 
until, two days later, the DOD declassified the letter, 
minus the one classified sentence. The AEC followed suit 
the next day by declassifying the Libby letter which 
disputed the DOD findings of a more rapid rate of 
stratospheric fallout. 
With the two letters declassified, Sen. Anderson went 
to the press to report the contradictory findings, along 
with the difficulties of obtaining information from the AEC. 
The New York Times ran both letters on Sunday, March 22, 
1959. 
On Monday, March 23, 1959, Sen. Anderson brought the 
whole matter to the Senate floor. He introduced the 
correspondence between the DOD, AEC and JCAE into the 
Congressional Record. He also introduced several news 
articles on the issue into the record. One news account 
pointed out that although Sen. Anderson was frustrated by 
the AEC and the DOD keeping the information secret, he 
optimistically intrepreted the data as meaning that future 
fallout would only be half that expected, since the fallout 
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was coming down twice as fast than earlier presumed (Richard 
Fryklund, "Anderson Sees Fallout Reaching Faster Rate--But 
New Data Disclosed by Senator May Mean Total Quantity is 
Smaller, " Washington Star, 3/22/59 ; in Senate Record 
3/23/59, p. 4367. ) 
Another news article pointed out Libby's attempts to 
suppress the information, with the help of Gen. Loper, until 
Libby could release data that would come into closer 
agreement with the DOD's findings. Edward Gamarekian, in 
"New Fallout Data Put AEC's Libby on Spot, " pointed out : 
Some Congressmen said yesterday that this entire 
episode may throw considerable doubt on Libby's 
revised estimates and his predictions of the future 
fallout pattern. Libby has been the AEC's leading 
expert and theoretician on fallout. 
This episode also throws into confusion previous 
predictions on the amount of strontium 90 which will 
be deposited on the United States over the next decade 
as well as its rate. Both are important, since a 
faster fallout means it will come down hotter. 
Gamarekian concluded: 
They [ Libby and Loper ] also talked in terms of 
external radiation and omitted [ the effect of ] 
internal radiation produced by the ingestion of 
radioactive atomic end products. Loper mentioned 
strontium 90, but gave no figures, saying only that 
the fallout of this radioactive element is greater in 
the United States than in any other area of the world. 
Libby did not refer to it at all (E. Gamarekian, "New 
Fallout Data Puts AEC's Libby on Spot, " Washington 
Star, 3/23/49; in Senate Record 3/23/59, p. 4368-69) . 
Finally, an editorial run in the Washington Post on the 
same day summarized some of the most salient points : 
once again the Atomic Energy Commission has used a 
'secrecy' stamp to try to prevent the public from 
learning this and other data vital to the health and 
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safety of the Nation. Sen. Anderson . . .  has expressed 
outrage at this attempt to smother information . . . .  
This faster fallout means that harmful particles 
descend to earth far more quickly and in a much 
'hotter' state than previously thought. Surely this 
is the kind of information that the country has a 
right to know. 
Manifestly, the new information should not cause 
any panic. The Defense Daepartment estimates that the 
chances of an individual being immediately affected is 
about 1 in 500, 000. Yet the new disclosure clearly 
affords no grounds for smug proclamations that fallout 
may possibly be good for everyone. There is also 
something deeply distressing about a Pentagon 
spokesman's cool notation to the committee that the 
long-run damage of fallout creates a 'moral issue that 
could be of considerable propaganda importance. ' Isn't 
it conceivable that safeguarding mankind from the 
malignant effects of fallout might be of more than 
mere propaganda importance (Editorial, "Faster 
Fallout,'' Washington Post, 3/23/59 ; in Senate Record 
3/23/59, p. 4369) . 
Sen. Anderson summarized briefly the major scientific 
points gained from the new information, then focused on the 
aspect of the suppression of information: 
I was surprised and disappointed that although the 
information sent to the JCAE was unclassified that 
there was an admonition that the commmittee should 
keep the information to itself and treat it 
confidentially. I know of no obligation on the part 
of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy to withhold 
the truth about fallout from the people of the United 
States. So far as it may be my responsibility on the 
Joint Committee, particularly as chairman of the Joint 
Committee, I intend to see that the essential facts 
are made available to the American people for their 
independent judgment as to their importance (Sen. 
Anderson, Senate Record 3/23/59, p. 4369) . 
Sen. Anderson then yielded to the other Senators who 
wished to speak on the subject. Most notable among them was 
Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey (D-MN) . Humphrey outlined the steps 
which the state of Minnesota had taken independent of the 
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AEC in order to gather all the relevant data on atomic 
fallout. He entered into the record several other newspaper 
articles and a report by the Subcommittee on Disarmament 
( which he chaired) on the latest findings of fallout. Sen. 
Humphrey then made five recommendations to better get at the 
truth on fallout: 
First. It is becoming apparent that the Atomic 
Energy Commission, with its important and primary 
interest in the field of atomic weapons and the 
production of atomic power, is not the best agency to 
conduct research on fallout and its effects on human 
health and heredity. This research should be lodged 
in another Government agency, one which has adequate 
funds to do its job and one which can be completely 
independent in reporting its findings . . .  
I say this, Mr. President, because I am convinced 
the Atomic Energy Commission has been playing down the 
dangers of radioactive fallout as it pursued its 
weapons program. While we need the atomic weapons as 
a shield of defense, we also need to be considerate of 
the lives of human beings now on the face of this 
earth and those yet unborn. 
The second point involved placing the responsibility of 
fallout monitoring and analysis in the U. S. Public Health 
Service and providing it with enough money to do an adequate 
job. Third, Sen. Humphrey recommended that the next 
commissioner, soon to be apointed to the AEC, be a biologist 
or physical scientist, so that the Board could more 
accurately assess the biological hazards of radiation. Sen. 
Humphrey made this recommendation on the basis of the 
suggestions of "his fellow citizen" Dr. Maurice Visscher . 
The fourth point involved getting more information to the 
United Nations Scientific Committee so that they could be 
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more involved in the U.S. discussions relating to the 
international effects of American nuclear wepaons testing. 
He continued: 
Mr. President, I am not satisfied with having 
political bodies of this Government screen materials 
relating to the lives of the people. I have seen 
enough of such screening through the so-called 
censorship apparatus. 
We are not given the information we need even for 
our national security, much less for our physical well­
being. I rise to protest this kind of self-styled 
secrecy on the part of agencies of this Government 
when it involves atomic energy information. 
It is important that all relevant material on the 
health effects of radiation be submitted regardless of 
whether it confirms or casts doubts on Government 
statements and conclusions regarding the extent of 
the danger. 
I am of the opinion that a good deal of the 
material could be [ currently ] held back if it cast 
doubt on some of the earlier statements of Government 
officials. I am not willing to let statements of 
Government officials be considered more important than 
the lives of my children or the lives of children yet 
to be born. We find ourselves today with an 
overwhelming body of evidence coming forth day after 
day as to the problems involved in bomb testing and as 
to the dangers of radioactive fallout. There does not 
seem to be the kind of deep concern in the high 
councils of this Government that there should be .... 
Fifth and finally, it is one thing to conduct more 
research so that we know more of the complete effects 
of radioactivity on man and his environment. It is 
another thing to try to see that this rising 
radioactivity does not raise further. This means that 
the efforts to halt nuclear weapons testing must 
continue to be pursued vigorously. 
The Senator from New Mexico [ Mr. Anderson ] told 
this body today that the northern parts of the United 
Starts happen to fall within an area in which the 
radioactive fallout seems literally to gush down upon 
us, and fall all over us. Because of geography, we 
happen to be the victims of a larger dose of 
radioactive fallout than other parts of the world. 
Mr. President, the five recommendations and 
suggestions above occur to me as a result of reviewing 
the memorandum and articles that I have submitted for 
the Record today. I hope that the administration will 
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see fit to act on them. If not, further investigation 
by committees of the Congress become a vital 
necessity. 
I assure my colleagues today, as I have done 
before, that I stand ready to do everything in my 
power, as chairman of two subcommittees, one on 
disarmament and the other on matters relating to world 
health, to study the danger of radioactive fallout in 
meticulous detail. 
This is something which we cannot trifle (Sen . 
Humphrey, Senate Record 3/23/59, p. 4371) . 
Included in the congressional record were all the 
correspondence between Dr. Visscher and Sen. Humphrey; the 
February 6, 1959 Gov. Freeman press conference report on the 
levels of Strontium 90 in Minnesota wheat; a report of the 
Disarmament subcommittee which summarized the latest 
findings on fallout; and six additional Washington Post 
articles written in March on everything from the hazards of 
Sr90 in milk to criticisms of the "maximum permissible 
concentration" levels as being meaningless and without 
scientific grounds. The articles repeatedly mentioned the 
need for getting the responsibility of health and safety 
monitoring of fallout out of the very agency which 
manufactures and promotes the bombs and nuclear energy which 
produce radioactive fallout. 
The following day the chairman of the AEC, John McCone, 
issued a statement to the JCAE, responding to the 
accusations by Sen. Anderson, and others, that the AEC was 
withholding information from the American public. McCone 
said: 
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No Atomic Energy Commission information relating to 
the radioactive content of the atmosphere and the 
amount of fallout has been withheld from the public or 
from United Nations . ... Finally, I assure this 
Committee most emphatically and unequivocally that so 
long as I am Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission 
I shall not be a party to the suppression or 
distortion of any information bearing on 
the safety and health of the American Public. I am 
fully prepared to assist any competent body in 
developing the facts now in controversy on fallout 
issues and to disclose these facts to the public. I 
am confident that the Atomic Energy Commission has not 
been derelict in its duty in studying radioactive 
fallout and revealing the conclusions of such studies 
when the data have been collated and evaluated. If, 
however, your Committee finds any shortcomings on the 
Commission's part, I pledge you to initiate 
immediately the most vigorous and comprehensive 
corrective measures possible (McCone to JCAE, 
3/24/59, pp.2, 5.). 
Sen. Anderson responded to chairman McCone's statement 
with an example of a study on Sr90 which was written by 
Cowan, E.C. Anderson and Langham, and whose authors had 
requested the immediate declassification of the report in 
October of 1957. The report was still classified. McCone 
had the report immediately declassified (Anderson to 
Compton, 4/20/59). Not to be put into such a position 
again, McCone wrote a memo to the General Manager on March 
27, 1959. In the memo, McCone pointed out concerning the 
remark that no information on radiation in the atmosphere 
and the amount of fallout had been withheld from the public, 
This statement was reviewed for accuracy by the 
Divisions of Military Application, Biology and 
Medicine, Finance, Classification, and Information 
Services. However, I wish to check further on our 
activities in this area to make absolutely sure that 
we are not withholding or suppressing information 
(McCone to General Manager, 3/27/59). 
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McCone requested the General Manager to have on his 
desk by April 1: 1) all the classified information relating 
to fallout and the basis for that classification ; 2) an 
independent survey by the Division of Inspection on the 
procedures and policies of releasing fallout data and the 
people under whose authority that data is released ; and, 3) 
if there was evidence that information was being withheld, 
it was to be included in the Divison of Inspections report. 
McCone wanted to know what the Division of Inspections 
"activities and responsibilities" were, and considered 
creating an independent Inspector General in the AEC. 
McCone requested that the General Counsel review the above 
suggestions for duscussions on the following week (3/27/59). 
What McCone found as the result of his request is open 
for speculation, since the documents are classified ... 
From May 5-8, 1949, the JCAE special subcommittee on 
radiation held hearings on the fallout from nuclear weapons 
testing. The subcommittee conducting the hearings was 
particularly sensitive to the two issues hammered home by 
the committee chairman: 1) the suppression of information; 
and, 2) the location of radioactive hot spots, given the 
fact that the northern part of the U.S. receives the highest 
amount of fallout of anywhere in the world. Though AEC 
chairman John McCone promised all the information possessed 
by the AEC would be released to the American public, and the 
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fact that the 1957 hearing held by the same subcommmittee 
was touted to hold the most comprehensive data on fallout in 
the world, in the more than 2000 pages of testimony, the AEC 
did not present Sr90 counts that were as high as those found 
on the Sauter farm in western Minnesota. 
The hearings opened with an introductory statement by 
Dr. Dunham. He claimed the earlier 1957 hearings before the 
subcommittee had amassed the most comprehensive data on 
fallout to date. He stressed that one of the main 
considerations of the AEC was "To bring to bear on the 
problem all the information that can be made available; we 
take maximum advantage of the combined judgement of able and 
well informed persons" (Fallout from Weapons Tests Hearings, 
1959, v.1, p. 46) . 
Of all the samples taken in the analyses programs which 
the AEC had conducted throughout the country, Dunham said, 
"The sample highest in Sr90 which we have analyzed, however, 
was of wheat submitted to us by the State of Minnesota" 
(Fallout Hearings, 1959, v.1, p. 27) . 
It is not surprising that the person who decided to 
suppress the knowledge of the levels of radiation on 
Sauter's farm in western Minnesota was also the person to 
whom Dr. Dunham referred when asked about specific 
questions on fallout in Minnesota during the opening of the 
hearings--Dr. Gordon Dunning. 
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Given the amount of publicity generated by the release 
of the Sr90 analyses of Minnesota wheat, the AEC was intent 
on downplaying the hazards of fallout from the recent 
nuclear tests. The congressmen were interested in finding 
out if "hot spots" were created by fallout from the nuclear 
tests. But just as the AEC in the months before had 
redefined the calculations on the permissible levels of Sr90 
in the Minnesota wheat, Dr. Dunham offered a new definition 
of the term "hot spot": 
As I first encountered it, it was a word coined by 
Dr. Kermit Larsen, who has done many of the studies in 
the vicinity of the Nevada Test Site. When he talks 
about a ' hot spot, ' he is talking about a number of 
acres. He is not talking about whole counties or 
whole states in which the radioactivity, fresh 
fallout , is manifold that short distance away. What 
we are talking about here is areas, counties, several 
states wide, which in most instances we believe are 
the results of rainouts occurring in trajectories from 
weapons detonated at our test site .... These areas 
are not severalfold in terms of Sr90 or cesium in 
adjacent areas, but they may be as much as half again 
to two or three times (Fallout Hearing 1959, v. 1, pp. 
3 6 - 7 ) . 
The congressional representatives were under the 
impression the topic of hot spots would be the subject of 
in-depth discussion during the hearings. They found this 
not to be the case. Rep. Chet Holifield, chairman of the 
subcommittee which held the hearings, pointed out the AEC 
failed to address the problem of hot spots in a scientific 
manner. On May 18, 1959, Holifield wrote the new General 
Manager, A.R. Luedecke, on the issue: 
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It had been our understanding that the hot spot 
area problem would receive comprehensive treatment in 
the hearings. Thus, our outline specifically 
designated it for discussion in the general review of 
developments since 1957 with the idea that it would be 
further discussed at appropriate points by AEC and 
other witnesses. It is true the hot spot problem was 
touched upon at various points, but it was not dealt 
with in any thorough scientific manner. I am sure 
that much data was submitted bearing on the problem, 
but again it was not teated as a subject of specific 
concern . 
It would therefore be appreciated if the 
Commission would provide a statement describing and 
evaluating the hot spot problem. Such a statement 
might cover among other things: 
a) why we have a hot spot problem ; 
b) the extent of the hot spot problem, i.e., the 
areas involved, and the radiation levels ( both external 
and strontium) . . .  ; 
c) the implications of these hot spot areas from 
the standpoint of maximum permissible exposure levels, 
both as to testing to date, and possible future 
testing, using guidelines established by the seminar 
on implications of testing . . .. It would be 
appreciated if the Commission could supply the 
subcommittee with a supplementary statement on these 
two matters so that our fallout hearing record may be 
complete on these two subject areas ( Fallout 
Hearings 1959, Appendix B, p. 2114). 
The AEC was mandated by law to fully comply with the 
request by Rep. Holifield. Instead of submitting any data 
on hot spots, such as the levels found on the Sauter farm, 
the AEC responded with a statement entitled, "The Hot Spot 
Problem and World Wide Fallout, " which was a refinement of 
the argument used in the earlier AEC document "Some 
Background on Sr90 in Wheat." The AEC stood by the new 
redefinition of "hot spot" which Dunham made in the 
introductions to the hearings, i.e. , 
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areas in which the external radiation dose from 
fallout may be higher by a factor of two to three than 
an adjacent area and the average Sr90 in soil be 
double that in an adjacent area. 
The AEC concluded their statement to Holifield that 
what really mattered was that the level of Sr90 in the human 
bone was so minute that the probablilities of anyone 
contracting leukemia or bone cancer was extremely low 
(Fallout Hearings 1959, Appendix B, pp. 2115-6.) 
Rep. Holifield was not satisfied with the AEC ' s  
response to his request for specific information on the 
levels and locations of local hot spots in Minnesota and 
North Dakota. He again wrote AEC General Manager Luedecke 
on June 17, 1959: 
After reviewing the Commmission's supplementary 
statement on the hot spot problem ... I believe some 
clarification is still required on the specifics of 
the question for the purposes of a meaningful record. 
In particular, it is requested that the AEC 
provide the subcommittee with specifics on the actual 
levels of Sr90 as measured in the various hot spot 
areas such as Minnesota and North Dakota, together 
with an interpretation of this information. 
If such data are not available, the subcommittee 
would like to know what measures would be required to 
obtain such data and what increase in the current 
levels of support would be needed (Holifield to 
Luedecke, 6/17/59; in Fallout Hearing 1959, 
Appendix p. 2116) . 
Three weeks later, Luedecke responded to Holifield ' s  
second specific request for all the relevant hot spot 
information. At this point, if the AEC had wished to comply 
with the law of the land, they would have provided the 
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subcommittee with the Sauter farm findings and other 
information they had on areas in Minnesota which exceeded 
background radiation by factors in the hundreds rather than 
one or two ; especially since it was the Division of Biology 
and Medicine, under which Dunning was the head of the 
Effects of Nuclear Weapons Tests Branch which filed the 
report. The AEC, however, stuck to the broad definition of 
hot spot, and lumped the entire North Central States 
together as one hot spot region. All number values which 
they submitted to the subcommittee were for average values 
of Sr90 in the soil, plants, milk, and other foodstuffs. 
Luedecke said: 
was: 
In summary, estimates of total dietary Sr90 referred 
to as ' maximum diet ' applicable to the population of 
the North Central States is calculated to be 16 
micromicrocuries of Sr90 per kilogram of food. This is 
to be compared with the International Committee for 
Radiation Protection recommended level of 100 as the 
maximum permissible level for populations outside 
controlled areas, and 33 as their · suggestion ' for the 
average concentration in the diet of the whole 
population (Ibid. 1959, Appendix p. 2117). 
The AEC conclusion to the second response to Holifield 
In summary, these studies show that: 
1. Sr90 soil values in the areas of interest . . .  
are not higher than the average for the United States 
as a whole ; 
2. these particular areas, considered from the 
standpoint of Sr90 contamination over the long term, 
which is the important consideration now, should not 
be considered 'Hot Spots ' (Hearings, 1959, Appendix, p. 
2119). 
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The AEC summary was followed by about 20 tables of Sr90 
in milk, water, air, soil, vegetable, hay, cereal and bakery 
products (Ibid. 1959 Appendix pp. 2122-29). The only table 
which could be directly compared to the findings on the 
Sauter farm were the pasture program hay samples (table 17). 
Of the nine samples, the highest Sr90 level was recorded in 
Logan, Utah. The Logan, Utah, Sr90 level was 20 times lower 
than the highest Sr90 levels on Sauter's farm. The only 
Sr90 level given for 1957 alfalfa on the table was 100 times 
lower than the levels of Sr90 found on Sauter's farm. 
Sen. Anderson persisted in requesting all the 
information which the AEC possessed on hot spots in America. 
In a memo to AEC Chairman McCone, Alvin Luedecke, General 
Manager, noted in March of 1960 that the AEC had specific 
values of localities which were subjected to higher than 
average levels of radiation. For instance, the infants in 
the city of St. Louis were subjected to over 20 times the 
background dose for I-131. But, because the fallout 
situation was not exptected to be repeated (considering the 
probability of the reocurrences of one locality being the 
subj ect of repeated high doses of radiation from fallout), 
and given the adverse media reaction from reporting such 
figures, the General Advisory Committee felt it advisable to 
present only average, rather than specific values (Luedecke 
to McCone, 3/29/60). 
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Dead Sheep "In the Ballpark of Causality" 
It is clear that not only individuals, but state and 
federal legislative bodies with oversight authority were 
powerless in their abilities to obtain the whole truth from 
the Atomic Energy Commission. 
Two conflicting issues were at stake: 
1) the protection of the health and safety of the 
American public; and, 
2) the future of the nuclear weapons testing program. 
One might say the actions taken by Dunning in 
suppressing the true levels of radioacvitity on the Sauter 
farm were the actions of only on man. It should be 
remembered, however, that Dunning headed the branch which 
dealt specifically with these types of claims within the 
Division of Biology and Medicine. 
Despite the magnitude of the problem, the Effects of 
Nuclear Weapons Tests Branch was comprised of only three 
scientists and two office personnel, of which Dr. Dunning 
was the chief. Though he was in a pivotal position, others 
knew of the excessive levels of radiation on the Sauter 
farm, and agreed to keep the true levels "in the family" of 
the AEC. 
John Harley (chief of the Analytic Branch of the Health 
and Safety Laboratory) , who also participated in the 1959 
JCAE hearings on fallout; Oliver Placak (who was in charge 
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of the USPHS Nevada radiaiton monitoring and analysis 
program); W.W. Allaire (Director of the AEC' s Albuquerque 
Operations OFfice); and Roscoe Goeke (of the AEC' s Eniwetok 
Proving Grounds) all received the July 15, 1958 memo which 
stated that the true levels on Sauter' s farm were not to be 
made public for fear of being misinterpreted and damaging to 
the AEC. 
If the counts found on the Sauter farm could not have 
caused the damages which Sauter claimed, why did they 
suppress the information? Releasing the counts could have 
set off a negative chain reaction for the AEC. 
On the individual level, the counts would have 
j ustified a much more intense sampling and analysis of the 
vegetation and animals on Sauter's farm. Independent 
scientists could have calculated the level of radiation from 
the initial fallout and found the levels to be closer to 
10, 000 times above normal background radiation rather than 
100 times. Releasing the figures could have opened the 
floodgates to countless other claims being filed against the 
AEC . 
On the state level, releasing the true counts would 
have legitimated the findings by Dr. Visscher and others on 
the Atomic Development Problems Committee and would have 
lent great support to the implementation and funding of a 
state controlled radiation monitoring and analysis program. 
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If similarly high levels were found by independent 
state scientists in Minnesota, concerned citizens, 
congressional representatives and scientists could have used 
this information in calling for a halt in the nuclear 
weapons testing program. For this reason, officials within 
the AEC chose to protect the broader interests of the 
missions set out in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, to 
promote the development of nuclear energy and to develop 
nuclear weapons, rather than protecting the health and 
safety of American lives. 
The counts were not released. 
The final question that remains to be answered, were 
40% of the herd, or 92 sheep, killed on Joe Sauter's farm in 
1957 as a result of radioactive fallout from the nuclear 
weapons tests in Nevada? 
Three independent scientists were asked to give their 
opinion on this question. Bernd Franke is the director of 
the Institute for Energy and Environment in Takoma Park, MD. 
He came over from Heidleberg, Germany, in 1980 at the 
request of the scientific panel studying the doses of 
radiation received by the people in the community 
surrounding the Three Mile Island accident. Dr. Karl z .  
Morgan, former director of the Health Physics department of 
the Oak Ridge National Labs, and Dr. Roland Finston, 
currently head of the Health Physics department at Stanford 
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University were solicited for their opinions on the 
question. 
The most lucid analysis of the question is that of Dr. 
Finston. Dr. Finston met with me three times over the last 
two years on the case. In August, 1986, Dr. Finston 
reviewed the narrative of the case, and compared the gross 
beta and strontium counts found on the Sauter farm, with the 
fallout studies and their effect on sheep as a result of the 
"Nancy" shot from the Operation Upshot-Knothole series in 
1953. Dr. Finston picked the "Nancy" study for comparative 
analysis, because it ' s  dose calculations fit the Sauter case 
more neatly than any of the other AEC or DOE contracted 
studies on fallout and its effect on sheep. In that 
instance, sheep in Nevada and Utah were dusted with fresh 
fallout within 12 hours after detonation of the bomb. On 
August 30, 1986, Dr. Finston wrote me with his analysis. 
Rather than take anything out of context, his analysis is 
included in full as follows: 
Dear Cliff, 
I have been pondering what to make of the Sauter 
sheep story. The greatest unknowns are: 
1. How much weathering occurred, between the time the 
leaves that fell to the ground in 1957 were 
collected in May of 1958 ? We could conservatively 
assume none. (If there was any weathering, the 
doses would be higher. ) 
2. How much time were the collected leaves on the 
trees (and weathering) before falling to the 
ground? Although it is anecdotally stated that 
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leaves started falling early, we don't know if the 
leaves collected that (and therefore weren't eaten 
by the sheep) might not have been the last ones to 
fall to the ground. Let's assume the leaves that 
were collected in 1958, fell to the ground about 
Sept. 1, after 70 days of weathering, following 
their contamination on 6/22/57. 
3. Using the weathering formula from "Nancy" sheep 
report PNL-4278: UC-41 
(0. 75e-0. 693t/5 day +0. 25e -0. 693t/18 day), the 
70-day weathering reduced the amount on the leaves 
to 0. 0387 of its initial value. 
4. What did the sheep eat from 6/22 on? Because the 
fresh fission products have so many short lived 
species, I believe if they were injured by Wilson 
fallout, it was as the result of browsing on 
vegetation on the ground at the time of the 
rainout, rather than from the leaves, which only 
began to fall a week later. One might assume that 
the amount we calculated to be present on the oak 
leaves was also present (same mCi/kg) on the 
browse. What do you surmise about that? Were 
that the case, and neglecting the weathering 
calculation for a moment, if you back-decay the 
gross B count (4900 d/m/g ash) to "unit-time" e. g. 
1 hour post detonation) and assume the total gross 
B count was all as the result of Wilson, then 
assume all the fallout arrived at 96 hours post 
detonation and the sheep began grazing on it at 
that time then using 
Fig. 9. 26 of Glasstone I calculate "gross B" 
intake (total) 1. 7 mCi between June 22 and Sept. 1 
as the result of eating 1. 4 kg/day (dry weight) of 
food contaminated similarly to the oak leaves. If 
you then take into account the weathering factor: 
1. 7mCi/ (0. 0387) = 44mCi total intake gross B­
activity. 
5. Would such an amount kill the sheep? 3 out of 8 
of Sasser, Bell, and West's sheep fed 234 mCi (78 
mCi/day for 3 days) of Yttrium 90 died, (on days 
25, 102, 133 following dosing). 
So we're "in the ballpark, " albeit, a bit low. 
In another analysis, retrospective like ours, 
Sasser et al calculated a localized dose of 200 
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rems to part of the rumen wall of the "Nancy" 
sheep who they calculated had ingested 3.5 mCi in 
a week (the "40mr/hr (H+12)" group). So, it's 
conceivable that Sauter's sheep had some local hot 
spot doses (in their rumens) in the range 
sufficient to produce G .. I. damage 44/3.5 X 200 = 
2500 rads). 
6. There are a lot of very loose ends in this 
analysis. I would not stand up in a court of law 
and try to prove that Wilson fallout caused the 
kill. It would be better to see if any other 
measurements on the diet the sheep were on from 
6/22-6/29 might be inferred, for that is when the 
major dose was inflicted (the first week); is is 
plausible that local rainout from a 10kt shot ever 
produced l0's of mr/hr at H+4 days, that far 
downwind? 
I look forward to your reaction. 
Sincerely, 
Roland 
P.S. A parallel analysis using the "fresh" Sr-90 
activity in the ash leads to a similar conclusion: 
each sheep would have ingested 9.2mCi gross B intake 
from 6/22-6/29; assuming a weathering factor of 
0.0387, ash is 10% of dry weight, ground vegetation 
similar to contamination to oak leaves, ingestion 
began with the rain out of 6/22. 
That's about the best I can make of it, somewhere 
between 10 and 40 mCi ingested (Finston to 
Honicker, 9/30/86). 
Dr. Finston made his analysis on the Sauter case twenty 
nine years after the fallout took place. He made his 
analysis 15 years after the death of Joe Sauter. As such, 
Dr. Finston had to make several logical assumptions about 
the fallout scenario. In the AEC Claim form that Sauter 
filed, he noted the first dead sheep were found under the 
grove of oak trees, whose leaves were "shedding." Sauter ' s  
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nephews remembered the leaves falling off well before the 
first frost , because it was the first and last time they had 
seen such an event , but they did not remember exactly when 
that was. Dr. Finston made the assumption that , though the 
leaves registered a high amount of radiation , it was not the 
leaves that killed the sheep. It was what they ate "on the 
browse , "  the week immediately following the initial fallout. 
Dr. Finston made the keen assumption that the leaves 
Sauter collected , in all likelihood were not the same as the 
more radioactive leaves that fell off the trees shortly 
after the fallout hit his farms. Those leaves were eaten by 
the sheep. The leaves that remained on the trees and were 
not eaten by the sheep had a longer time to decay. Thus , 
Dr. Finston came up with the 70-day weather factor. 
Dr. Finston points out that the 70-day decay factor is 
the length of time the leaves weathered on the trees before 
falling to the ground. Since he had no equations for 
figuring the weathering factor for the 250+ days that the 
leaves reamined out in the open , on the ground , that 
estimate was left out. A longer weathering time factored in 
would result in a higher dose received by the sheep. As 
such , Dr. Finston's assessment can be seen as conservative. 
Despite the fact , Dr. Finston found that the level of 
radiation was "in the ballpark , albeit a bit low" for 
causing the death of the sheep. But , there are too many 
129 
uncertainties, too many times where critical facts are not 
known and assumptions are made, for Dr. Finston to say that 
the death of the sheep could be proved to be caused by 
radiation. 
One could be drawn into an endless controversy, trying 
to prove or disprove the death of the sheep due to 
radiation, based on the known facts. A hundred different 
factors could be introduced that would either increase or 
decrease the dose estimates by several factors of magnitude. 
Two very important questions, however can be answered. 
One, is it likely that all of the fallout was from one shot? 
And, two, did the symptoms that Sauter' s sheep exhibited, 
resemble in any way those exhibited by Bell, and his 
associates after their experimental sheep were fed Yttrium 
90 laced alfalfa pellets, which simulated fallout Bell, et 
al., 1970: , 71-82)? 
If either question is answered negatively, then there 
is no point to continue any speculation. If the vegetation 
on Sauter's farm were contaminated by a number of different 
(and presumably later) shots, then a precise measurement or 
estimate would be impossible. As equally important, if the 
symptoms that Sauter's sheep exhibited in no way compared to 
known symptoms of radiation sickness in sheep exposed to 
simulated fallout, then a case of radiation exposure would 
be very difficult to even consider. 
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There were five other shots whose fallout clouds passed 
over or near the vicinity of Sauter ' s  farm in 1957, 
according to the trajectory maps developed by Lewis Machta 
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The rain data for the town of Alexandria (the town closest 
to Sauter' s farm where climatological data was gathered) for 
the days the shots passed over or nearby are as follows: 
June 22nd ..... • 1.3 inches 
July 25th ...... trace 
July 26th ...... trace 
Sept. 1st ...... 0.23 inches 
Sept. 17th ..... trace 
Oct. 8th ....... 0.01 inches (source: Minn. Star) 
The Wilson shot distinguishes itself from the other 
five shots in two important areas. The clouds from the 
other shots were in the stratosphere, high above the rain 
clouds. As mentioned earlier in the report, Willard Libby 
131 
and others became embroiled in an argument with Sen. Clinton 
Anderson on the mean, half-residence time for fallout in the 
stratosphere. The estimates ranged from two to seven years. 
The fallout cloud from the Wilson shot that passed in the 
vicinity of Sauter ' s  farm was in the troposphere, or at 
10, 000 feet. Fallout in this cloud layer is generally 
assumed to fallout close to the test site, and it generally 
falls out of the sky within a few months at most. Where 
there were light to nearly non-existent rains at the time of 
the other shots ( whose clouds were travelling above the rain 
line), there was a comparative "deluge" of 1.3 inches at the 
time of the Wilson shot passing over. The radioactivity from 
the Wilson shot stands as the most logical candidate for 
depositing the radioactivity found in the vegetation samples 
on Sauter's farm. 
The answer to the second question can be found by 
comparing the symptoms Sauter's sheep exhibited with those 
found in the experimental study of Bell, et al., ( 1970). 
In the claim form that Sauter sent to the AEC, he 
described the sheep as suffering from scours, shrinkage of 
the flesh, paralysis, and the entire floor section of 
bladder and "urinals" in one animal is absent. He described 
the area ( bladder and urinals) as looking cancerous. 
Another symptom Sauter observed was weight loss: one animal 
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shrunk from 80 to 40 lbs. Other difficulties centered 
around the difficulties in birthing and reproduction of the 
animals. 
Bell and his associates found that animals who were fed 
the higher levels of radiation (the 234 mCi that Dr. Finston 
mentioned) suffered weight loss on the average of 1-2 pounds 
per day (Bell et al, 1970: 73). Sheep fed the higher levels 
of radiation developed mild to severe diarrhea (Bell et al, 
1970: 75). And finally, lesions, blisters, polyps developed 
where the fallout settled in the rumen and abomasum of the 
digestive tract, although they did not see lesions in the 
large intestine as earlier predicted (Bell et al., 1970: 
77) . 
There are some similarities between the two. Sauter 
said his sheep were suffering from "scours." Scours are 
what farmers call a severe diarrhea in young animals. Bell 
and his associates found mild to severe diarrhea in the 
higher level radiation exposed sheep. In both cases, the 
experienced weight loss. Anorexia is a well known symptom 
of acute radiation poisoning. Finally, Sauter apparently 
cut one of the dead animals open and found gross 
abnormalities in the "urinals and the bladder. The region 
is cancerous." It is possible that he saw areas in the 
digestive system where the fallout settled, leaving black, 
133 
necrotic, blistered, or polyp like growth areas, as Bell and 
his associates described in their study. 
In conclusion, it is conceivable, even plausible that 
the sheep on Sauter's farm were injured, even mortally 
injured by radiation. But it ' s  not provable. The reasons 
for this do not necessarily deal with the limitations of our 
knowledge of physics. They have to do with government 
officials who, 28 years ago, covered up the true nature of 
the facts regarding fallout, out of fear of damaging the 
programs of the Atomic Energy Commission. 
Had Sauter been given the true counts on the farm back 
in 1958, even with a detailed denial from the AEC at the 
time as to their blame for causing the damage Sauter 
alleged, Sauter could have easily gone to Senator Humphrey 
for help in finding independent scientists to affirm or 
refute the AEC ' s position. Sen. Humphrey, as reported in 
the April 14th, 1958 edition of the Minneapolis Star, was 
committed to helping Sauter on the fallout case. Even the 
state of Minnesota was committed to developing independent 
sources for monitoring and analyzing radiation. With 
independent, or even Minnesota state scientists working on 
the case with Sauter, all the unanswered questions that we 
face today would have been answered. 
The outcome of releasing the information, getting it 
into the hands of Sen. Humphrey, Sen. Anderson of the Joint 
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Committee on Atomic Energy, the Minnesota scientists Dr. 
Caster and Visscher, could have ultimately affected the 
momentum of the atmospheric nuclear weapons testing program. 
That is the only interpretation that can be made by 
Dunning ' s  observation that "misinterpretation of the data 
could prove damaging to the AEC. " 
The AEC government officials, who were supposedly 
making scientific decisions, made a political decision to 
withhold information for fear of harm coming to the overall 
nuclear weapons program. But that decision was not theirs 
to make. It is the right and duty of congressional 
representatives such as Sen. Humphrey and Anderson to openly 
question government practices (such as nuclear explosions) 
that threaten to endanger the lives and property of American 
citizens. But the AEC officials held a tight rein on 
information critical to their program, and as such 
manipulated the public ' s  opinion about the safety of fallout 
from nuclear weapon's test. The AEC had the absolute power 
over the control of information coming in this arena. As 
Lord Acton said "Absolute power corrupts absolutely. " 
For many years, the Atomic Energy Commission was openly 
criticized for its dual role in both regulating and 
promoting nuclear energy. That is why, in 1973, the Atomic 
Energy Commission was abolished. Out of the ashes arose two 
agencies, the Department of Energy, which controls the 
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production of nuclear weapons, and the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, which licenses, and oversees the operation of 
America's nuclear power plants. But, from the experiences 
gained from the 1984 Congressional investigation, the 
actions of the DOE in withholding information from the House 
Energy, Conservation and Power Subcommittee in 1984, were no 
different than the AEC withholding information from Sauter, 
the scientists representing the State of Minnesota and Sen. 
Humphrey in the late 1950's. 
As long as secrecy and fear dominate, sectors of our 
government will remain more authoritarian than democratic. 
It is indeed ironic, that the nuclear weapons program was 
first developed to stand as a bastian against 
authoritarianism. Yet, the men carrying out the day to day 
duties of those agencies acted as though the development of 
nuclear weapons was paramount. Individual's rights could be 




THE SOCIOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE 
Three Rules to Remember 
As the son of Dolph Honicker , 25 year veteran news 
editor of the Nashville Tennessean , I was given three rules 
of writing and reporting: 
Son , [ my father would say ) Number one , never make 
assumptions if the facts aren't there to support them. 
Number two , don't explain , let the facts speak for 
themselves. And number three , never end a sentence with 
a preposition. 
It was for these reasons that the most conservative 
reading of the documents found in the files has been 
presented. That is why it was stated in the first chapter 
that Dunning "should" have known (but not that he did know) 
about the laws regarding fallout and decay curves , and why 
it was absolutely imperative to factor back to the time of 
the fallout so as to assess the true level of damage on 
Sauter's farm. Despite the man' s prestigious position as 
the chief of the "Effects of Nuclear Weapons Testing 
Branch , "  I could not categorically state that the man knew 
the facts on fallout , and that he nevertheless covered up. 
What if Gordon Dunning was incompetent , hired only because 
he had a PhD in Science Education , and only as a figurehead 
to deny any and all claims of radiation injury? He might 
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have known little about calculating the levels of radiation 
and the unit dose to individuals (or animals) more than a 
year after the initial fallout. 
Before passing judgement on the man, and the AEC, I had 
to determine if the man was capable of making certain 
evaluations, regardless of his position. The critical 
scientific evaluation that was never done by Dunning in the 
Sauter affair was the simple calculation of determining the 
unit dose at the time of fallout. Even excluding the 
weathering factors, Dunning could have gone back to 
Glasstone's The Effects of Nuclear Weapons and plotted the 
decay curve. To this point, following my my father's 
injunction, I've given the man and the Agency that he 
represented every benefit of the doubt. 
Two new pieces of information concerning Dunning have 
come to light. Not only did this scientist know about decay 
curves; when it came time for the Atomic Energy Commission 
to explain the meaning of decay curves and its relation to 
fallout at great distances from the nuclear test site, it 
was Gordon Dunning who explained the scientific nature of 
the rapid decay factors of fallout to Congress in his 
address to the Special Subcommittee on Radiation of the 
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in the hearings titled "The 
Nature of Radioactive Fallout and its Effects on Man. " 
(JCAE , 1957: 170-247) . Dunning's extensive testimony and 
presentation of graphs and reports demonstrates the 
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incontrovertible fact that he not only was aware of decay 
curves, it was his duty to explain the nature of 
radioactivity in relation to decay, the effect radioactivity 
had on humans, plants and animals, including the function of 
time with respect to dose. 
Why, if he knew precisely how to calculate the true 
levels of radioactivity on Sauter' s farm, did he not do that 
and then use those true levels to make some sort of accurate 
estimate of the dose that Sauter's sheep received to their 
gastrointestinal tract? In his testimony subheaded 
"Internal Exposures, " he stated: 
The principal hazards from intake of relatively large 
amounts of radioactive fallout for several weeks 
immediately following a nuclear detonation are doses 
to the: (a) gastrointestional tract, from the gross 
fission product activity; (b) thyroid, from isotopes of 
iodine; and (c) bone, principally from isotopes of 
strontium and barium-lanthanum (Dunning, in Hearings, 
1 957: 177) . 
From the symptoms the sheep exhibited before they died 
(indicating severe gastrointestinal disturbances) and the 
extremely high 1 year + post shot radiation findings, 
whistles, bells, sirens should have been going off in 
Dunning's mind, alerting him to the fact that there was 
evidence on Sauter's farm that radiation might well have 
been involved in the death of the sheep. 
But instead of investigating, Dunning chose to coverup. 
Thirty years later, Dunning's list of problems from 
fallout have come to haunt Douglas County in Minnesota, the 
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home of Joe Sauter' s farm. Cancer rates for Douglas County 
have been compiled from the U. S. Cancer Mortality, Rates and 
Trends Volumes 1-3 by Dr. Richard L. Miller (see Appendix 
C). Both thyroid cancer and bone cancer are statistically 
higher than expected in Douglas County compared to the 
cancer rate for the state of Minnesota as a whole. The 
facts are even more disturbing when one looks at the fact 
that Douglas County has a lower cancer rate than the state 
for "All Cancers Combined, " yet many radiogenic cancers such 
as the two mentioned above, along with leukemia, malignant 
melanoma, multiple myeloma are above the state cancer rates. 
(For a graphic illustration of the problems, see Figures 3, 
4, and 5. ) 
Government statisticians might retort that the numbers 
of cancers in the county are too low to prove radiation 
exposure and cancer causality. Qualitatively, however, the 
statistics point in the right direction of causality. It 
should have to go without saying that the family survivors 
of the people in Douglas county who died of thyroid and bone 
cancers would define their own losses as "significant, " 
regardless of anyone else' s opinion. 
Because of one man's decision, along with the 
concurrance of his peers at the highest operational levels 
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Why? Why did he do what he did, when he knew what he 
knew? 
Dunning's own statements, as cited in Ball (1986), 
provide the probable reason. Note that Dunning is referring 
to the sanitized verson of the levels of fallout reported by 
the government Ball prefaces the Dunning quotation: 
AEC medical advisors testified at congressional 
hearings in 1957 and 1959, and at the AEC 
commissioner's meetings, that accepting the more 
conservative safety figures 'would make it impossible 
to conduct operations at the test site without major 
changes in procedures'. Dr. Gordon M. Dunning, 
Division of Biology and Medicine, in 1957 testimony 
before the Joint Committee, stated that the AEC 
scientists and technicians, ' with moderate effort', 
could reduce even further the release of radioactive 
materials into the atmosphere. However, if we 
continue to reduce the fraction we are willing to 
release, we eventually reach a cost of control which 
makes the operation prohibitive. The dilemma is that 
we must weigh the degree of undesirability of 
radioactive fallout against the advantages which may 
be anticipated from activities which are inevitably 
accomplished by fallout (cited in Ball, 1986: 41). 
Put in simpler terms, to significantly reduce the level 
of fallout would cost so much, that it would be impossible 
to continue nuclear weapons testing. To gain knowledge, the 
"advantages" of nuclear weapons testing (superiority over 
the Russians) Americans must accept some degree of 
radioactive fallout. 
Not to mention disinformation fallout. It is 
reasonable to presume that Dunning knew exactly what he was 
doing. He knew that if the Sauter case came to light and 
established solid evidence for livestock injury due to 
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fallout that was further from the test site than any other 
recorded in history, then the costs for insuring that it 
could never happen again might bring the nuclear weapons 
testing program to a grinding halt. Imagine that. A 
billion dollar weapons testing program. A multi-billion 
dollar arms race. A poor, self-educated farmer in Farwell 
with dead sheep on his hands and no place to turn. 
Neal Shover defines organizational crime as 
. . .  criminal acts committed by individuals or groups 
of individuals, thus including conspiracies, during 
the normal course of their work as employees of 
organizations, which they intend to contribute to the 
achievement of goals or other objectives thought to 
be important for the organization as a whole, some 
subunit within the organization, or their own 
particular job duties. Individuals may be well aware 
while committing such an act or series of acts that 
their personal fortunes and organizational career (s) 
will be thereby enhanced or jeopardized. Still, so 
long as, in their motivation, their acts contain even 
a modicum of intent to benefit the organization, they 
fall within the ambit of this definition (Shover, 
cited in Ermann and Lundman, 1978: 39) . 
From the data presented in previous chapters, it is 
clear that Dunning committed governmental crime. With 
forethought and premeditation he broke specific laws of the 
United States Criminal Codes in the performance of his 
duties as the head of the Effects of Nuclear Weapons Testing 
Branch of the Division of Biology and Medicine for the 
Atomic Energy Commission. Keeping information secret had 
powerful effects on two different levels. 
Six years after the fallout killed Joe Sauter's sheep, 
five years after Dunning ' s  decision to lie and coverup in 
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the Sauter case, the above ground nuclear weapons test ban 
treaty was signed. His job done, Dunning then moved up the 
AEC ladder to head the Division of Occupational Safety in 
the AEC . 
Meanwhile, Sauter' s neighbors thought he was crazier 
than ever. 
Dunning reached retirement age in 1975. After his 
retirement, he settled in an upper middle class retirement 
community in Arizona. 
Four years before, 1971, Joe Sauter finally succumbed 
to the cancer that began in his bladder was found inoperable 
and slowly twisted the life out of his body. He was found in 
his one-room smoke-filled cabin by the county maintenance 
snow-remover crew. He was barely able to move, but they got 
him to the hospital. 
Ironically, radiation therapy was used, but to no 
avail, the cancer took his life. Now, the head of Radiology 
for Boston University Medical hospital believes that 
radiation may have caused his cancer. 
Secrets: Their Impact on An Open Society 
Although the files that comprised the Sauter case did 
not have any classification markings restricting them from 
public access, they were effectively kept from public view 
for thirty years. Several of the other cases that I 
discovered were classified, from the lowest non-security 
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classification, "For Officials Use Only, " to the highest 
classification "Top Secret." 
What such classification means is that release of the 
information could be injurious to the defense and national 
security of America. Though there is nothing in the 
consitution about the right of the government to withhold 
information in the national interest, the practice has been 
with us since the days of our first President and commander 
in Chief, Mr. George Washington (see Barker and Fox, 1972). 
The executive priviledge of classifying information was 
minimal and flexible until the time of the first and second 
world wars. The rapid escalation of secrecy in government 
coincided with technological development in warfare 
equipment. 
Security classifications were in three grades, top 
secret, secret, and restricted data. Barker and Fox give 
the definition of the three levels of classification 
The most stringent label was "Top Secret." It was 
to be applied only to that information or material 
the defense aspect of which is paramount and the 
unauthorized disclosure of which could result in 
exceptionally grave damage to the nation such as 
leading to a definite break in diplomatic relations 
affecting the defense of the United States, an armed 
attack against the United States or its allies, a 
war, or the compromise of military or defense plans, 
or intelligence operations, or scientific, or 
technological developments vital to the National 
defense. 
The 'Secret' label was to be applied to a document 
when disclosure could result in serious damage to the 
nation, such as by jeopardizing the international 
relations of the United States, endangering the 
effectiveness of a program or policy of vital 
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importance to the national defense, or compromising 
important military or defense plans, scientific or 
technological developments important to national 
defense, or information revealing important 
intelligence operations (Barker and Fox, 1972: 13-
14) • 
It's understandable in a time of war that we would want 
to keep our technological advances in the art of warfare 
from our enemies. We certainly would not want them to know 
the weaknesses in our planes, ships, submarines, tanks, 
radars. To have such information leak out would indeed 
result in visible damages to the defense of our country. It 
is understandable that the penalty for disclosing such 
information could lead to life in prison if convicted (or 
death, as in the case of the Rosenbergs) . 
With the AEC, the license to classify information was 
freely given. Where other agencies in government, such as 
the State Department must automatically declassify their 
documents after 30 years, once an AEC official classified a 
document, it, by law, could stay classified forever. 
During the course of my Congressional investigation, I 
came across a set of files that listed about 80 cases of 
individuals that, similar to Joe Sauter, had claimed injury 
by radiation exposure, either at a nuclear weapons test, in 
AEC-contracted nuclear facilities, or from fallout, as in 
Sauter's case. Half of the files were classified; from 
"official use only" to "secret. " To our amazement, when we 
requested a file that reported on the levels of strontium 90 
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in the soil of the Rongelap atoll following the detonation 
of the 15 megaton shot "Bravo" on March 1, 1954, in direct 
response to our request for the files, the Department of 
Energy upgraded the national security classification of the 
30 year old file from "Secret" to "Top Secret . "  
I remember asking my supervisor who was Q-cleared to 
review classified files for the reasoning behind upgrading a 
30 year old report on radioactive dirt on a small pacific 
atoll 5000 miles from the us top secret? How would release 
of information on some hot dirt on a humid tropical island 
that is smaller than Knox County lead to 
exceptionally grave damage to the nation such as 
leading to a definite break in diplomatic relations 
affecting the defense of the United States, an armed 
attack against the United States or its allies, a 
war, or the compromise of military or defense plans, 
or intelligence operations, or scientific, or 
technological developments vital to the National 
defense (cited earlier in Barker and Fox) ? 
My supervisor just shrugged and said that they had the 
Department of Energy power to do that, and besides, even if 
she knew what was in the report, she couldn' t tell me, it 
was a secret. 
Atomic Power and Social Power 
This case study of AEC cover-ups is a study of the use 
of social power to promote atomic power. But what exactly 
is to be meant by the term "social power?" Debates over its 
meaning have been voluminous and contentious (Martin, 1977 ; 
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Wrong, 1979; Miller, 1983). suffice to say that its atomic 
structure has been delved. Still, one of the most 
enlightening discussion os the concept is that of Steven 
Lukes (1975). Lukes provides a complex, three-dimensional 
view of power, which is useful for deepening our 
understanding of the material at hand. 
The first dimension of power is the most easily grasped 
of the three. In Dahl' s (1957: 201) explication: "A has 
power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something 
that B would not do otherwise." The emphasis here is on 
observable behaviour, decision-making, key issues, overt 
conflict, and observable expression of interests (Lukes, 
1975: 25). 
The federal agency, the AEC (here "A") conducted 
atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons that created 
potentially harmful fallout to the American public, the 
citizens of Minnesota, and Joe Sauter (all "B"s). The AEC 
was successful in getting all of these (and their more 
knowledgeable political representatives) to accept this 
potential harm even though it was contrary to their 
interests. That is, it is unlikely that any of these 
parties would have volunteered to be subjected to radiation. 
The first dimension of power, as its name indicates, 
tends to be one-dimensional, suface level, superficial. It 
is a report of what actions were taken by whome and it may 
include a report of how decisions were made. The one-
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dimensional view of power has a built-in analytic bias in 
its focus on only those issues which are defined as such by 
the decision-makers themselves. There is an unstated 
conservative assumption that even though decisions sometimes 
may be inequitable, the array of issues in the political 
arena do, indeed, represent the various interests of the 
citizenry. Although the legitimacy of the decision-making 
process may be questioned from time to time, the legitimacy 
of the agenda-setting process is not. 
The second dimension of power focuses on non­
decisions, non-issues, expressed grievances, and covert 
conflict (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962, 1963 ; Lukes, 1975) . The 
central point of this dimension is most elegantly expressed 
by Schattschneider (1960: 71) : 
All forms of political organization have a bias in 
favour of the exploitation of some kinds of conflict 
and the suppression of others, because organization is 
the mobilization of bias. Some issues are organized 
into politics while others are organized out. 
Examples of second-dimensional power are pervasive 
throughout the body of this case study. At every step of 
the way the AEC mobilized its resources (bias) to deny not 
only Sauter's claim but also the concerns of the state of 
Minnesota, the press, and Sen. Humphrey's and Sen. 
Anderson ' s  committees. Issues became non-issues and 
decisions became non-decisions. 
The state of Minnesota requested from the AEC all their 
data on hotspots in the state. The state had a grievance. 
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Its scientists had collected river water samples that 
exceeded the maximum permissible level for human consumption 
of gross beta radiation products. It wanted data to 
substantiate the need for extra precautions and it wanted 
independent state-controlled laboratories to test 
radioactive fallout. Similarly, Joe Sauter had a grievance. 
He filed a claim requesting compensation for radiation 
injury in the death of 92 of his sheep. Sauter wanted a 
confirmation that vegetation from its farm was radioactive. 
The AEC made autonomous decisions to report to both 
Minnesota's Governor ' s  Scientific Advisory Committee on 
Atomic Energy Development Problems and to Joe Sauter that 
there was not enough radiation falling out over Minnesota to 
warrant an independent monitoring and analysis laboratory 
nor to warrant compensation for the dead sheep. 
Requests for information by the state of Minnesota, by 
Sen. Humphrey, by the chairman of the Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy, and by Sauter went through normal 
bureaucratic channels. These were channels through which 
nothing flowed out. By withholding information the AEC 
prevented the mobilization of power resources by the 
aggrieved parties. The issue was removed from the political 
agenda. 
The mobilization of bias was stretched to absurd 
lengths in the Sauter case. On a claim against the AEC for 
only $1556.40, the AEC actively involved or informed a dozen 
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of their top officials for over a year. The clearest 
example was the employment on the claim of Dr. Donald 
Chadwick, head of Special Radiological Services for the 
Department of Health. Dr. Chadwick was also a member of the 
Federal Radiation Council, a committee that directly advised 
President Eisenhower (Metzger, 1972) . Of the radiation 
injury claim against the government, only 0. 1% was for 
personal injury ($15) . Yet the AEC had one of its top 
consultants investigate that portion of the claim. Why? It 
gave the AEC the appearance of expertise, even though the 
evidence was not carefully considered. 
Walking through the Sauter case, one perceives a clear 
and pervasive mobilization of bias to insure that nothing 
happened. The case was not decided openly, equitably, or 
scientifically. From May, 1958, when the head official of 
Albuquerque Operations first wrote Sauter denying that 
fallout from any Nevada Test Operations could possibly have 
harmed his sheep, to the April, 1959 from the same official, 
denying his claim for lack of any evidence, the AEC was 
oriented toward damage prevention to the organization rather 
than protecting the health and safety of the claimant and 
the public at large. 
Luke ascribes to second-dimensional power a "reformist" 
value assumption. This dimension gets at what goes on 
behind closed doors. It implies a call for openness, for 
due process, for constitutional rights. But the 
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second-dimensional approach only deepens the description of 
the problem. It does not address the question of why people 
do not openly rebel against such abuse. 
It is at this point that third-dimensional power comes 
into play. The third dimension of power refers to the 
control of information and knowledge as a form of power that 
structures the process of issue formation. For power is 
expressed not only when something happens (an issue is 
resolved) , and not only when action is taken to make nothing 
happen (an issue becomes a non-issue) , but also when nobody 
does anything at all (objective interests remain 
non-issues) . The third dimension of power allows for the 
analysis of unexpressed interests and latent conflicts in 
society. As Lukes states, it is difficult, but not 
impossible to study potential issues that do not become 
visible as a result of the control of information. John 
Gaventa's Power and Powerlessness (1980) is an empirical 
case study of why people, in the face of glaring inequities 
do not rebel . 
Gramsci's (1971) "cultural hegemony" concept is 
relevant at this point. Social values taught at an early 
age and continual normative pressure shape people's 
preconception of what is a real issue, who has a right to 
determine such issues, and how issues are to be constructed . 
Faith in government, accepting the official stand , is 
for many people an even more powerful influence than the 
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media. For example, some of Joe's neighbors condemn Joe 
because he openly criticized the AEC officials for their 
"willful and premeditated deceit." One neighbor said, "You 
just don' t talk like that about the government." Her tone 
was not that of fear (as perhaps a Russian might say, "you 
just don' t criticize the Party like that") but more of some 
one speaking of something distasteful. 
Even on an institutional level often there are not 
sufficient resources to reconstruct an issue once it has 
been neutralized by second dimensional power. Third­
dimensional value consensus limits such attempts. In a 
sense, what could the Governor Advisory Science Committee do 
when the AEC officials said, "We have given you all the 
data, and as you can see, there is no danger from fallout, 
now or in the future." The scientific advisory committee 
was compelled to accept the decision because of the cultural 
hegemony of law and government. The 1954 Atomic Energy Act 
mandated the AEC, first and foremost, to protect the health 
and safety of American citizens from any dangers or harm 
that might arise from nuclear weapons testing operations. 
Who could doubt that the AEC should abide by the law? 
Moreover, the AEC was the only agency with the range of 
expertise to adequately assess the problems involved. The 
AEC owned the experts and the cultural hegemony of 
"expertise" ensured its powers. Governor Orville Freeman's 
Scientific Advisory Committee, Sen. Humphrey's Senate 
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Committee on Disarmament , Sen. Clinton Anderson' s Joint 
Committee on Atomic Energy , all deferred. 
When the Atomic Energy Commission was charged with 
promoting nuclear weapons development , and protecting the 
health of the people from the deleterious effects of nuclear 
weapons testing , the agency was put into a position of 
irreconcilable conflict. When forced to choose which was 
most important , the continuation of weapons testing came as 
a higher priority in the minds of the leading AEC officials 
charged with protecting the health and safety of the 
American people. Their rationale: a few must suffer for 
the good of the many. That simple. The mechanism by which 
they carried out their duties in perpetuating the nuclear 
testing program: control of the production and flow of 
information. 
John Gaventa , in "The Powerful , the Powerlessness and 
the Experts: Struggles in an Information Age" (1985) notes 
that our society has changed from an industrial society to a 
post-industrial society based on information. Where , in an 
industrial society , power was based in the hands of those 
who owned , as Marx coined it , "the means of production , "  
power in the post-industrial society is based in the hands 
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of the people who control the flow, production and 
dissemination of "official" knowledge. 1 
Gaventa rightly points out that the primary mechanism of 
the power of knowledge is the ability and practice of 
withholding information from those who want it by those who 
have it. 
Withholding of knowledge by those who control it may 
take blatant forms- -secrecy, lying, evasion. But 
there are more subtle forms of knowledge control. 
Professionalizing knowledge, making it available only 
in obscure journals, or portrayed in obscure 
language--all serve the same purpose of keeping it 
from those those interests may be affected by it. In 
a system already affected by inequalities in the 
communication and production of knowledge, the 
knowledge elite are the gatekeepers, further 
controlling the dissemination of information, and thus 
the emergence of certain issues and conflicts 
altogether (Gaventa, 1985: page 18) . 
When only experts have the knowledge necessary to 
decide the critical aspects of a particular public program 
(such as the nuclear question) in a controversial situation, 
it simply reduces down to which experts one wishes to 
believe, the established or the opposing experts. The 
1Gaventa's research makes a sharp break with the vast 
majority of scholarly research in both the fields sociology 
and political science. Gaventa points out that research by 
experts is generally a one-way street where knowledge of and 
about the powerless is conferred to the powerful. He is 
openly critical of the present state of sociology: 
" Sociology has worked to create and increase the unequal 
distribution of knowledge. It has worked to make the power 
structure relatively more powerful and knowledgeable, and 
thereby to make the subject population more impotent and 
ignorant. " (Gaventa, 1985: pp. 14-15. ) 
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Atomic Energy Commission used all the tactics mentioned 
above to keep an iron grip on controlling public opinion on 
the issue of nuclear testing in the 1950's. Virtually all 
of the funding for radiobiological research passed through 
the AEC. As Dr. Caster's and many other ' s  experiences 
demonstrated, when research findings proved contrary to the 
AEC doctrines, one could expect his research grants to be 
abruptly cancelled. In the small professional circles of 
radiobiology, epidemiology and other radiation related 
areas, word quickly spread of the experiences of Caster, 
Knapp, Gofman, Tamplin, Morgan, Mancusso and others. Those 
without a firmly grounded set of ethical principles, who 
were wedded to the idea of financial security, thought twice 
or even three times before publishing material that would 
meet the disapproval of the Atomic Energy Commission. 
Continuing on the control of information, as Gaventa 
rightly notes, control of an issue is maintained when the 
language is deliberately kept obscured, or printed in 
obscure professional journals. For an example of this, one 
need only go to the 4, 000 pages of testimony and articles 
submitted by the Atomic Energy Commission to the Joint 
Committee on Atomic Energy. Much of the material is so 
recondite as to be nearly unintelligible, certainly not 
written for consumption by the legislators or the general 
public. Rather, it was written to give an air of expertise. 
The general attitude displayed in the testimony: "The 
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issues are very complex, but reasonable policy can be 
established on scientific grounds ; if you can follow our 
technical analysis, you will agree that our conclusions are 
reasonable." Many of the question/answer sessions in the 
testimony bring out the evasiveness and heightened abilities 
of the AEC scientists to obsfucate an issue when asked a 
direct question. Often the answers would become so 
circuitous as to be meaningless. But, given the loquacity 
of the scientists, and the sheer volume of material 
presented to Congress, the legislators were forced to the 
conclusion that the AEC had provided them with the "truth, " 
despite the uneasy feeling of some that they were not being 
dealt with squarely, as the exchanges between the AEC and 
Senator Clinton Anderson demonstrate. 
Only through the near absolute control of the 
interpretation of knowledge did the AEC have the ability to 
influence public opinion so radically on the issue of 
fallout in the 1950 ' s. Uranium prospectors ' geiger counters 
in Nevada would go off scale as fallout clouds passed over 
head. The AEC said "no problem." Thousands of sheep were 
killed in Utah following the shots passing over in 1953 that 
were called "Nancy" and "Dirty Harry.11 2 Despite one AEC 
2see Fuller (1985) for an action-packed journalistic 
account of the trials and tribulations of the Utah sheep 
(Footnote Continued) 
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livestock inspector ' s  conclusion that the sheep were "hotter 
than a two dollar pistol" after passing his geiger counter 
over their wool, the AEC was effectively able to divert the 
cause of death to "range mismanagement" and "malnutrition." 
Five years later, the same AEC officials involved in the 
Utah case, Allaire and Dunning, would suggest the same 
reason for Sauter ' s  dead sheep. 
By having a monopoly on the control of interpretation, 
then, in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, 
the AEC could effectively lie when all other tactics failed. 
They could get away with it for a number of reasons. First, 
there was no outside agency monitoring the actions of the 
AEC (except for the JCAE, which was impotent in their duty 
as watchdog). Sauter might have been able to find an 
"expert" to further his cause. Being a rural uneducated 
farmer in the backwoods of western Minnesota it is not 
surprising that he found none. But for every expert he might 
find that would publically support his contention of 
radiation injury, the AEC could muster 20-30 experts to not 
only refute the lone expert ' s  position, but to publically 
ridicule him as well. Gaventa aptly notes that in a society 
where people don ' t  question the expert, "the greatest power 
(Footnote Continued) 
farmers. The book so disturbed Dr. Dunning that he wrote a 
35 -page rebuttal to the book that was circulated within the 
American Health Physics Society. 
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of the monopoly of knowledge is the power to engineer its 
own consent" (Gaventa, 1985: 24). 
Tom Cochran accurately summed up the problem in his 
ariticle "Secrecy and Nuclear Power, " 
The federal government has repeatedly abused its 
classification authority to deflect public concern, 
minimize nuclear fears and avoid embarrassments and 
debate. To my knowledge, no public official has ever 
been punished for these abuses. Instead, some of 
those most responsible receive commendations and 
promotions for their valuable public service. And 
those who have sounded the alarm-- the whistle 
blowers--where their identity is known, have been 
rewarded with poor performance evaluations and removed 
from their jobs (Cochran, 198 1: 37). 
Problems/Solutions 
Given that I have spent over 150 pages pointing out a 
serious problem in the byproducts of the creation of the 
nuclear age, I would be remiss in not pointing out a few 
solutions to the problem. Mortin Halperin, former assistant 
secretary of defense, and a key figure in the Pentagon 
Papers controversy states quite clearly the first change 
that must take place before any hope of rectifying the 
problem is possible: 
If we are to have less secrecy we need to change the 
rules of the game, to take away from Presidents and 
bureaucrats the unfettered authority that they now 
have to determine what should be kept secret in the 
interests of national security. We need in short, 
laws that will require more disclosure and greater 
respect for First Amendment values (Halperin and 
Hoffman, 1977: 4) . 
How does one change the law, especially on an issue 
that calls for a radical curtailment of power in the hands 
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of officials long used to such power. Certainly , they will 
not relinquish it readily. Wilson and Rachal note: 
A government agency operates in a milieu of 
politically supervised autonomy. All organizations 
value autonomy and strive to reduce threats to it. 
There is no businessman who would not prefer less 
competition to more , certain markets to uncertains 
ones , and guaranteed revenues to contingent ones. 
Given half a chance , a firm will try to acquire as 
much of a monopoly position as it can. But government 
agencies share in the authoritative power of the 
state , which preempts all rivals and establishes a 
monopoly position itself (cited in Ermann and Lundman , 
1978: 316-317). 
The AEC was firmly in control of this issue when the 
reins of power passed to the ERDA in 1973 (which was later 
abolished. In the separation of powers , the Department of 
Energy was charged with the production and testing of 
nuclear weapons components , the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission was charged with the regulation of the nuclear 
power industry in America). Efforts to bring outside 
intervention into the processes of decisionmaking concerning 
health and safety issues , recognition or compensation for 
radiation inj uries related to AEC/DOE Activities have failed 
miserably (e.g. , the Glenn/Wirth Radiation Reorganization 
Act failed even to come to the floor for a vote). 
Howard Ball , (1986: 201-02) sees the only solution as 
court action. 
The picture is a bleak one when one reviews recent 
compensatory legislation for the downwinders. Since 
1979 , it has languished in the legislature , 
unsupported by legislators and roundly attacked by 
White House bureaucrats who have periodically visited 
the Capital to lobby against the Kennedy and Hatch 
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proposals. While there was a slight chance of adding 
an amendment to the Marshall Islands Compact of 1984 
to create a trust fund for the American downwinders, 
the legislative picture is generally discouraging for 
the survivors. It is especially poignant that a 
national dilemma has been turned into a local one, 
perceived by legislators as Hatch ' s  'pork-barrel ' bill 
for a few Mormons who live in southern Utah. 
The Reagan White House, committed to reducing 
nonessential, government financial support in the 
domestic arena, has completely opposed any kind of 
legislation that would provide taxpayer funds for 
persons injured by negligent governmental activities 
in the past. Reaganomics is based on reducing 
entitlement programs, and the Reagan personnel see a 
compensation bill as a type of entitlement that would 
commit the federal government to an expenditure of 
untold billions of dollars to these and other victims 
of the government's lack of due care. Consequently, 
it has made every effort to kill the legislative 
effort and has been unwilling to discuss a settlement 
with the plaintiffs' attorneys in the Allen litigation. 
The downwinders ' best and probably only hope for 
the foreseeable future, therefore, is the judicial 
remedy. Despite the very nature of the federal 
judicial system, with its lengthy time delays and 
prohibitive costs, the plaintiffs have the ability, 
at least in federal court, to mount a substantive 
challenge to governmental negligence--within the 
limits of the existing law. Until the political 
branches reevaluate the complexities of the 
downwinders' problem and develop a public 
policy that addresses society ' s  responsibility to 
react to governmental wrongs committed against its 
citizens, the only remedy is the one found in the 
federal district courts (Ball, 1986: 202). 
Although the book is less than a year old, Ball's 
solution is already sadly outdated. The judicial remedy 
that Ball . counted so heavily was the class action suit of 
Allen, et al. Vs USA. Judge Bruce Jenkins heard before his 
court a handful of the plaintiff's cases from the more than 
1100 downwinders represented by Stewart Udall. After 
hearing months of testimony from both sides, reviewing over 
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7, 000 pages of documentation, Judge Jenkins recessed. He 
then spent over 14 months in preparing his memorandum 
opinion. His was a landmark decision. He broke with past 
judicial rulings and found that the government had been 
negligent in its duty to warn and adequately protect the 
lives of the people downwind from the nuclear tests. He 
found exception to the discretionary clause of the federal 
torts claims act that holds the government immune from 
prosecution. His logic was that the stated policy of the 
government at the time was to protect the health and safety 
of the American public from deleterious effects of weapons 
testing. Jenkins noted there was a breakdown at the 
operational level, specifically the field managers failed to 
provide the protection and adequate warnings needed to 
protect the public. He awarded the plaintiffs $2. 3 million, 
opening the way for the other 1000+ cases to be heard. The 
case was settled in 1984. As a ruling of the court, it 
provides not only some of the most elegant demonstrations of 
the use of logic, but it is also one of the most 
comprehensive and thoroughly well written treatises on the 
weapons testing/radiation exposure issue. 3 
3The document most frequently cited in the ruling (over 
35 times by my count) is Dr. John Gofman's Radiation and 
Human Health. Dr. Gofman is probably the most well-known 
critic of America's nuclear power program. A former 
(Footnote Continued) 
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The Allen decision was appealed by the government 
attorneys from the Justice Department and the Department of 
Energy's General Counsel's civil Litigation Branch. The hope 
that Ball and so many other attached to the Allen decision 
were dashed to the rocks in April, 1987 ago when the Federal 
District Court overturned Jenkins decision finding that the 
government had sovereign immunity in such cases. 
The decision will be appealed to the Supreme Court, but 
it is unlikely that the appeals court decision will be 
overturned. In this, as in many other radiation injury 
cases, the government has spent several fold over what it 
would cost to settle so as to avoid setting a "bad" 
precedent. 
My reading of Gaventa (1985) would suggest another 
solution the problem. The legislative or the judicial 
strategies, in which experts are pitted against other 
experts, duking it out on behalf of their constituencies is 
simply a perpetuation of the existing problem, the problem 
of the control of knowledge being in the hands of the few, 
rather in the minds of the many. Gaventa would advocate a 
shift in that control of knowledge to the powerless. He 
(Footnote Continued) 
assistant director of Lawrence Livermore Labs, his funding 
was abruptly cancelled after a critical report from him and 
his colleagues showed expected increases in cancer from 
normal routine releases of radiation from nuclear power 
plants. (See Gofman and Tamplin, Poisoned Power.) 
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points out the many problems attendant to the shifting of 
the power of control and production of knowledge to the 
powerlessness. In a majority of instances where outside 
researchers come in and work with disenfranchised groups, 
the skills, knowledge, and resources that the researcher 
brought with him, often leave when the researcher decides to 
move on to greener pastures. Gaventa (1985: 33) stresses 
that the loop of dominance/subordination between the 
researcher and the powerless group must be broken. 
Ideally there is some accountability between 
researcher and researched: the researcher begins with 
questions that the powerless group has posed, the 
information is provided back to them in a usable and 
understandable form. 
He goes on say that the real power of a researcher is 
not so much to provide the group with information so much as 
it is to provide the powerless with the skills to produce 
their own information, thus making the researcher's presence 
no longer necessary. Gaventa cites Oleiveras on the problem: 
The group must gain control of the research process, 
meaning that they have succeeded in appropriating to 
themselves the knowledge and science which the 
researcher brought. Acquisition by the group of 
methodological tools which were once the monopoly of 
the researcher, prevent the repetition of the 
dependence relationship' ... (Oleivera cited in 
Gaventa, 1985: 34). 
The difficulty with Gaventa's solution to the problems 
outlined in this thesis is that, in Minnesota at least, 
there is no clearly definable group which might go through 
the empowerment process that Gaventa advocates. Gaventa's 
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approach of empowerment using participatory research works 
best when there are specific groups of people (such as 
families adjacent to strip mines, or workers in an unhealthy 
workplace, etc) with a common and somewhat easily defined 
common problem. 
With fallout from radiation, even if the person 
received a dose well exceeding maximum permissible standards 
and died within a few years of known radiation related 
disease or syndrome, proving causality is next to 
impossible. To further compound the problem, in fallout 
cases over great distances, the number of people affected 
might be only 1 in a thousand, ten thousand or a hundred 
thousand. There may be only a few here, and a few there. 
Yet, the damage may be quite severe when the number of 
people, over the years, and across the country are all added 
together. Gilbert Geis (cited in Ermann and Lundman, 1978: 
285) wrote on this very problem. Geis credits C. Wright 
Mills for posing a most eloquent statement of the problem. 
The first prerequisite for imposing heavier 
sanctions on corporate criminals involves the 
development of a deepening sense of moral outrage on 
the part of the public. A number of factors have 
restricted public awareness of the depth and cost of 
white collar crime. That the injuries caused by most 
corporate violations are highly diffused, falling 
almost imperceptibly upon each of a great number of 
widely scattered victims is undoubtedly the greatest 
barrier to arousing public concern over white-collar 
crime. 'It is better, so the image runs' C. Wright 
Mills once wrote, ' to take one dime from each of ten 
million people at the point of a corporation than 
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$100, 000 from each of ten banks at the point of a 
gun.' Then Mills added with wisdom: 'It is also 
safer' (Mills, 1956: 95). 
Analogously, public outrage is diffused, sanctions are 
limited, and government crime is safe when victims are 
scattered. 
Postscript 
When I began this work, I was convinced that the only 
way to seek a solution to the problem was through Congress. 
An individual or group would be stymied in any attempts to 
gain access to the needed information on other cases, 
because of the privacy act and the national security 
restrictions. A congressional oversight committee has the 
power to override both. My solution, turning to a 
Congressional subcommittee turned out to be a mistake. 
After this thesis is "put to bed, " the work on the 
Minnesota case will continue. Rather than seeking an 
experts solution to the problem, however, a few things will 
be turned upside down. After a March, 1987 trip to 
Minnesota, a number of radio, newspapers and at least one TV 
station reported on my findings. I had asked that people 
ask their representative Gerry Sikorski (D-MN) to meet with 
me on the issue. He has invited me to DC, where to inform 
him of my research. Given that Congress has failed to 
effectively regulate the actions of the agency and its 
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predessors for the past years, it is more likely they will 
continue to be part of the problem rather than part of the 
solution. 
After that trip, I will be going back up to Minnesota 
to work with the Minnesota Public Interest Research Group on 
the issue. Several people have called in to the radio 
stations, newspapers, and MPIRG with their own stories of 
strange happenings that coincided with the nuclear weapons 
tests. Some people in the far western part of the state 
want to know if the unexplained clusters of rare cancers in 
their areas might be connected to radiation. I will be 
going back up to Minnesota to help set up participatory 
research groups, and begin the process shifting knowledge 
from the experts to the people in rural western Minnesota. 
Because of the magnitude of the problem posed by 
radioactive fallout and the concomitant suppression of 
information spanning over 30 years, any "solution" such as 
just compensation for the victims, will come neither easily 
nor quickly. The solution will certainly be of no use to 
those who have already died from fallout's ill effects. The 
solution may not even come in time for the immediate 
survivors to reap from its benefits. But if people learn 
the truth, and learn the truth in such a way that their own 
lives are enriched and empowered by the participatory 
research methods outlined in Gaventa's "Knowledge Struggles 
1 6 9  
in an Information Age, " then something will have been gained 
from all this. If, out of this tragedy, some people at 
least recognize it for what it is, a case of governmental 
homicide in the name of national security and a case of 
criminal bureaucratic cover-up in the name of scientific 
expertise, perhaps such abuses will be limited in the 
future. 
Governmental homicide is an extreme example of raw, 
first dimensional power. It is mystified by the exercise of 
second dimensional power, the ability of government to 
stifle protest by keeping grievances off the agenda. 
Classification of information, the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity, and criminal withholding of information are 
examples of such power. If power is to be gained by common 
citizens, they must gain the power to set agendas. But such 
power is mystified further yet by a third dimension of 
power, deference to legitimate authority and expertise. 
Only when common citizens learn to break omniscient 
deference to experts will they begin to increase their 
ability to create public issues and thereby mobilize publics 
to action. If the hegemony of expertise is to be broken, 
common people must come to recognize the legitimacy of their 
own "local" knowledge. 
a long road to travel. 
The raising of such consciousness is 
My desire is that this research will 
draw people in Minnesota and elsewhere across the country a 
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LOSSES CA U S E D  aT ACCIDENT 011 INCIDE NT 
A B OVE DESC:1119£D. 
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CLlIH 
Th!s tl&.l;J ror as,erteJ d:uui;e fl-� ra.ll out noted on my Red Clo·,er June �8, l9S7 
1.n .ro:-:n or ccp:ocr rr-d er ru=t c::ilor.:iti::n on t op side or le.ve:oi &."ld 10::e or t� 
clovor tc-;:,:i turned ov�r L"ld SO.."'le ru::ty loc}:ini holos were t..'lrou�h the leiives. 
Tho dcp::i�it v:u (taken from rush color.:itien and turn--:i,cr cf!ect o! clover) 
r.orc rlcn::o on :;outl-.crly lcndin& alop�, &."le! also in l,.nd 't-11.:!.r. or ra.·.�e area::. 
The usub.l lst ci;ttio� \."ll,.l; taJ;cn orr for h:?y llbout Jul:,· Lth and fed on a raticn 
ba:;is o! L to 6 bales per d.:iy to 1:Jic atnek ewes be&ir.n!.nl! about Dcet."lbe:- l, 1957, 
i.o About 6o aniltals . They were &lso reeeivin& about I. to 6 bales o! l:t and 
:'r.:i cut.tine al.!.:u!a dw-in, th!. s  ti::e p::r c!a.j'. Eiccept fc,r rceurrcnc:es 0! hut 
rcrio.S io :10111e 0! =Y best �, in::ludinc S o! the l5S7 he.V}· wci.ht eve l�t-s 
ar.d \.'ith a tot� o! .3 proi:d.nent 1C&Sters. No other ill &!feet w.s noted until 
a!t.er the SP.ed crop {nur ba.rrP.n) c:lc,ver '\.�S entered into the feed r:ition about 
Y.�c:h 1st to 15th - 2 cues or tei=:por:iry p:ir�•sis occ:ured a;,;i::r�tly 1ti!.!'er.ine tha 
forcleis (joints ) et.tirels • .  One o\mce 0! lir.e 1o � our,ccs -i.a.ter d:-tneh -wu eiv�n, 
tJ:e t'\.-es surviTed and both birthed pri:cat1lu dend and near ceac! le::-.�:: a re-.: cays 
lntcr, in one case , and about 2 \.-eebl lat.er in the ot.l":er c�e. The clOYer 
fcei!inc \.-U discontinued a.t th:.a oecur:.r.ce end other !ud �eh&sed.. · 
J!istcry, rii.nch oper:itional since l9$'l on these. land:J. Lu:binc pa:a.1)·�, � not-
, ; ::�c-:d • .A. field o! the entire �...11:ar 'bt:ets, 2 ae2·e::, civen av-er to the �u 
;. .:-ep:ir:itory to breeding in the !ell o! 1 S7. Ho\lenr the tree petri.ric .. tion u 
nov !e>und creater ar.d less, denotes the ccx:ntour 'beet field -..-:i:: ili tho �order a.t 
lu::t o! tM fall-out atre:id or  felt. The e.rly 'brecciini, pen 'bred a.r.d to  sehe;t 
sire, '-'..S ta.ken up di;rini; the but fora(:i!'-C period, a pro.en hich :ase�i sex 
throw �::t<.:r !or 2 year:; previous, an:! a e>r-.c 0! the sr:c � d.:live:-cc only no?T.;u 
J11ale out o! the !ir::t l4 lar.i'bs born. A tctal o! 3 =lcs were bi!"'t.t,cd, both other 
1'1:\les ver� di::b birth a.nd were one or t,.rin la.':lbs c,d per:i..!'hed 1r. :i-x:r.s 'by t..�i> c!u�. 
T"nc::e were nomal brc�dinC md not 11::in:le er interbred . Appc-1.r!tly t�.c trend 0! 
r.,.le sex dellve-:-y ilr.;,rc--r-cd a.rte:- lic:,vei.1bc:- 10 to t:ov�bcr 1.5" b:-ccdir-= :::l,ed�e. 
1:ca:-ly 1111 sir.:;le birth:: sired bc:�ore liovc:nbc:r 10th 1:c2·e P!fe lG.':lbs �d 3 sires 
r c:;:rcsc:ntcd in 'brceoir,e reduction from t'-"in to 1in1:lc l.K-:bs is aonre, an:1 ill 
S-1 bo:it. stt,ck, both }for:;,shire ..-id Cclt..-::ir.n a. total o! 95 l.&."lcS ar.d 80 e,:e s:.h!.'c!�e 
a:; co:-:p:ircd to l.LCJ on this �ch priviol!!l opcrAt.:icm or 25 � lo:::: in red\;cticn. 
�hcrcfc:-e continu.,.nee o! clll!l:i in pa.rt through l9S8 : 
(1) l�;e clever acorch noted Ml\1" 2eth. 
{ ? )  l��C corn burt2 noted J\:ne 9th, rcfcnnee loccl. agr-�c-ul.t-cr..l .field i:ia.n, l0ur,l.: Co.,  r• · 
0 )  Ti:Lcr �r.e C&Jmot be fully- use::scd at. this cat�. 
(L)  Per::enit.l l:llic!t-r,ti!'itd eyes and ha.nds b= 0! .April 211 1950, ha::d:.inl 11.-:ha.:;e, 
eye:: net ewer it. • -
. l9S7 Llr.ib Los:: Schcdlllo 
�l:c first llUl!b losses oeci:n-ed ab-,ut Sey-,t. l, 1957 . T\.--o were !'o-mld dc:id lyir.j; -c;,ri�ht 
•t foot of sl0re and un:1er grove, or cal: an:i a::h trees in lDt S, Sec. 17 or "t:l!f 
r:-o;:crt.ic:s in this I cet.or only 'bll:c (;?'�:s ar.d shed.;.in� tree lc�e!l and J:'(!t,rificd 
,,e:d azid no approach to -..-ater. They •�oared to have c!j ed slcc;n.nc. Thi: �a., 
!cllc-.'t'd :ibout !.cpt • .3,  l !o-.::r 7ear old H ... �:-.hire cvt: ne:.r the s:..--r.e a.ren 11:ld 
�-v:l:,sls  !'c.rolci:,:s and shoulccrs noted about 5 :CO P.1i. and li ea� :it 8 : C-0 P.l!. . LL."lb 
h:isc::; 1r,erc:i:od to 6 !our.c! about .Sept. l5 near watering and re::tinc st.:itior.$ L"1d 
•• -iu n U?M cht, 111u:zl�!: :resting on ground, ,p;:,:irii.n"l.ly �r.d slc:c:p:..n;. A. fe\f CU el 
.., •. r .. nnt�d, Slldd�n de.th follow:1.ng t.6.lcinc "'atcr at :in inland -i.-at.cring sutior, &."ld 
•. ".!:, :t.:ition, untrentc,d, ,r..th l.:lJ::inc ;:ro!.'c::s 'but pct.ri:ie:! r.!:iplc trees and o:ik 
r ·,h,rhl ovcrt-..anciin, the c!rinJ:j.nr, �:i. Only a re,.: ct.ended case::, thestr dcvelc;,ed 
'-:0�, L.,d shrinr.:ice or rlc::h, r..1!! jo�nu in 111ost. c:i::c:1. llotcd i:o�t, lmc.-c C. htl:k 
�. • cn•l�i:�. also hlp .  A rc:w no �d !lJj rht !roth !r .. � =uth hc�cre de•t.'l, aver::re li.!e 
•-=t • ntJ,-1! cn::c:: tone to three d..--ys. OTllj l c:,::c t.1oo \Ice!::. en� case sur:ivl'!ri 'but ti":� 
"::•.� :-e floor !lcetion o! bl:idtlc,r or un.n:>ll! ra,P on 1� absent. '!'he re[:ion is criecrow; 
a:-.·1 ani l'::\l shru:il-: fr'1m about 80 l't-:, to abvu:. l.O 1:.:: at this da.:.c . II. ::iy b� J:!au.c! at. tl. !s  r�"lch only, �:rovi ::ion pcr:,:it.tcd or ri :tiuncd evic!cnce, ope:-i.ticm:.l 19�6 =:r.hcd\lle. 
�ai.�cr, Jcr J.. 
�--C'\"�., .. ,:.,: , r::�•-�ll� Y.� r_�. 
1 8 1  
CLIDl 
. • r . . � :-
ic 
�-:-chued llS ho�d, &Teratc -.:�. SS lbs.  Tucn Sept. 1, l9S7 c..rri&�c ot o-.-n 
r.1 lsrd :i..,:�:h:, , ll2 &\"erai;e wi:t,. 70 lbs . Total CB head loss (b�th vo._"!'IS ) .  T.r.en 
LO head 0-..-:1 l.t.�bs loss, 1chedili A._�ra,e .2� per J>OU."ld .. 1es. Taken !iB he�d 
pw-ch.uc 1�m loss. 
liO head, vit• 70 e .tt 
· 1.8 head, vet,. SS O .22 
$616.00 
e-seo.so 
. . . 
or e 19S7 eve lambs adc!ed to herd, S hud bL"'T�, t.ake:i prc�tion lou 1chec!ule 
or SO% • 2.S lar.ibs anra,e aales a:hcdule t20.00 per head or $So.oo. 
Jlcuorable z::a.:dn= de:ith loss ei - claill loss l.m� t-1101.06. 
ta.�• o::i]Jr, barren, 1.ot&l � $ SO.oo 
Clonr aecd loss, 1L acres, tar.en � production 100 lbs, per acn O .2S 
;>r.r pound, 80;: chimd • $280.00. 
tcr,onsl, unic!e::,tif1ed bUffil o! qu and h&.-.:!.s li:,nl 21, l.958. 
Schedule doctora $6.C.V 
J-:ediciDO " &lasHI $9.60 
£:Jtiute �t tor bzl::Dt 
S c:ul.ons & 7 .oo per •­





T"�"bcr c!�:�:111?e 200 more or hss trur� � as�, 1:hite oak, ha:-d :.&?le, red oal:, 
i:ilver ca?lc and bo:.celder Cll."'.:.ot be � ssessts: at this d•�•• Per1Q� (e7;s ) are 
net in c��?l�ta rQcov�r,- at t�.is date . O;,er&tio�al 19�3 schedule ca:�t be 
assessed at this c!�te, t.here�ore th• :1:lser.. ill t.ha ,ove:n::.ent !or= ar.:1 not to 
ae err,t in !'in�l 1ctth:11ent or �.is c�. 
Sauter, .Joa J.. 
Jlout.e 
1.�,11, Kimluot& 
STATUS V IFIEO UHCUSS1Fl£I) 
. ,n ./.� SEP 9 7� 
John H. um;ibell Date 
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1 James E. Reeves , AssistAnt Man�ger for 
Tes t  Operations , AI.00 
DATIi, October 23 , 1958 
Cordon M. Dunning , Chief, Radiation E ffects of Weapor.1 Branch 
Division of :Biology and Medicine , Washin;ton 
k.t. ;:.D 
- .. 
lmJ]-CT: CLAIM OF JOE A. SAun:R, 'FARWEU., Mil.NESOIA 
I 
S!MSOL: mmzw:CMD -!
 .. !. • .  
This 11 in reply to your memorandum of  September 16 ,  19S8  requesting 
our opinions on the claim of Joe J.. Sauter for radiation damage from 
fallout. 
There is  nothing in our experience of radiation effects that vould 
suggest that fallout, in the amount experienced at Fan:ell ,  Minnesota 
and environs , could have produced the alleged damage a1 described in 
Mr. Joe A. Sauter ' s claim. The external ga=a radiation exposure in 
that area probably has been les1 than 100 milliroentgens 'Wl-.ich would 
not produce any obsen•able effects on humans , Fl•nt1 , or animals • 
• The amount of  radioactive fAllout material that would produce this 
external ga=a exposure could also produce external and int•rnal bet& 
exposure. However , these potentiAl beta doses do not change OUT 
overall evaluation of the damage ha:ard. The potential beta doses 
WO"Jld be most  pronounced in plant life and might be 1: the order of  
- tens of rads to  the plant ti11ues in the Farvell ,  Minnesota area. 
Experimental and field data collected at 1uch placect" a1 :Brookhaven 
and Oak Rid6e 1how that uceedingly higher racliation d�ses than these 
are required to produce observable effects in planta. 
I t  11 correct that there is �onsiderable information that is not know 
on radiation effects , especially for low level chronic a:cpcsures . It 
i1 possible for � claic.ant to raise these question, as they did in the 
sheep trial in Utah. This aspect ,  I believe , can be handled by •�ert 
tes timony as was done for the 1beep case. Bovaver, if the Sauter claim 
does come to court you probably vill need more 111onitoring data than 
now exist• , e specially in li&ht of the radioc.hemi�l analyses made by 
HASL ou selected S&lllplu from the Farwell, Mimiesot& araa. ,' 
cc: J>T. Dunham 
Dr. Shilling 
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APPENDIX C .  
CANCER RATES 
CANCER I N  DOUGLAS COUNTY AND STATE OF M I NNESOTA < F'ER 1 00 , 000 ) 
1 950-59 1 960-69 1 970-79 
THYRO I D  CANCER 
Doug l as Mal e o . o 0 . 6 1 . 1 ( h i gh )  
M i n n . Ma l e  0 . 4 0 . 5  0 . 3 
MAL I GNANT MELANOMA 
DoL1g l as Mal e 2 . 4 1 .  4 .;;. .. .  �. 
Mi n n . Ma l e  1 . 0  1 . 3  1 .  9 
Doug l as Femal e 1 . 8  3 .  o 1 .  4 
M i nn . Fema l e  0 . 9  1 . 1 1 . 2  
EYE CANCER ( n o known CaL1Se ) 
Doug l as Ma l e  0 . 8 1 . 4  0 . 0 
Mi nn . Mal e 0 . 3 0 .  3 0 . 3 
Doug l as Fema l e  3 .  1 0 . 0 o. o 
M i n n .  Fema l e 0 . 3 0 . 2 o .  1 
LYMF'HOSARCOMA 
Doug l as Mal e .., .., ... . ... 6 . 0 6 . 3 
M i nn .  Ma l e  4 . 3 6 .  1 6 . 6 
Doug l as Fema l e 0. 7 3 . 7 6 . 4 
M i nn . Fema l e 0 . 3 4 . 6 4 . 8 
MULT I PLE MYELOMA 
DoLtg l as Mal e 0 . 7 2 . 6 4 . 5 
Mi nn . Mal e 2 .  1 2 . 8 3 . 3 
Doug l as Femal e 3 . 0 1 .  7 3 . 9 
M i n n . Fema l e  1 .  3 1 . 7  2 .  1 
LEUKEM I A  
Doug l as Femal e 7 . 5 8 . 0 6 . 2  
M i n n .  Fema l e  6 . 8 6 . 6 5 . 6  
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L I VER AND GALLBLADDER 
DoLtg l as Mal e  1 . 5  0 . 8 7 .  1 
Mi nn . Ma l e  3 .  1 3 . 6 4 . 2 
DoLtg l as Fema l e  5 .  1 5 . 4 4 . 8 
M i n n .  Fema l e  5 . 4 4 . 8  4 .  1 
BONE , i nc l ud i ng J aw c: anc: er-
DoLtg l as Ma l e  0 . 8 1 . 3  1 . 4  
Mi n n .  Mal e 1 .  5 0 . 8 0 . 9 
Doug l as Fema l e  2 .  1 2 . 6 0 .  (> 
Mi n n .  Fema l e 1 . 0  0 . 7 0 . 6 
ALL CANCERS COMB I NED 
Doug l as Mal e 1 52 . 0 1 60 . 3  1 65 . 0  
Mi nn .  Mal e  1 65 . 3 1 75 . (l 1 82 . 4 
Doug l as Fema l e  1 50 .  1 1 35 . 6  1 1 6 . 0 
M i n n . Fema l e  1 39 . 6 1 29 . 7 1 24 . 6  
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APPENDIX D. 
CAST OF CHARACTERS 
CAST OF CHARACTERS 
Joe A. Sauter - sheep farmer who claimed that he, his sheep, 
and his hay crops were damaged by radiation (fallout) 
Mary Lou Sauter Young and John Sauter - children of Joe A. 
Sauter and wife, Rose 
Joe Sauter - nephew and namesake, spent more time with 
Sauter than anyone 
William Sauter - nephew 
William W. Allaire - Director, Nevada Operations Division, 
ALOO 
Gordon M. Dunning - Chief, Radiation Effects of Weapons 
Branch, Division of Biology and Medicine 
James E. Reeves - Assistant Manager Office of Test 
Operations, ALOO 
Fred Driver - Veterinarian in Charge, USDA, St. Paul, MN 
Dr. Alfred Peterson , Leon Fleisher, Jr. , and James E. 
Wentworth - Veterinary Livestock Inspectors 
C. L. Weaver - Radiological Safety Officer, , ALOO 
Roscoe H. Goeke - Radiological Safety Advisor, Office of 
Test Operations 
Dr. Donald R.  Chadwick - Chief, Radiological Health Program, 
Public Health Service (PHS) 
James G.  Terrill , Jr. - Assistant Chief, Radiological 
Division, PHS 
Oliver R. Placak - PHS liaison officer, Las Vegas Branch 
Dr. Robert Letson and Dr. Gordon E. Lee - Sauter's 
physicians 
Brig. Gen. Alfred D. Starbird - Director, Div. of Military 
Applications, AEC 
Lewis Strauss - AEC Commissioner 1946-50, Chairman AEC 
1953-58 
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Kenneth Fields - General Manager , AEC 1955-58 
Charles Dunham - Director , DBM Div. of Military Applications 
John Harley - Chief , Analytical Branch of the Health and 
Safety Laboratory , NYOO 
Richard D .  Elliot - Director of Information , Santa Fe 
Operations Office 
Senator Hubert Humphrey - Senator from Minnesota 
Senator Clinton Anderson - Senator from New Mexico 
Senator Eugene McCarthy - Visscher appealed to McCarthy to 
investigate AEC on fallout studies 
Dr . William o.  Caster - Minnesota scientist involved in 
fallout studies Atomic Energy Development Problems 
W . F. Libby - AEC Commissioner 
John McCone - Commissioner , AEC 1959 
Maurice Visscher - University of Minnesota scientist 
Gov. Orville Freeman - Governor of Minnesota 
Lester Machta - Director , US Weather Special Projects Bureau 
Morse Salisbury - Director , Information Services , AEC 
1958-59 
Dr . Armstrong - University of Minnesota scientist , Dr. 
Caster's superior 
Lee Loevinger - Attorney , represented state of Minnesota 
S .  Allan Lough - Director , HASL , NYOO 
Konni Zilliacus - British Parliament member , called for ban 
on US wheat based on Minnesota findings 
Mrs. J .  Harms - concerned U.S. citizen 
Gen . Herbert B. Loper - Asst. to Secretary of Defense for 
Atomic Energy , accused by Sen. Anderson of withholding 
fallout data 
Rep. Chet Holifield - JCAE member , requested hot spot data 
from AEC 
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Alvin R .  Luedecke - General Manager, AEC 
Eisenbud - scientist 
Kulp - scientist 
Samuel Glasstone - editor, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, 
Washington, DC: AEC, 1958 
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VITA 
Clifford T. Honicker was born in Mobile, Alabama 
on Flag Day in 1958. He was raised in Nashville, TN. 
His mother is the well known nuclear power critic, 
Jeannine Honicker (author of Shutdown; and Honicker 
Vs Hendrie). His father, Dolph Honicker, is the news 
editor of The Tennessean. 
He entered the University of Tennessee in the 
fall of 1976. He worked as a work-study research 
assistant to Dr. Donald Clelland from 1976-1980. His 
studies were fully funded by work-study, need-based, 
and academic scholarships. In June, 1980, he 
received a Bachelor of Arts degree in Sociology. 
He worked for a year as a consultant to an 
organization doing economic conversion research of 
mothballed Department of Energy facilities. In 198 1, 
he entered the master's program in Sociology at the 
University of Tennessee. 
In 1983, he left the University to become 
Director of the non-profit organization, Radiation 
Research Project, based in Knoxville, TN. In 1984, he 
initiated and directed a Congressional investigation 
through the House Energy, Conservation and Power 
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Subcommittee. The thesis "Premediated Deceit: The 
Atomic Energy Commission Against Joseph August 
Sauter, " was a product of his research while employed 
with the Radiation Research Project. 
The author is married to Jacqueline Odessa 
Kittrell Honicker. His two boys are named Myles 
Henry, and Nicholas Beckett Honicker. 
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